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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1648



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## MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

### USE OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN DESCRIBED

Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 22, Nov 81 pp 30-32

[Article by Colonel P. Tarutta: "The Difficult Path of the Afghan Revolution"]

[Text] Long-standing, firm bonds of friendship link the peoples of two neighboring countries, the USSR and Afghanistan. They originated in the terrible year 1919 when both Afghanistan and the young Republic of the Soviets exerted every effort to defend with arms their freedom and independence, their right to build their own lives as they saw fit and not by mandate of foreign conquerors.

In May 1919 in a telegram to V. I. Lenin the leaders of Afghanistan expressed complete trust in the policies of Soviet Russia and mentioned "the urgent need to declare unity and friendship." The reply, signed by V. I. Lenin and M. I. Kalinin, expressed the readiness to exchange embassies immediately.

The moral and material support of Soviet Russia helped the Afghan nation to defend its independence. New equal relations between the USSR and Afghanistan were consolidated in the 1921 Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship.

During the terrible years of the 1940s, while waging a mortal struggle against the Hitlerite aggressors, the Soviet Union again provided assistance to the friendly Afghan people by firmly and resolutely demanding that the Afghan ruling circles put an end to the activity of the pro-Fascist forces attempting to turn Afghanistan and neighboring Iran into a base for Fascist Germany in Central Asia.

In our times, too, Afghanistan--whose people have, as a result of the April 1978 Revolution, taken power into their hands--once again has found itself under the real threat of losing its sovereignty and being turned into an imperialist military bridgehead at the southern frontiers of the USSR. Just as it did 60 years ago, the Soviet Union stretched a helpful hand to the peoples of Afghanistan. In conformance with the 1978 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness, and Cooperation, and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Soviet Union has, in response to repeated requests by the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, dispatched a limited military force to help the Afghan nation. Such a decision was not easy to take, but the party and the Soviet government took it in full awareness of their responsibility in the name of international duty, wishing to aid the Afghan nation which has suffered a brigandish external invasion.

In his comments to a correspondent of PRAVDA Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed: "The time came when we could no longer desist from responding to the request of the government of Afghanistan, a nation friendly to us. To act otherwise would have meant abandoning Afghanistan to the claws of imperialism.... To act otherwise would have meant looking on passively while a focus of grave menace to the safety to the Soviet state was forming on our southern frontier."

Soviet soldier-internationalists came to the aid of the Afghan nation in its struggle for freedom and independence, for the right to peaceful creative labor. Their coming wrought havoc in the plots of Afghanistan's enemies. On the pages of pro-imperialist press streams of lies and slanders concerning the Afghan Revolution and the Soviet Union began to flow with renewed force and ingenuity.

The very first steps taken by Soviet troops on Afghanistan land refuted the lies heaped up by Washington and Beijing. Under the difficult conditions of a severe and snowy winter and a mountainous terrain to which most Soviet troops were unaccustomed, they started their difficult service with honor and dignity, giving due consideration to the customs and mores of the population and providing all possible assistance to the Afghan people.

How far it all is from the picture of an "aggressor" who came to "subjugate" Afghanistan, as drawn daily and hourly by the imperialists with all the means of ideological indoctrination at their disposal. And the simple Afghans, workers and peasants, for the most part illiterate people who had their minds crammed with various fabrications about the Soviet people, understood in their hearts that friends had come to their aid. And they reached out to their friends [confiding in them] their worries and problems but mainly [displaying] a tremendous thirst to learn as much as possible about our country, how our people live, and about the Soviet Army. Everything interests them. Soviet privates and officers willingly devote every moment they can spare from their duties and training, to talk about themselves, about their villages, cities, plants, klokhazes, about the new happy life, about the abundance in everyone's home, about the friendship and mutual assistance of the Soviet peoples. And they do not just talk but demonstrate by their entire behavior, self-sacrificing spirit, simplicity, accessibility, good relations within the military collectives as well as between servicemen and commissioned personnel (the latter until then unwitnessed by Afghans), and by their deep understanding of their military and international duty to aid and to share all they have with a friend--that they are representatives of a new world, citizens of a communism-building country.

This elicits from the enemies of new Afghanistan special hatred in that they, not without reason, perceive in this the main danger to themselves--the danger of losing influence with the masses. This also is the reason for the extreme cruelty which the gangs dispatched into Afghanistan have been showing in their dealings with the native population.

But the efforts of reaction, both external and internal, are in vain. They cannot smother the Afghan Revolution or overcome the friendship between the peoples of our countries because this friendship has withstood the test of time and has been cemented by the common aims of the Afghan and Soviet troops--aims of assuring the inviolability of the sovereign frontiers of Afghanistan, thereby preserving the mutual security of both our countries and peoples. For the sake of these aims

Afghan and Soviet patriots often take risks in the spirit of self-sacrifice. For the sake of these aims Soviet troops of the limited military contingent perform their difficult service on the land of friendly Afghanistan: persistently improving their combat and political training, they stand watch, assuring uninterrupted shipments for new construction sites and to supply the population; together with the people's militia, they protect industrial facilities and other important objects against attack by saboteurs sent in from abroad. In performing all these duties, Soviet troops display heroism and bravery.

In their leisure hours Soviet troops take an active part in voluntary-labor Saturdays; they assist peasants in planting and harvesting and aid in the event of natural disasters, in rebuilding schools, hospitals, and roads destroyed by the bandits. Soviet troops have close links with Afghan enterprises, educational institutions, and cooperatives, where they always are welcome guests. Soviet army medics enjoy broad popularity and fame, especially in the villages. Tens and hundreds of people swarm around individual physicians, seeking skilled assistance, advice, consultation, or essential drugs.

But the bonds between Soviet and Afghan troops are especially strong: combined exercises, seminars, gatherings, exchanges of experience. Together they take part in combat exercises, festivities, and sports contests. The friendship between the armies of the two neighbor countries is growing during both military work and moments of leisure; and along with it the troops improve their combat skills and combat preparedness and become more resolute in doing everything to safeguard the peaceful labor of their nations and the security of the sacred frontiers of their countries.

Vain are the hopes of the enemies of Democratic Afghanistan--of the imperialists, Beijing hegemonists, and their stooges. They will not succeed in disrupting the friendship between our nations and the friendship and solidarity of the troops of both armies. They will not succeed in stirring up the workers of Afghanistan against their faithful friend--the Soviet Union.

Similarly condemned to failure are the attempts of the imperialists to find even a tiny crack in the steadfast and brave character of the Soviet soldier-internationalist. Like their grandfathers and fathers, Soviet soldiers of the 1980s sacredly fulfill the behest of the Homeland to be always ready to defend its sacred frontiers and provide international assistance to the peoples of the fraternal countries.

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ARMED FORCES

CONTENTS OF 'KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL', NO 20, 1981

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 81 (signed to press 5 Oct 81) pp 1-2

[Full-text translated articles published in this issue of the JPRS report are indicated with an asterisk (\*). Article indicated with a double asterisk (\*\*) will be published in JPRS 079747 report on Latin America]

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## ARMED FORCES

### PARTY-POLITICAL WORK: IMPROVEMENT METHODS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 81 (signed to press 5 Oct 81) pp 3-9

[Editorial: "Combined Unit Political Section"]

[Text] Army and navy personnel, inspired by the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, are working with enormous political enthusiasm and are endeavoring to gladden our beloved homeland and the party of Lenin with new achievements in combat and political training. They are successfully completing the 1981 training year, which in the Soviet Armed Forces was declared a year of shock-work military labor. Outstanding results were produced by socialist competition under the slogan "For a High Degree of Combat Readiness and Firm Observance of Regulations!" The ranks of excellent-rated individuals in combat and political training in the units and naval ships have grown, the proficiency of personnel and tactical skill of officers have increased, as has the level of preparedness of subunits, units, and warships for action in a complex situation.

A vivid confirmation of this was the "West-81" exercise, which was held on the territory of the Belorussian and Baltic military districts and on the Baltic Sea. In this exercise troops and naval forces persuasively demonstrated a strong fusion of excellent technical equipment, military skill and indomitable morale. The exercise was a test of the combat maturity of the personnel of units and naval ships and became a report by our Armed Forces to the Communist Party and Soviet Government on their readiness to carry out any mission assigned by the homeland pertaining to defense of the socialist achievements of the Soviet people.

Concrete and purposeful party-political work plays an exceptionally important role in achieving success in military labor and in forming excellent moral-political, psychological and fighting qualities in personnel. Party-political work is rightly called a special kind of weapon in our Armed Forces. The party manifests constant and unabating concern for improving the effectiveness of party-political work, the significance of which is increasing immeasurably in the period of expanded building of a Communist society, at the present stage of development of the Armed Forces and, finally, in conditions of the international situation, which has become aggravated at the present time.

The Communist Party exercises its direction of party-political work in the army and navy through political agencies. In all their activities they are guided by the

CPSU Program and Rules, congress resolutions, and decrees of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government. They organize their practical work on the basis of the Statute on Political Agencies of the Soviet Army and Navy, ratified by the CPSU Central Committee in February 1973. It stresses the obligation of political agencies to strengthen the combat power of army and navy with all their work, ensuring daily and undivided party influence on all Armed Forces affairs and activities.

The CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" continues to be of fundamental significance for the activities of political agencies. In January of next year it will be 15 years since its adoption. During this time much has been accomplished to improve the structure of political agencies and party organizations. The party, having established in the Armed Forces a uniform system of party agencies, corresponding to the tasks and forms of Soviet military organizational development, has never presented them in a stiff, inflexible form. It endeavors to ensure that party-political work reflects in full measure the processes and phenomena which characterize the dynamics of the societal relations of developed socialism, the upsurge in the political awareness and general educational level of servicemen, their increased feeling of responsibility for the security of the homeland, and the changes taking place in military affairs. Just as all living things, political agencies continue to be constantly developing in conformity with the spirit and demand of the times; their work is organized in an inseparable link with party affairs and reflects its plans and designs, and its concern for the security of the building of communism.

Combined unit political sections occupy an important position in the well-structured system of Armed Forces political agencies. They are the most numerous supervisory party agencies in the Soviet Armed Forces. Political sections exercise direction of party-political work, organize it directly in the units and naval ships which are components of the combined units, and carry out their activities wherever the bulk of military personnel are performing their military labor, where the tasks of increasing combat readiness, training and indoctrination of personnel, their moral-political and psychological training are being accomplished. Together with party organizations and in a close unity with commanders, combined unit political sections unite personnel behind the Communist Party and Soviet Government and indoctrinate servicemen in a spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism, and willingness to devote all their resources, knowledge and energy to defend the interests of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community.

The resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the mission assigned by the congress to the armed defenders of the homeland, to continue reliably guarding the peaceful, productive labor of the Soviet people, have presently become for political agencies a program of purposeful practical activity and its main content. Points were formulated at the party's highest forum which also form the basis of the work of political agencies -- on enhancement of the party's role in the affairs of society, on the importance of qualitative growth of party ranks, tasks connected with improving methods of leadership, verification of execution, all aspects of intra-party affairs, and demands pertaining to further improvement of ideological and political-indoctrination activity.



Directly organizing and conducting party-political work in combined units, units, and on naval ships, political sections focus this work on successful accomplishment of combat training schedules, alert duty tasks, strengthening of one-man command, military discipline and personnel political-moral condition, and indoctrination of military personnel in a spirit of unswerving observance of standards of Communist morality, the military oath and regulations, precise execution of orders and instructions by commanders and other superiors, in a spirit of high vigilance and continuous combat readiness. Political agencies also focus the attention of primary party organizations on accomplishment of these tasks, making an effort to ensure that they knowledgeably grasp and vigorously influence all aspects of the activities of military collectives, increase demandingness on Communists and secure their vanguard role in service, training, and discipline.

Military activities contain many examples of purposeful, thoughtful work by political agencies in this regard. Take, for example, the political section of the Rogachev Guards Motorized Rifle Division (Imeni BSSR Supreme Soviet). Political workers indoctrinate military cadres in a spirit of party principledness, an implacable attitude toward unnecessary relaxation of demands and simplification in training, and develop in all Communists the endeavor to improve the quality of the training process day by day, to increase their contribution toward the accomplishment of combat training tasks, and to ensure a high level of discipline and organization. Political section officers, headed by its chief, Lt Col Yu. Khvostikov, regularly visit party organizations, look deeply into the activities and training of the personnel of each and every unit, each and every subunit, into the course of socialist competition, promptly warn of deficiencies and errors of omission, and help activists consolidate all new things which have been tested and verified by practical experience. The performance results of the political section officers in the unit are examined at meetings of the party bureau, committees, and sometimes at meetings of party members. Political section officers teach the men how to implement party decisions and directives, orders by command authorities, their own decisions, and help them master methods of a political approach to accomplishment of combat training tasks.

Guided by party congress decisions and CPSU Central Committee decrees on further improving ideological work and party instruction, the political section skillfully organizes Marxist-Leninist training of officers, political training of warrant officers, political instruction classes for enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, propaganda and agitation, and concentrates the efforts of ideological activists in the company and battery, where the success of personnel combat training is determined on a daily basis. The political section and party organizations are concerned with ensuring thorough and integral study of Marxist-Leninist theory, the writings of K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. I. Lenin, the heroic history of our party, the documents of the 26th CPSU Congress, and the works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The political section focuses unabating attention on communicating to each and every serviceman the conclusions of the 26th CPSU Congress on defense matters and on the necessity of increasing vigilance and improving combat proficiency. All this influences in a most direct manner the state of affairs in the subunits, units, and in the combined unit as a whole. The division has for an extended period of time held firmly to high performances in combat training and socialist competition. One out of every third company and battery here is rated excellent. The efforts of all personnel of the guards combined unit resulted in additional success at the

"West-81" army and navy exercise. The Rogachev fighting men performed courageously and smoothly on the main axes of advance and excellently performed their assigned missions.

We repeat: the most important criterion with which one should approach an assessment of the multifaceted activities of political agencies and party organizations is the effectiveness of their work aimed at maintaining continuous combat readiness of troops and naval forces, increasing vigilance of personnel, effectiveness of socialist competition, and strengthening of discipline. Just criticism is leveled at the political agencies of combined units and party organizations of certain units and naval ships, which fail to exert continuous, effective influence on accomplishment of the tasks of combat readiness, fail to show adequate demandingness on Communists, fail to penetrate deep into the state of affairs regarding the level of personnel proficiency, discipline and organization.

Successful accomplishment of the tasks facing combined units, units, and naval ships is directly dependent on the quality and effectiveness of political, military, moral and legal indoctrination of personnel. Therefore forming a scientific, Communist philosophical outlook in army and navy personnel and indoctrinating them in a spirit of total dedication to the cause of the party and its ideals, a high degree of political vigilance and implacability toward bourgeois ideology and morality, which is alien to us, has always been and remains the object of constant concern on the part of commanders, political agencies and party organizations. This work is now being intensively filled with new content and is assuming an increasingly more innovative character. It is grounded on the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, at which the basic problems of ideological work at the contemporary stage were analyzed. Ways to achieve its further improvement are specified in the CPSU Central Committee Decree of 26 April 1979. It is necessary to reorganize many sectors and areas of ideological work. Its contents should be more up-to-date, and its forms should meet people's present needs. It is also necessary to enhance the role of primary party organizations as the political nucleus of military collectives, as a center of daily ideological indoctrination activity, to ensure that each and every Communist is a propagandist and executor of the ideas of the Leninist party.

Persistent embodiment of all party guidelines on ideological matters is becoming particularly important because certain political agencies are not organizing political indoctrination work at the proper level and thus are exerting weak influence on accomplishing the tasks of combat training, strengthening discipline, unifying military collectives, and forming in servicemen a vigorous attitude toward practical realities. Not all political agencies succeeded in ensuring that daily work with the organizers of the training and indoctrination process was in conformity with present-day demands. Some commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists need to be more solidly armed with theoretical knowledge and methodology of organizing propaganda and agitation, and the ability to take into consideration in this work the increased intellectual aspirations of military personnel.

Political agencies are called upon aggressively to promote further growth of professional, political and social activeness on the part of personnel. As we know, socialist competition is a powerful, tested and proven device in this area. Organization and direction of socialist competition is a constant search for forms, methods and techniques of developing the creative initiative of servicemen, most

fully corresponding to the given moment, the nature of the tasks being performed by the combined unit, unit, or naval ship, and the qualitative features of personnel. Increasing party demandingness on those who have a formalistic attitude toward competition, who make a lot of noise about it but fail to back up word with deed will make it possible fully to utilize this tried and proven device for increasing successes in accomplishing the tasks of combat and political training and strengthening its organizational and indoctrinational influence on people.

A most important focus of the work of political agencies is instilling in all personnel conscious military discipline and strengthening one-man command. Working together with commanders, staffs and party organizations, political sections are doing a great deal to indoctrinate command, political and engineer-technician cadres, to teach them the ability to rely in their activities on party and Komsomol organizations, and to involve officers in active participation in indoctrination work. However, demands on maintaining organization and discipline are increasing, as is the importance of follow-through on the part of each and every serviceman. This is why political sections are called upon more deeply to study the facts and phenomena which characterize the actual state of discipline in units and naval ships, and to draw up on this basis proposals aimed at further strengthening observance of regulations. It is important to teach commanders and political workers, especially officers at the regimental and warship level, who are closest to enlisted personnel and noncommissioned officers, the art of deeply analyzing the entire complexity and multiple-level nature of problems connected with man, his consciousness, morality, and psychology, to elucidate the reasons for undisciplined behavior on the part of certain personnel, and to correct these causes. One should not be limited merely to conducting numerous tests and inspections and determining shortcomings. It is necessary to correct deficiencies on the spot, to ensure first and foremost that the leaders proper represent for all personnel a model of flawless performance of their duties.

Party commissions attached to political agencies greatly promote instilling in Communists a high sense of responsibility for the assigned task and securement of exemplary performance by party members in service activities and discipline. Today the range of activities of these commissions is extensive. They are concerned with improving the qualitative composition of party ranks and actively participate in verifying observance of CPSU Rules by party members and probationary members, as well as observance of party and government discipline. Of course things do not boil down merely to punishing those who violate standards of party and military affairs, although this too must be done, intelligently and promptly. It is necessary to help party organizations prevent similar breaches, to teach them to analyze what has taken place, to draft and implement proposals aimed at correcting deficiencies, and to monitor execution of adopted decisions.

The role of primary party organizations, which comprise the foundation of our party, is steadily increasing in the army and the navy, just as throughout the country. They are more and more becoming centers of attraction and unification of the productive forces of the masses, spokesman of their collective will, opinion and aspirations. "A primary role in accomplishing the large and diversified tasks of building communism is played by primary party organizations," the 26th CPSU Congress once again stressed. Our party's Central Committee is maximally activating these components and demands constant attention toward them on the part of local party agencies.



In the Armed Forces primary party organizations are a reliable support of commanders in accomplishing combat training tasks and in carrying out combat and political training plans and strengthening military discipline. Through primary party organizations, with their elaborate network of subunit party organizations and party groups, combined unit political sections exert their influence on all aspects of military life and ensure a vanguard role for Communists and a high degree of responsibility by Communists for quality of the training process, training and indoctrination of personnel. Political sections work persistently to develop active-ness and initiative on the part of party organizations and display constant concern for improving their work forms and methods. These positive processes, however, are not yet taking place everywhere without delays and hindrances. Unfortunately some political agencies are still slow about reorganizing their work in light of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress. Some of them do not yet adequately take account of the specific features of the various party organizations and fail to concentrate attention on the main elements in their activities. Sometimes they ignore important matters pertaining to combat training, strengthening of discipline and indoctrination of personnel, and do not always evaluate in a principled manner facts of unnecessary situation simplification and lack of originality at exercises and training drills. Not all political agencies promptly respond to errors of omission in ideological work by party organizations, while some of them at times are complacent about the fact that there are party members who themselves are lagging in training and who violate military discipline, which greatly weakens their influence on the entire military collective.

Many of these shortcomings, for example are characteristic of the political agency of which officer A. Tkachenko is an official. His people do a shallow job of analysis, have poor knowledge of the state of affairs in the party organizations of the units and subunits, rarely visit them, and rarely attend meetings of party committees and bureaus. Party organizations of lagging military collectives have essentially been ignored by the political agency. Some of them have failed to show proper initiative and have become reconciled to shortcomings. As a result the party influence of these organizations on the daily life and training of personnel has appreciably weakened, and there are subunits which have failed to reach the performance level specified in socialist competition for the current training year. Obviously the political section should delve more deeply into the situation locally and, on the basis of a thorough analysis of the economy, forms and methods of party work, give activists well-substantiated instructions and recommendations, and concentrate their attention on the main areas of activity of party organizations, which primarily determine successful accomplishment of combat and political training tasks.

It was noted at a recent conference-seminar of army and navy organizational-party officials that many political sections exercise a differentiated approach to leadership by party organizations and training of activists. For example, they single out the work of headquarters organizations, do not ignore battalion, company and equivalent party organizations, and hold seminars and instruction sessions with their activists. This is of course a good thing. But the work content proper -- seminars, conferences, and individual instruction -- is not always of a sufficiently objective character and is not always based on a thorough study and knowledge of the specific features of the daily life and tasks of each collective. And yet a party style and scientific approach demand precisely a deep penetration into the essence of those processes which take place in military collectives and their party organizations. Those political agencies proceed correctly, for example, which

regularly receive and discuss reports by political workers and party organization secretaries on specific matters pertaining to their activities, and which themselves regularly inform party members on progress in carrying out the decisions of party and Komsomol organizations, activist meetings, and which respond sensitively to grass-roots criticism. All this helps efficiently and flexibly synthesize and disseminate advanced know-how, correct deficiencies in a prompt manner, and more strictly monitor observance of Leninist standards of party affairs.

To increase the effectiveness of party leadership and to improve the style and methods of activities of political agencies and party organizations means first and foremost to improve monitoring and verification of execution. The Leninist demand of constant and systematic verification of actual execution of decisions, "of that which is actually done," is becoming even more important today, when the party is assigning the task of improving the efficiency and quality of work performed in all areas of activity. The party Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improving Monitoring and Verification of Execution in Light of the Resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress," assessments, conclusions and recommendations contained in this document, and the tasks advanced in it are of fundamental significance for political agencies, party organizations, and all army and navy cadres. The activities of combined unit political sections should be organized today in the direction of ensuring a further rise in the level of organizational work, strengthening of monitoring and verification of execution, with improvement in their forms and methods, achieving an organic blending of verification with practical work pertaining to carrying out party and government decrees, orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, as well as the decisions of the political sections.

In May 1982, by decision of the CPSU Central Committee, a Armed Forces Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations will be held. It will be a significant event in army and navy affairs and an important step in the direction of implementing the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the instructions of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on defense matters. Military councils, commanders and political sections must make preparations for this conference, concentrating their attention on improving the work performance of each and every primary party organization as the political nucleus of the military and labor collective and center of daily ideological indoctrination activities. Preparations for the conference should promote an improvement in the level of all organizational and political work of commanders, political agencies, and party organizations, and mobilization of personnel for a campaign to achieve new levels and performance in combat and political training and strengthening of military and labor discipline.

Reports and elections in party organizations are currently in progress. It is important that political agencies draw appropriate conclusions from these report-election meetings, which coincide with summing up performance results of the training year, and that they learn lessons from the fundamental party discussion which will be held in each organization.

Komsomol, as a mass voluntary youth organization in the army and navy, membership in which encompasses the majority of personnel, plays a major role in accomplishing tasks of combat and political training, in instilling excellent moral-fighting

qualities in personnel, and in strengthening military discipline. Political agencies must extensively support initiative in Komsomol activities and seek to ensure that each and every member of Komsomol is an exemplary, disciplined serviceman and that the Komsomol organization is a reliable assistant to the commander and party organization in accomplishing tasks of combat readiness.

As practical experience shows, the more practically and concretely political sections are supervised by higher political agencies, particularly the political directorates of military districts, groups of forces and fleets, the more efficient political sections are and the more deeply they master advanced know-how in party-political work. The urgent need to strengthen this leadership is also dictated by the fact that at the present time many combined unit political sections are headed by young political workers. Understandably they need the assistance and advice of older, more experienced comrades.

The party Central Committee instructs political agencies to maintain close contact with local party committees, Soviet agencies, public organizations, enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and to inform them on political work in military units. Carrying out these demands, combined unit political sections are called upon to work persistently to strengthen purposeful contacts with local party agencies, to become more fully and deeply acquainted with their experience and know-how, and innovatively to adopt from them all the best elements which can be utilized under our conditions.

Every combined unit political section has genuinely inexhaustible capabilities for assimilating advanced know-how and achieving further improvement of style and methods of organizational and ideological indoctrination work. It is merely necessary to be guided unswervingly by the resolutions and conclusions of the 26th CPSU Congress and to approach things innovatively, on a scientific basis. It is important that the resources, experience and know-how, knowledge, and capabilities of army and navy Communists, Komsomol members and all servicemen be directed in a concentrated and purposeful manner toward accomplishing the tasks specified by the 26th CPSU Congress and toward increasing the combat readiness of units, naval ships, combined units.

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## ARMED FORCES

### POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: FORMING A SCIENTIFIC WORLD VIEW

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 81 (signed to press 5 Oct 81) pp 10-18

[Article by Professor Col G. Suglovov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "The Philosophical Outlook of a Serviceman Is Formed Comprehensively"]

[Text] It was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress that in conditions of mature socialism the interrelationship between advance of the economy on the one hand and the sociopolitical and spiritual-intellectual advance of society on the other is becoming increasingly closer. The role of the human factor is increasing in the overall process of building communism. Hence that enormous attention which the party devotes to further improvement of ideological and political indoctrination work. And forming of a scientific, Communist world view in Soviet citizens has been and remains the heart of this work.

One can scarcely exaggerate the importance of a scientific world view in the life of Soviet servicemen. Figuratively speaking, this is that spiritual and intellectual summit from which the defenders of the socialist homeland perceive the reality around them, the world as a whole. It is precisely a Communist philosophical outlook which unites all aspects of army and navy spiritual and intellectual affairs, forms the core of the moral-fighting qualities of the serviceman, dictates the inner integrity of his person and in the final analysis the indomitable morale of the Soviet Armed Forces, which is a most important component of their combat potential.

The 26th CPSU Congress made a large contribution toward concretization and further innovative substantiation of the principles, forms and methods of Communist indoctrination, which enables us to make the process of forming and shaping the world view of servicemen scientifically controlled to an ever increasing degree and to increase its actual effectiveness.

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Just as society as a whole, our Armed Forces today possess vast opportunities for development of the individual, and particularly for forming a scientific philosophical outlook in all Soviet servicemen. These possibilities can be transformed into reality only on the basis of a comprehensive approach to the process of training and indoctrinating servicemen, with the most extensive participation of all officer personnel in this process.



As we know, a combined, comprehensive approach constitutes the most general methodological principle of evaluation and analysis of the reality around us, proceeding from the material unity of the world and the universal relationship and interaction of its processes and phenomena. The need for a combined approach to forming a scientific world view is dictated both by its content and structure. By content a scientific world view constitutes an aggregate of dialectical-materialist views on the external world and man's place in it. A system of such views, formed on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and basic natural-scientific conclusions, provides man with an integral perception of the world around him and a clear understanding of his place in the struggle for communism. Structurally a scientific world view includes diversified spiritual and intellectual qualities of an ideological and emotional-psychological order. Of course formation of such complex content and structure cannot be secured by any one way or means. A combined approach is essential.

We shall recall the principal demands of a combined approach to indoctrination: unity of goals, principles and directions; a combination of ideological-political, labor and moral indoctrination with organizational activity; study of the object of ideological efforts; differentiated indoctrinational influence on all groups of individuals; effective utilization of all ideological indoctrination means, forms and methods.

In light of these demands, it is correct to pose the following question: what is the actual state of affairs in the area of philosophical preparation of our military cadres and all personnel? What problems in this area are assuming particular importance in light of the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," which is a long-term document? I shall permit myself to make a number of statements which apply first and foremost to the problem of practical implementation of party instructions on a combined approach to forming a scientific world view.

It is logical for commanders, political agencies, and party organizations to pay more attention to political training of military personnel and boosting the level of their ideological training. Units and combined units have amassed certain experience in implementing the demands of a combined approach. In a certain aviation unit in the Moscow Military District, for example, demands of a combined approach permeate the entire organization of Marxist-Leninist training of officers. They employ diversified forms of development of skills of independent study of primary sources, the content of papers by officers is closely linked with practical military activities, and proposals based on reports by officers A. Starovoytov and A. Saflulin are being implemented in the moral-psychological training of airmen.

Unfortunately things are not this way everywhere. In a certain radar unit, for example (Central Group of Forces), they have ignored the necessity of encompassing all categories of military personnel with ideological influence. As a result political instruction classes were not being held with company personnel when preparing to stand alert duty. They also forgot about such an active form of indoctrination as seminars with party and Komsomol activists. All this inhibited the training and indoctrination process and affected the state of military discipline.

Other errors are also encountered, which diminish the effectiveness of ideological work and which complicate the ideological conditioning of servicemen. Some officers, for example, do not delve deeply enough into the spiritual and intellectual world of their subordinates, approach everything with a single measuring stick, and fail to see the difference between the ideology of society and that of the individual.

Of course a scientific, Marxist-Leninist, dialectical-materialist world view prevails in our society. But V. I. Lenin counselled "sober-minded monitoring of the actual state of consciousness" of the entire worker class, of all working people, not only their Communist vanguard. Of course not every member of the Soviet society possesses a scientific world view. A certain percentage of young servicemen are still at the level of an ordinary, commonplace philosophical outlook. On the whole it enables them more or less correctly to orient themselves in respect to the world around them. But today this is not enough. In conditions of the present-day scientific and technological revolution and an acute ideological struggle between two systems, no serviceman can be content with a commonplace assessment of events and act intuitively.

A commonplace world view is based primarily on empirical knowledge, and even with a systemic reflection of reality this knowledge fails to reveal all essential relations, their logical interaction, and cannot guarantee genuinely scientific foresight. Sometimes accurate information and prejudices eclectically occur side by side in such a world view. "It is no secret," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "that in some young people education and a high degree of informedness sometimes exist side by side with political naiveness, and professional competence with an insufficiently responsible attitude toward labor."

Unfortunately there are encountered, even among officers possessing excellent professional training, those who like to muse in a serious manner about the mysterious phenomena of the "Bermuda Triangle," "flying saucers," and various "miraculous" methods of healing. And few people consider the fact that superstitions and prejudices also change, sometimes assuming a quite contemporary and even pseudoscientific form. Vacillation of ideological position engenders social sluggishness and a contemplative attitude toward various phenomena. In contrast to the commonplace world view, a scientific world view is always active. Correctly reflecting the world with its contradictions and conflicts, it impels one to practical actions, to social and combat aggressiveness.

A commonplace world outlook is also vulnerable from another aspect. If one is satisfied with knowledge merely of external relations and does not deeply analyze sociopolitical questions, it is difficult to withstand the ideological attacks of the class enemy, which are becoming increasingly more sophisticated and insidious.

Frequently people link their thoughts only with immediate goals, without thinking about the theoretical principles on which their practical actions are grounded. It is like the passenger who wants to know when the train will arrive at the destination but has no interest in the physical principle on the basis of which the locomotive powerplant operates. Because of such a position, people begin to think that theory and practice supposedly exist separately. For example, rarely is an officer not acquainted with the laws of class struggle, but sometimes this knowledge does not go beyond acknowledgement of the fact of the global conflict between

socialism and capitalism. Many would be unable to give from the position of these laws a scientific analysis of the concrete phenomena from the activities of their unit and precisely define their class position in the campaign for increasing combat readiness.

Formalism, which is still encountered in ideological work, holds back the forming of a scientific world view. Wherever form is not in conformity with content, red tape and lack of originality are inevitable. And yet indoctrination, stated M. I. Kalinin, does not tolerate unoriginality, even positive unoriginality. Formalism has many countenances. They include thoughtless utilization of obsolete forms, noisy chatter in place of painstaking day-by-day work with people, boring moralizing on any pretext, and paper shuffling in place of real action, which still occurs some places.

Success in forming a scientific world view depends to a decisive degree on the composition of propagandists. Speaking out against overfilling this profession with persons of little ability and thus lowering the level of propaganda, V. I. Lenin wrote: "There are very few truly fundamentally self-restrained and capable propagandists (and to become one, it is necessary to study hard and acquire experience), and it is necessary to specialize such individuals, fully to utilize their abilities and take particular care of them."

At the present time, it was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, we possess a vast army of people -- both Communists and party-unaffiliated -- who carry into the masses the thoughts of the party and explain its policy. There are also trained lecturers and propagandists, agitators and speakers in the Armed Forces. The above ideas of Lenin, however, have by no means lost their significance, for demands on ideological work have increased. "...It is one thing," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the party congress, "when people were still insufficiently prepared, little educated. It is another thing altogether to appeal to today's Soviet citizen."

Unfortunately some propagandists seem not to notice these changes and continue to abuse general phrases, avoid addressing questions of concern to their audience, and speak to others in a thoughtless, formalistic language. It still sometimes happens that chance individuals become full-time propagandists. As a rule they do all kinds of things, but not their immediate job. In some units enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers go for months without seeing a propagandist: he is either busy writing up subscriptions to newspapers, he is lacking something, or he is busy seeing somebody off or meeting somebody.... Some places they do not appreciate the propagandist's labor, although they talk about the importance of ideological-political indoctrination. And yet this is one of the rare professional units which is instructed by the party to wage an uncompromising class battle not only tomorrow, when the thunder of war resounds, but today, right now.

The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that it is impossible to make a decisive shift toward improvement in the quality of political training without a more substantial approach to selection, training and prompt informing of our propagandist cadres. If the congress demands are applied to the military propagandist, he should be first and foremost a brilliant and respected individual, possessing truly encyclopedic knowledge and a wealth of life experience. At the same time he is also a genuine expert in military affairs. Just as any officer, the propagandist is an



organizer of the masses. But he is an organizer of a special type: he is not endowed with administrative authority, and he can influence personnel only with the impassioned word of the political warrior and by personal example.

Under the influence of the conditions of life in a mature socialist society, socialist servicemen assimilate correct, stable knowledge of various social processes. This knowledge is concretized, modified, and takes on emotional coloration in military collectives under the influence of the entire military way of life. Formed concepts and knowledge grow and are refined in the course of ideological-political, moral and military indoctrination.

The serviceman himself plays an important role in forming a scientific world view. A boy enters the military with certain views and concepts, which form the unique ideological prism of the individual, through which he passes all newly received information. In the course of this perception there takes place consolidation of certain views, adjustment of others, rejection of still others and, most important, knowledge merges with personal experience, assumes a stable emotional coloration, and is transformed into convictions.

Fundamental views about the world, which comprise the content of one's philosophical outlook, reflect first and foremost a person's convictions. Convictions in turn are a complex ideal image formed on the basis of knowledge, goals and aspirations which directly affect the individual's practical activities. Consequently, in order to form a scientific world view it is necessary first of all to arm each serviceman with basic knowledge about the world around him, without which he is unable to act in a purposeful manner and, most important, to perform his military duty in an exemplary fashion. Secondly, it is necessary to convert this knowledge into profound convictions, which define a serviceman's life position, his ideals and values. This cannot be accomplished with the aid of any one group of forms and means. It is necessary effectively to utilize all means, forms and methods of the ideological indoctrination process, to organize it so that theoretical knowledge is reinforced by practical verification and the personal experience of the individual.

Thus a combined approach to forming a scientific world view is dictated by the very essence of this process. Only a combined approach ensures unity and integrity, continuity and succession of ideological work, a combination of objective and subjective factors, an organic link between different types of training and indoctrination on the one hand and organizational activity at all levels. It was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress that "the point is to achieve in actual fact a unity of party ideological-theoretical, political indoctrination, organizational and managerial work."

If we apply this congress guideline to the task of forming a scientific world view in Soviet servicemen, the necessity of ensuring in a practical manner a unity of ideological-political, moral and military indoctrination with organizational work in all units and combined units will become obvious. It is important that ideological-political indoctrination include elements of military and moral indoctrination and perform specific organizational functions. Otherwise serious costs are inevitable. Experience indicates that political indoctrination without a link with practical activities can result in doctrinairism, empty twaddle, and morality without clearly marked political guidelines, not permeated by Communist ideology can assume features of unprincipledness or callous rationalism.

Ideological-political indoctrination plays a leading role in formation of a scientific world view. It is directed toward developing in Soviet servicemen correct political views, ideological conviction, deep awareness of one's constitutional duty and social responsibility. Forming a developed political awareness so presupposes elaboration of skills at independent analysis of societal events and phenomena of political affairs and the ability to determine one's place and actions in these events and phenomena.

Marxist-Leninist education of servicemen, carried out in diversified forms of political training, constitutes a most important means of ideological-political indoctrination. In the last century F. Engels stated that since socialism had become a science it demanded to be treated as a science, that is to be studied. Today mass study of Marxism-Leninism has become a regular pattern of the society of developed socialism. We have a well-structured system of political education in this country. In order to increase its effectiveness, the 26th CPSU Congress pointed to the necessity, without excessively expanding the number of seminar participants, of resolutely improving the quality of training. This is dictated primarily by the fact that the object of ideological influence has changed substantially. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the congress, the Soviet citizen is an educated, cultured individual.

The Soviet serviceman has grown substantially in an ideological-political respect, together with the entire people. This is directly reflected in his actions. "...Whenever the interests of national security and defense of the peace demand it, whenever it is necessary to aid victims of aggression, the Soviet serviceman appears before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, ready to surmount any and all difficulties." But one should not forget the statement in the Central Committee Report that our young servicemen "have not undergone the severe trials which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers." For characters were toughened and ideological convictions forged out in these trials.

In discussing ideological conviction, one should also consider the fact that in the past it was formed under the direct influence of the class struggle. As A. M. Gorky picturesquely stated, "I was taught Marxism by the owner of a bakery." Today objective conditions have radically changed. There is no longer a class struggle in our society, and the present younger generation frequently judges capitalism abstractly, and even incorrectly -- on the basis of those goods and clothing which come to this country from the West. These judgments are influenced to a certain degree by acts of ideological sabotage by imperialism, including intensified ballyhoo of the bourgeois-consumer way of life. In conditions of aggravated conflict between the two worlds, profound knowledge of the laws of societal development is particularly essential, on the basis of which a serviceman forms correct ideas about contemporary capitalism and its inalterable exploiter essence.

Our Armed Forces have all the necessary conditions for purposeful Marxist-Leninist education of military personnel: an effective system of political training and various forms of mass-political work. The task consists in most effectively and innovatively utilizing available opportunities. The 26th CPSU Congress demanded that party training be reorganized in such a manner that people are drawn toward it

voluntarily, in order collectively to discuss current problems of party theory and policy, to receive answers to questions of concern to all, and to add to their ideological-theoretical knowledge.

Of course it is no simple matter to organize political training in this fashion. The experience of the best military propagandists, however, who extensively utilize seminar-debates, discussions, statement of problems, and inclusion of facts from local affairs in theoretical analysis, gives reason to believe that this task can be accomplished. Many full-time and volunteer propagandists are already utilizing tried and proven new forms of ideological indoctrination. Good results have been produced in particular by so-called informal talks, where the propagandist and his audience conduct productive debates and exchange views in a sincere and unconstrained fashion.

The most promising forms of modern political training focus on independent acquisition of knowledge. Independent search for the truth is especially important for forming a scientific world view in military personnel. The fact is that the process of cognition is difficult and complex. A person does not reach specific conclusions immediately; his thought process usually proceeds from external relations and concrete phenomena to the source of their development, and from the latter back to specific relations. Having mentally accomplished such a path, a person arrives at conviction of the truth of his acquired knowledge and takes confident guidance from it in practical manners. Only after learning to look independently into a given question, stated V. I. Lenin, will you be able to consider yourself "sufficiently firm in your convictions and will be able sufficiently successfully to defend them before anybody and at any time."

But in order for a person to endeavor to acquire knowledge, his interest must be aroused. The simplest and most effective method of developing an inner need for knowledge is vivid demonstration of the practical significance of points of theory. Some military personnel, for example, fail to show a particular inclination toward knowledge of philosophical problems, since they do not feel a suitable practical need. In their opinion such knowledge is needed "for examinations" at best. When at a certain examination party member V. Fedorov was reproached for poor philosophical preparation, he immediately retorted that Suvorov and Chapayev had not studied dialectical materialism and yet won brilliant victories. It was reasonably pointed out in response to this that all outstanding military leaders of the past and military leaders of natural talent as a rule were natural dialecticians and knew the laws governing warfare well. In present-day conditions, when military affairs have become incredibly more complex, a natural understanding of dialectics is not enough. It is essential to have a scientific world view and to master the method of materialist dialectics.

A deep understanding of the relationship between theory and practice engenders a cognitive need. Therefore the CPSU Central Committee Decree of 26 April 1979 demands "strengthening the meaningfulness and concreteness of propaganda and agitation, its link with practical affairs, with accomplishment of economic and political tasks." And yet it still frequently occurs in ideological and indoctrination work with military personnel that the link between theory and practice is limited solely to simple references to examples from military life without their scientific analysis.



In actuality the link between theory and practice in ideological-political indoctrination finds expression, in the first place, in the ability of the propagandist theoretically to assimilate a concrete fact together with his audience and to reach correct political conclusions. In other words, to raise a given phenomenon of military life to theoretical synthesis and political resonance. Secondly, one needs the ability to convert points of theory to the level of concrete, specific guidelines for practical actions. For example, the propagandist or agitator, thoroughly discussing imperialism as a source of military danger, ends his lecture with an appeal to increase military and political vigilance. It would seem that everything is logical and correct. But the enlisted men and noncommissioned officers have heard such appeals before. It would probably be much better to bring each of them to an independent conclusion: "But what should I personally do to ensure that the danger proceeding from imperialism is not transformed into war, that my loved ones do not share with all mankind the horrors of a devastating nuclear missile catastrophe?"

Political information plays an important role in the ideological-political indoctrination of servicemen and in forming their world-view knowledge. In recent years, in addition to scheduled political information sessions, unified political days have been extensively employed in units and combined units, with speeches by senior commanders and political workers, rallies and meetings for personnel. It is true that in some units principal attention is frequently concentrated on questions dealing with international relations and other global problems (although the mass information media report fairly fully on them), while concrete facts of local military life are ignored. Some places so-called difficult questions are not in high esteem. As a rule they all are local matters, with people awaiting a direct answer. Lack of needed information leads to a situation where military personnel return to questions of concern to them, but without their commander or political worker, and sometimes they reach conclusions which are far from the actual state of affairs.

"Our party's policy is clear," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress. "And we are willing and able to answer any questions which arise with Soviet citizens. It is necessary to do this more boldly, bearing in mind that if we do not answer these questions, our country's enemies will attempt to utilize this for slandering socialism." When the subject in question is elaboration of ideological conviction and a scientific world view, there can be no prohibited subjects or difficult questions -- everything yields to Marxist-Leninist analysis. It is only a matter of erudition and party principledness.

Forming a scientific world view in Soviet servicemen is also being actively accomplished in the process of moral indoctrination. A person copes with the world around him not only in sociopolitical but also in moral categories, with this defining the degree of his freedom and actual framework of behavior. Communist morality prevails in our society. Its principles and standards have taken deep root in the consciousness and conduct of the majority of Soviet citizens. But developed socialism, as a logical stage on the road to communism, imposes higher moral demands on a person. The necessity of drawing up certain sectors of the moral front is becoming obvious, as well as the need to strengthen the aesthetic indoctrination of servicemen, which affects moral relations. "We possess great material and intellectual capabilities for the increasingly fuller development of the individual, and we shall continue increasing them," it was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress. "But at the same time it is important that each individual be able to utilize them intelligently."



Unfortunately such an ability is not possessed by everybody. Sometimes things occur as follows. Serving for years alongside a cultural center, some servicemen do not even find time to inquire in decency what intellectual opportunities are available there. When Leningrad was under blockade people would stand in line for hours for a ticket to a play or concert. Today the auditoriums of some officers' clubs and enlisted men's clubs are half empty. Many officers have an upright piano in their apartment, but nobody plays it.

Where there is no genuine cultural or intellectual life, pseudoculture prevails. The moral force of civic and patriotic songs is well known. And yet even amateur performing groups in the military sometimes give preference to various popular hit songs, songs of momentary popularity without content, and loud, cacophonous dance rhythms. Some officers accept this as the fad of the moment. But fads pass, while distorted tastes and deformed sensibilities remain. We must not forget that an uncompromising struggle of ideologies is also taking place in music.

Another cause of moral costs is the fact that moral indoctrination frequently boils down to the effect of word alone. Word, unfortified by deed and by appropriate organization of one's entire way of life, fails to evoke an emotional response and does not achieve an indoctrinational goal. And with frequent, thoughtless repetition even of correct words, their value is diminished, and at the same time there arises the danger of devaluation of ideas and moral principles.

Of exceptional importance in moral indoctrination are so-called informal relations between military personnel. Wherever superiors endeavor to be close to their subordinates, where officers treat one another like family and spend their off-duty hours together, there are greater opportunities for comradely discussion of the most diversified questions, including those of an ideological and moral category. Frequently when a superior officer shares details about his career and frankly assesses his own successes and failures, such friendly advice helps young officers acquire confidence, moral staunchness, and a firm life position. If young people are deprived of the opportunity of informal intercourse with their elders and do not see a worthy "moral standard," their ideological and moral maturation takes place more slowly, and their life position frequently assumes traits of passiveness and contemplativeness.

In order to overcome ideological-political and moral contemplativeness and to eliminate the gap between word and deed, it is essential to bond together with the cement of life the bricks of knowledge obtained in the course of training and indoctrination. This means that ideological-political, moral and other kinds of indoctrination should experience organic continuation in such organization of the military labor, daily life and off-duty time of military personnel whereby each and every point of Marxist-Leninist theory and every principle of Communist morality is reinforced by facts of actuality.

Comrade M. A. Suslov stated at the All-Union Seminar-Conference of Ideological Workers held in the CPSU Central Committee in April: "Life confirms that violation of the unity of word and deed and substitution of political twaddle for real actions exert harmful influence on people's moods, on the moral atmosphere in labor collectives, and in society as a whole". A gap between word and deed, always

harmful is especially dangerous in military affairs, for it does direct detriment to the combat potential of the Armed Forces. The responsible task of increasing combat readiness does not tolerate empty talk, appeals, promises, paper reports, etc. Unfortunately in some places the state of affairs is appraised not on the basis of a profound analysis of the actual situation but solely according to submitted plans, reports, and memoranda.

Formation of a scientific world view is actively promoted by organization of the life and activities of military personnel whereby it corresponds to a maximum degree to the points of regulations. Proper observance of regulations, which incorporate the experience and wisdom of many generations, focuses on the most optimal and purposeful activities of military personnel. It objectively forms in them those qualities which are essential for conscientious performance of military duty. This is why observance of regulations must be maintained unswervingly with no exceptions whatsoever. Law remains law as long as its demands are observed by everybody.

Strict observance of regulations, with their rigid regimentation and restrictions, exerts a more active indoctrinational effect if demandingness is organically combined with fairness. Communism as a doctrine is inconceivable without the principle of justice. In the socialist society this principle has become one of the criteria of maturity of societal relations. We should not forget that consciousness and a sense of justice are manifested particularly sharply when any restrictions exist. Therefore every officer must bear in mind the moral consequences of his decisions and actions. Fairness is important not only in punishment but in reward as well. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev put it well at the party congress: "Any leveling tendency, instances of paying wages essentially merely for showing up at work rather than for actual results of work, and the paying of undeserved bonuses -- all this has an extremely adverse effect both on production indices and on people's psychology."

Finally, forming a scientific world view is inconceivable without a constant uncompromising campaign against views which are alien to our society and antipodes of the socialist way of life. This campaign mandatorily presupposes a class appraisal of negative phenomena and precise determination of their causes and social consequences. Where such an appraisal does not occur, there is a tolerant attitude toward violators of military discipline, to cases of mutual protection, and mutual relations contrary to regulations. Social maturity is developed and philosophical principles consolidated precisely in the campaign against such phenomena which are alien to our military.

We have examined only some of the aspects of the complex and conflictive process of formation of a scientific world view in Soviet servicemen. Of course they do not exhaust the demands of a combined approach, which as an aggregate are directed toward training ideologically conditioned, professionally skilled servicemen who are ready and able to carry out honorably their duty to the homeland.

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## ARMED FORCES

### POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: SOCIAL BENEFITS DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SJZ in Russian No 20, Oct 81 (signed to press 5 Oct 81) pp 19-25

[Article by N. Davydova, docent, candidate of economic sciences: "Public Consumption Funds -- For the Benefit of the People"]

[Text] A steady rise in the people's living standards is the most vivid trait of developed socialism. Concrete concern for concrete man, his needs and requirements are the beginning and end of party economic policy, it was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress. A constant improvement in the people's living standards defines the main thrust of development of the USSR economy in 1981-1985 and the period up to 1990. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted in the Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress that "for the 11th Five-Year Plan and the 1980's as a whole, the party is advancing an extensive program of further improvement in the prosperity of our people. This program encompasses improvement of all aspects of the life of Soviet citizens."

Public consumption funds play a major role in improving the living standards of working people. K. Marx pointed to their importance in conditions of socialism. In his "Critique of the Gotha Program" he wrote that in the socialist society funds will be created from a portion of aggregate societal product "for the common satisfaction of needs, such as schools, health services, etc," as well as "funds for the incapacitated, etc." This portion "will steadily increase, as the new society develops" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Writings], Vol 19, page 17).

In conditions of mature socialism public consumption funds play an increased role in implementation of the party's economic strategy. These funds promote the movement of Soviet society toward complete social homogeneity, elimination of the differences between intellectual and physical labor, and indoctrination of people in a Communist spirit. They constitute the material foundation of such important rights of Soviet citizens, formally stated in the USSR Constitution, as free education and medical care, paid annual vacation, financial security in old age, in case of illness, full or partial disability, etc. They are directly related to solicitude for protecting motherhood and our young people.

The state contributes enormous amounts of money to public consumption funds. They totaled 527 billion rubles in the 10th Five-Year Plan. Payments and benefits from these funds increased in 1980 to 438 rubles per capita, as compared with 354 rubles

in 1975. Further growth of public consumption funds is targeted in the 11th Five-Year Plan. During the five-year period they will increase by 20 percent -- from 116.5 billion rubles in 1980 to 138 billion in 1985. Disbursement of such large funds to solve social problems greatly improves the material and cultural living standards of Soviet citizens.

Just what are public consumption funds? They are that portion of national income which is utilized to satisfy the material and cultural-intellectual needs of the members of the socialist society and which are distributed above and beyond labor remuneration income. Public funds are financed by state budget funds, profit of state enterprises and organizations (social-cultural measures funds, housing construction funds, etc). Funds used for cultural-personal services needs, social security and financial assistance to kolkhoz farmers are established on kolkhozes.

There are needs in a socialist society in satisfying which the entire society has an interest. These include public education and the creation of normal housing conditions. In the Soviet Union protection is given to mothers and infants, and old-age financial security is guaranteed. And all this is paid for by public consumption funds.

V. I. Lenin stated that in a socialist society "each individual receives, having worked an equal share of societal labor with another, an equal share of societal product.... And yet individuals are not equal: one is stronger, while another is weaker; one is married, while another is not; one has more children than another, etc," ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 33, page 93). Public funds help reduce the still existing inequality in family income due to distribution on the basis of labor, and promote creation of equal conditions for the education of children. Public consumption funds are used to pay benefits and subsidies for large families and families with comparatively low per capita incomes.

Thus public consumption funds, created in the interests of the entire people and of each individual, are one of the important means of development of relations of equality and collectivism, and strengthen the confidence of Soviet citizens in tomorrow. The existence of these funds is dictated by the very nature of socialism, the highest aim of which is the fullest satisfaction of people's growing material and cultural-intellectual needs. They represent a significant addition to the wages of workers and employees. Average monthly earnings per Soviet family, with the addition of payments and subsidies from public consumption funds, amounted to 419 rubles in 1980. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted in the Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress that "one of the most outstanding features of the Soviet way of life is the increasing benefit which people receive from public consumption funds."

This is one more persuasive evidence of the tireless concern of the party for the well-being of the people.

Public consumption funds in this country pay for free education and job training for Soviet citizens. The 26th CPSU Congress devoted considerable attention to further development of the system of public education and fuller satisfaction of this country's requirements in specialists and skilled workers. A dense network of general-curriculum schools, vocational-technical and secondary specialized schools, as well as higher educational institutions has been established in the USSR. During



the years of the 10th Five-Year plan vocational-technical schools graduated 12.5 million boys and girls, while 10 million specialists were trained by higher educational institutions and secondary specialized schools.

An enormous increase in the number of specialists became possible because in our country all citizens have the right to an education. This right, formally stated in the USSR Constitution, is financially backed up. All types of education are free of charge. Annual expenditures by the Soviet State per enrolled student per year are as follows: approximately 200 rubles in general-curriculum schools, approximately 700 rubles in secondary specialized schools, and more than 1000 rubles at higher educational institutions. The amount of these funds is growing at a rapid rate. Presently approximately one third of public consumption funds is going into public education, which comprises more than 7 percent of this country's national income.

Approximately 10 million specialists with higher education or a secondary specialized education will be trained in the 11th Five-Year Plan. There will also be an improved quality of training and better utilization of specialists in the nation's economy. There will take place further development of the network of vocational-technical schools, which are a most important source of providing additional worker cadres to the nation's economy.

Our country has now completed the transition to compulsory universal secondary education. A total of 98 percent of this country's secondary general-curriculum day schools provide detailed labor training for enrolled students at enterprises, organizations, on sovkhozes and kolkhozes, in school shops and laboratories.

Concern to guard the people's health is an object of special attention by the CPSU and Soviet State. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 26th CPSU Congress that "it is necessary to do everything possible to ensure that the Soviet citizen will at all times and in all places be able to receive prompt, skilled and sensitive medical care."

The USSR Constitution formally states the right of citizens to medical care, which is provided by the state health care system, by free medical care, and by measures aimed at preventing disease. A total of 110.3 million persons in this country have periodic medical examinations. Today this country's general outpatient clinics can process half a million persons more per work shift than five years ago.

In the majority of characteristics, the health care system in the USSR is substantially superior to the health care system in developed capitalist countries. In this country there are 37.2 doctors for every 10,000 persons, while the corresponding figure is approximately 25 in the FRG, 22.5 in the United States, 20 in Italy, 16.4 in Great Britain, 16 in Japan, and 15.3 in France. Today there are almost one million doctors in the Soviet Union -- more than one third of all the doctors in the world. Much attention is devoted to sanatorium treatment and organized rest and recreation for working people. In 1980 a total of 55 million persons received medical treatment and rest at sanatoria, rest houses and vacation facilities. It is appropriate to note that 20 percent of all persons receiving sanatorium and health resort care and treatment did not pay a single penny, while 60 percent paid only one third of the cost.

There are presently 23,218 hospitals in the Soviet Union, as well as 35,696 medical facilities providing outpatient care to the public. The total number of hospital beds exceeds 3.3 million. A hospital stay for an adult costs the state more than 10 rubles per day. In addition, if a person is ill he receives temporary disability benefits, and at the world's highest rates -- up to 100 percent of wages for the overwhelming majority of working people. Large scientific centers -- oncology, surgery, cardiology, maternity and child care -- are in operation, established with funds received from nationwide Communist unpaid mass work days.

The picture is quite different in capitalist countries. Medical care is very expensive for working people. In the United States, for example, 9 out of every 10 persons cannot afford a hospital stay: the cost of hospitalization has increased 12.5-fold in the last 20 years. According to one U.S. magazine, heart surgery costs 9,910 dollars. It is not surprising that the business of health care is one of the most profitable in the United States.

Our health care system will experience further development in the 11th Five-Year Plan. New hospitals and outpatient clinics will go into operation, and health care facilities will be better provided with medical equipment, apparatus, and instruments. Medical industry output will increase by approximately 40 percent. Greater attention will be focused on prevention of disease, improved efficiency of clinical examination and treatment, and expanded coverage of the population with medical care, especially children. During the five-year plan the total number of hospital beds will increase by 8-10 percent.

Working and living conditions as well as conditions of rest and recreation are of great importance for maintaining and strengthening the health of working people. Plans call for all-out development and improvement of rest and recreation for working people, vacation travel and excursion opportunities. Greater opportunities are being provided for joint rest, recreation and medical treatment for parents and children.

Concern for the health of Soviet citizens is inseparable from development of physical culture and sports. The scale of the physical culture movement in the USSR is one of the most important achievements of socialism. In 1980 there were a total of 63.2 million persons active in physical culture in this country, there were a total of 3,510 stadiums (with a seating capacity of 1,500 spectators or more), 73,000 gymnasiums, and 1,650 swimming pools.

The recently adopted CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree entitled "On a Further Upsurge in Mass Participation in Physical Culture and Sports" is new evidence of the concern of party and state for the harmonious physical development of Soviet citizens.

The successes of the Soviet homeland in solving the housing problem are well known. It was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress that housing occupies a most important place in the party's social program. Vivid confirmation of the unabating attention of the CPSU and the Soviet State toward the interests of the people was examination at the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation, of the question of growth and development of housing and improvement in utilization and maintenance of housing. It was noted that qualitative changes had taken place

in the designing and construction of housing. Now approximately half of all apartment buildings are built from new, improved standard plans. Providing citizens with decent housing is a component part of the extensive program of further improvement in living standards for Soviet citizens.

The USSR Constitution formally states the right of Soviet citizens to housing. This right is backed up by a vast scale of housing construction; the Soviet Union is the world leader in volume of housing construction. In 1966-1980 approximately 1.6 billion square meters of housing were constructed from all financing sources, and more than 161 million persons, or more than three fifths of this country's population, moved into new homes and improved their housing conditions.

The state is sequentially carrying out an important social task -- provision of each family with its own comfortable apartment with all amenities. Today approximately 80 percent of the urban population is living in their own separate apartment.

Solution of the housing problem in this country is being accomplished while maintaining low apartment rents, which have not changed since 1928. Rent comprises a minimal portion of the budget of worker families, averaging only 3 percent of income, and covers only 30 percent of the total cost of routine housing maintenance. The remainder, in an amount of approximately 6 billion rubles per year, is covered by public consumption funds. One should bear in mind that rent in the USSR is remaining unchanged, while state expenditures are increasing substantially, in connection with improvement in the quality and comfort of housing.

A totally different situation is observed in the capitalist countries. Rent comprises a substantial portion of family expenses: more than 23 percent in the United States, 23 percent in Switzerland, almost 22 percent in Canada and Sweden, and more than 17 percent in the FRG.

In the 11th Five-Year Plan, just as in previous years, housing construction in the USSR will be conducted on a large scale. Plans call for building 530-540 million square meters of housing in the five years. Distribution of new state housing will be accomplished as a rule according to the principle of giving each family its own apartment. The 26th CPSU Congress also drew attention to the necessity of improving operation and maintenance of housing. The total value of housing has reached an immense figure -- 339 billion rubles. This comprises approximately one fifth of this country's total fixed assets. The "Fundamentals of Housing Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics," adopted at the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, states that Soviet housing laws are aimed at guaranteeing the right of citizens to housing, and efficient utilization and care of housing. The law specifies that priority in assigning housing shall go to disabled veterans of the Great Patriotic War, the families of servicemen (partisans) killed or missing in action and equivalent persons, Heroes of the Soviet Union, Heroes of Socialist Labor, and persons awarded the Order of Glory, Order of Labor Glory, the "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" decoration, all three classes. Housing shall be assigned on a priority basis to persons in active service in the military during the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, as well as during other combat operations in defense of our homeland, to partisans of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War, as well as other persons who took part in



combat operations in defense of the USSR, and disabled military personnel, groups I and II.

The high degree of humanism of the society of mature socialism is vividly manifested in the fact that it is to an ever increasing degree taking material and financial care of persons who, to quote K. Marx, are not yet able or are no longer able to take part in production. A large part of public consumption funds is spent for these purposes.

The 26th CPSU Congress stressed that it is necessary in the future to continue improving social security for working people. It includes pensions, various benefits, grants, operation of homes for the aged and disabled, maternity benefits, subsidies to preschool establishments, Pioneer camps, etc. Social security also provides for health-promoting measures and skilled medical care for the public. The USSR Constitution specifies the right of Soviet citizens to material and financial security in their old age, in case of illness, partial or total disability, as well as in case of loss of breadwinner. Citizens of the USSR do not make any contributions from wages or other income for social security purposes. Social security is provided entirely by state and public funds.

The state allocates enormous funds for social security and social insurance. Allocations for these purposes just in the 1981 state budget will total 45.8 billion rubles. In order better to comprehend this figure we shall state that total payments and benefits received by the public from public consumption funds in 1940 totaled 4.6 billion rubles.

Increased pension support occupies an important place in the party's social program. As of the beginning of 1981 the total number of pensioners in this country was 49 million persons, while the figure should grow by an additional 5-7 million by 1985, according to calculations. Every year more than 43 billion rubles are expended on pensions and benefits, or more than one third of all public consumption funds. The society of mature socialism is to an ever increasing degree assuming responsibility for the material and financial security of persons who are no longer able to take part in production but who have made a substantial contribution toward building socialism. Also remarkable is the following aspect of the matter. Retirement age in the USSR has been established at 60 years for men and 55 years for women. Retirement age has been lowered by 5-10 years for persons employed on jobs underground, jobs in high temperature environments at industrial plants and in other jobs with tough working conditions. In the majority of capitalist countries the retirement age with pension rights is higher than in this country. In France, for example, it is 70 years for both men and women, 65 years in Finland, the FRG, Spain, Canada, and Sweden, in the United States and Switzerland it is 65 years for men and 62 years for women, and in Great Britain 65 and 60 years respectively. We should note that in capitalist countries substantial amounts are withheld from worker wages as pension contributions.

In the 11th Five-Year Plan the USSR will increase minimum old-age and disability pensions for workers, employees and kolkhoz farmers. Further efforts are being made to equalize social security conditions between kolkhoz farmers and employees of state enterprises. The minimum old-age pension for kolkhoz members will increase in 1981-1985 to 40 rubles per month.

One of the features of the current five-year plan is that for the first time earlier determined pension amounts for workers and employees retiring more than 10 years ago will gradually be brought closer to the level of pensions designated at the present time for persons of a similar occupation and skill level. First and foremost these measures will apply to those persons whose pension is less than 60 rubles per month. The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree entitled "On Measures for Further Improvement of Social Security of the Population" specifies an increase in 1981 for the minimum old-age pension for workers and employees to 50 rubles per month and an increase in the minimum amount for disability pensions and loss-of-breadwinner pension. The state also specifies favorable terms for women with five or more children who raised them to the age of 8 years. They receive a pension beginning at age 50 if they have an employment record of not less than 15 years.

In conformity with the social program ratified by the 26th CPSU Congress, recently the CPSU Central Committee, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR Council of Ministers and All-Union Central Trade Union Council adopted a decision on the procedure and schedule for carrying out measures to increase state assistance to families with children, as well as in the area of further improving pension benefits to the public.

The party devotes considerable attention to veterans of the Great Patriotic War. Former combat veterans, disabled veterans, and families of persons killed in action now receive a number of supplementary benefits and privileges. Effective 1 May 1980 pension rights were granted to widows whose husbands were killed in action in the Great Patriotic war. And this is independent of whether or not these widows have a disability. All previously existing benefits and privileges for the families of servicemen killed in action shall also apply to them. War veterans have priority in obtaining authorizations to health care facilities, enjoy a 50 percent reduction in income tax and a 50 percent discount on a round-trip rail ticket once a year, and on water, air or bus transportation in areas lacking rail service, plus other benefits and privileges. The 26th CPSU Congress specified new measures aimed at further improving financial and living conditions for veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

In the 11th Five-Year Plan there will be increased state assistance to families with children and to newlyweds. There will be improvement in meals and services to children in nursery schools and kindergartens, boarding schools, and children's homes. Beginning in 1981 working mothers in various parts of the country will begin receiving leave with partial pay, to care for an infant up to the age of 1 year. Mothers of juveniles are being offered the opportunity to work a part-shift or reduced work week, on a sliding schedule, as well as to work at home. There is being introduced in the current five-year plan a one-time government grant, payable on the birth of a child, in the amount of 50 rubles for the first child and 100 rubles for the second and third. The network of children's preschool institutions is experiencing further growth and development, which is increasing free time for mothers and is creating improved conditions for rearing children.

Growth in public consumption funds depends directly on the strength of our homeland. And its wealth, as we know, is being increased by the labor of millions. As was stated at the 26th CPSU Congress, we possess great material, cultural and

intellectual capabilities for the increasingly fuller development of the individual, and we shall continue to increase them further. But at the same time it is important that each individual have the ability to utilize them intelligently. And this in the final analysis depends on the interests and needs of the individual. This is why our party views their active, purposeful formation as one of the important tasks of social policy.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted that the majority of Soviet citizens work honestly and with enthusiasm. By right they intelligently utilize the diversified benefits which society gives them, care for and add to our nation's assets. But some people seek to give less and take more from the state. This psychology engenders selfishness, petit bourgeois attitudes, greed, indifference toward the cares and affairs of the people, drunkenness, and other abnormal phenomena.

The 26th CPSU Congress stressed that there is a great deal of work to be done, directed toward improving the socialist way of life and eradication of everything which hinders formation of the new man. This is one of the integral component parts of the party's social policy, the aim of which is the benefit and happiness of Soviet citizens.

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## ARMED FORCES

### INDOCTRINATION ON DEFENDING THE HOMELAND

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 81 (signed to press 5 Oct 81) pp 66-72

[Article by Col G. Polyakov: "Reliably Defend the Socialist Homeland"\*)]

[Text] This is the first study topic of the new training year. The purpose of instruction classes on this subject is to ensure that personnel assimilate even more thoroughly the conclusions of the 26th CPSU Congress on the contemporary international situation and understand the great complexity of the military-political situation in the world, caused by a sharp increase in the aggressiveness of imperialism. It is necessary to ensure that each and every enlisted man, noncommissioned officer and petty officer become fully aware of his personal responsibility for maintaining a high degree of vigilance and combat readiness on the part of troops and naval forces. In view of the particular importance of this topic, it is advisable to enlist for holding these classes commanders, political workers, staff officers, and the most well prepared propagandists of combined units, units, and naval ships.

A total of 6 hours are allocated for study of this topic. It is recommended that this time be distributed as follows: two hours for a lecture, two hours for independent study by the men, and two hours for a seminar (discussion).

The following topic items must be covered in the lecture: 1. The 26th CPSU Congress on the increasing complexity of the contemporary international situation in connection with a sharp increase in the aggressiveness of imperialism; 2. Party concern for further strengthening the nation's defense capability and all-out improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces; 3. Tasks of personnel in the new training year.

It is important to note in the brief introduction that the Soviet people are working with great enthusiasm on implementing the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. The congress was an event of truly world-historic significance. It deeply analyzed current problems of the contemporary international situation and the internal development of our society and defined the tasks and prospects of further

\* Material for political instruction classes on the subject "The 26th CPSU Congress on the Necessity of a High Degree of Vigilance and Constant Combat Readiness by the Soviet Armed Forces. Tasks for Personnel in the New Training Year."



building of communism in this country as well as the principal directions of CPSU foreign policy and improvement in the defense capability of the soviet state.

Particular attention at the congress was devoted to problems of strengthening peace, deepening détente, and holding the arms race in check. "Defending the cause of peace," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the Central Committee Report, "is today the most important task at the international level for our party, our people, as well as for all the peoples of the world" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KTsS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], page 31).

The Soviet Union's unfailing dedication to a Leninist peace-seeking foreign policy was once again confirmed at the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation, in the "Appeal to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World" adopted at the session, as well as in the course of the Crimean meetings between Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev and leaders of the brother Communist parties of the socialist nations.

Our steps toward peace, however, are encountering stubborn resistance on the part of aggressive imperialist circles, particularly the United States and a number of other NATO countries, which do not want to accept the historic changes which are taking place in the world and which have openly adopted a policy of thwarting détente, of further intensification of the arms race, thus facing mankind with the threat of another world war. In conditions of a sharp aggravation of the present international situation through the fault of imperialism and its stooges, the Communist Party is doing everything it can to ensure that our country's defense capability is reliable and that the Soviet Armed Forces are in a state of the highest vigilance and combat readiness.

#### 1. The 26th CPSU Congress on the Increasing Complexity of the Contemporary International Situation in Connection With a Sharp Increase in the Aggressiveness of Imperialism

In proceeding to present the material of the first topic item, the instructor should note that imperialism is endeavoring at all costs to halt the advance of socialism, to put the brakes on the development of the national liberation struggle, and to regain its role as the ruler of the destiny of peoples.

Aggressive imperialist circles have taken the path of intensive military preparations in order to carry out their insane plans. The following facts attest convincingly to this. In May 1978, on orders by the United States, NATO leaders adopted the decision to increase to a substantial degree the military budgets of their countries within the framework of the long-range (up to 1995) program of increasing the bloc's strategic offensive arms. In December 1979 the United States forced upon a number of Western European countries a plan to deploy new U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles on their territories. And this year the world witnessed a new new sinister action by Washington -- adoption of the decision to proceed with manufacture of the neutron bomb.

The United States veered even more sharply toward increasing tension when the present R. Reagan Administration came into office. This administration not only became the successor of the course of policy pursued by the preceding administration headed by J. Carter but also has displayed unconcealed, militant anti-Sovietism from

the very outset. Disseminating the lying myth of a "Soviet threat" and slanderously accusing the USSR of involvement in "international terrorism," the United States declared the Soviet Union to be its principal enemy and proceeded to pursue an unprecedented arms race, including nuclear missile weapons.

Not since "cold war" times has this leading country of the capitalist world pursued such an open policy of employment of force as it is pursuing today. The growth curve of U.S. military expenditures is steadily climbing upward. According to a statement made by U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, in the 1982 fiscal year military expenditures will total 226 billion dollars. In the next five years (up to 1986) the United States intends to spend 1.5 trillion dollars (!) on its armed forces, that is, almost as much as it has spent in the last 12 years.

A substantial portion of these expenditures is being used to fund more than 450 new military programs recently drawn up by the Pentagon. The United States is working at a priority pace on deployment of the MX mobile intercontinental missile system. Nuclear submarines of the "Ohio" class, armed with Trident I and Trident II missiles, are being built at an accelerated pace. Large amounts have been appropriated for development of advanced bombers, air-launched, sea-launched and land-based cruise missiles, as well as Pershing II missiles. The Space Shuttle is being developed for military purposes, and aggressive research is being conducted on development of laser and other inhuman mass destruction weapons. The numerical strength of the U.S. armed forces is to be increased by almost a quarter of a million men by 1986.

The following question arises: why does the United States need such mountains of arms and such enormous military expenditures if nobody is planning on attacking that country? U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger gave a very clear and distinct answer to this question, stating: "We shall spend whatever it takes to increase U.S. military might and to gain superiority over the Soviet Union."

The United States clearly aims to put together a unified reactionary military front against the USSR and the other brother socialist countries. It is precisely for this reason that the United States is allying with the most sinister forces throughout the world, is attempting to bind its NATO partners more tightly, and is seeking to expand the functions of the aggressive NATO bloc. Under U.S. pressure, the NATO member countries adopted a long-range program to modernize their armed forces, at a cost of more than 80 billion dollars. In the opinion of the leaders of these countries, implementation of this program will enable the bloc to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Pact nations in the mid-1980's.

Japan and China are becoming increasingly involved in Washington's reckless policy, which is pushing the world toward a nuclear catastrophe. In its plans the United States assigns these countries the role of mailed fist in the Far East.

We should note that in Japan a hostile campaign against our country is steadily building up momentum. The most recent step in this campaign was a "rally for the return of the northern territories," which was recently held in Tokyo. It was timed to coincide with the anniversary of Japan's signing of the instrument of unconditional surrender in World War II. This political rally in Tokyo is one more graphic example of how certain forces in Japan are employing the most diversified pretexts

and methods -- from the contrived "problem of the northern territories" to intimidation "with the growth of the Soviet military threat" -- in order to sow seeds of distrust of and hatred toward the USSR and the Soviet people, to kindle revanchist moods, to fan the flames of chauvinist passions, and to justify militarization and strengthening of the military alliance with the United States.

During the lecture the instructor should particularly emphasize the idea that China's Maoist leaders have today become transformed from imperialism's reserve to its de facto ally. As was pointed out by the 26th CPSU Congress, Beijing's policy continues to be aimed at aggravating the international situation (see "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 11). Gravitating toward U.S. militaristic policy, China is rapidly increasing arms production, spending 40 percent of its national income on military preparations. Following the visit to China by U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig in June 1981, a new phase began in the military-political collaboration of these two countries. As a result of this visit, Washington stated its willingness to offer Beijing the most modern weaponry, including offensive weapons. China now has access not only to such classified U.S. military goods as strategic missile guidance systems and communications equipment but also to various kinds of other combat equipment -- from antitank missiles to fighter-bombers. The military-political alliance between the United States and China is whetting their aggressive militarist appetites to an even greater extent, posing a threat to stability in Southeast Asia and greatly complicating the world situation.

Placing an emphasis on force, Washington either rejects or blocks peace-seeking initiatives by the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community. The United States is thwarting ratification of the SALT II Agreement, establishment of a moratorium on deploying new nuclear missile weapons in Europe, and a ban on the production of neutron weapons. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, openly militant challenges and declarations can be heard from Washington, which seem to be specifically intended to poison the atmosphere of relations between our countries (see "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 22).

Ignoring world public opinion, the R. Reagan Administration declared its adherence to the notorious J. Carter Doctrine No 59 with its stake on so-called "limited" nuclear war. In addition, it declared the preparedness of the U.S. armed forces and economy for two large protracted "nonnuclear wars" -- in Europe and in the Near East.

Thus the United States and its NATO partners view a buildup of military muscle and a rattling of sabers as the only way to achieve their great-power pretensions. Aggravating the international situation, they are attempting to intensify pressure on our country, our friends and allies, and to secure world domination for themselves. The imperialists seek to frighten the peoples of the world with the possibility of employment of the newest and most advanced weapons of mass destruction, in the hope that they will succeed in paralyzing the will of those who are fighting for peace, democracy, and socialism, and to turn back the world revolutionary process. Such plans are clearly doomed to failure, however, for they are opposed by the unified might of the nations of the socialist community and by our joint constructive policy of peace, which conforms to the aspirations of all progressive mankind, unifying all the world's peace-seeking, democratic forces in a united endeavor to prevent war.

## 2. Party Concern for Further Strengthening the Nation's Defense Capability and All-Out Improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces

In proceeding with presentation of the material of the second topic item, the instructor should stress that defense of the achievements of socialism against encroachments by imperialism has been and remains an objective necessity. Deeply analyzing and assessing the complex contemporary international situation in all aspects, our party has not ignored and does not ignore for a single day the problem of further strengthening this country's defense might and the combat efficiency of its Armed Forces. The principal directions of this work are scientifically and comprehensively substantiated in the USSR Constitution, the CPSU Program, resolutions of party congresses and decisions of Central Committee plenums, the writings and speeches of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other leaders of the Communist Party and Soviet State.

Our party has always resolutely opposed and continues to oppose escalation of the arms race, which reactionary imperialist nations are attempting to force upon us. But it cannot ignore the fact of vigorous militarization of all aspects of life in the bourgeois society and is compelled to be constantly concerned with steady improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces. The CPSU proceeds thereby from the well-known statement by V. I. Lenin that the very finest army and people who are the most dedicated to the cause of the revolution will be immediately annihilated by the enemy if they are not adequately armed, supplied with provisions, and trained (see "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 35, page 408).

The building of mature socialism in the USSR, its powerful technical-economic base, the high level of development of productive resources in our country, and the indestructible sociopolitical and ideological unity of society enable the CPSU successfully to accomplish the responsible tasks of all-out strengthening of the homeland's defense capability.

The 10th Five-Year Plan was an important step toward further increasing the economic might of the USSR and increasing the combat power of its Armed Forces. As is noted in the proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, this five-year plan resulted in a substantial increase in this country's national wealth. Its production and scientific-technological potential grew. The defense capability of the Soviet State became stronger. There was a rise in our people's living standards (see "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 3).

The successfully-begun 11th Five-Year Plan constitutes a new stage in accomplishment of the tasks of strengthening national defense. The Basic Directions of Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981-1985 and the Period up to 1990" note: "Successful fulfillment of the five-year plan will ensure further growth in this country's economic potential, increase in our people's living standards, maintaining the defense might of the Soviet State at an adequate level, and will enhance its international authority and prestige to an even greater degree...." ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 205).

Today the Soviet Army and Navy possess everything they need to give a prompt and resolute rebuff to any aggression, from any quarter. "A solid fusion of a high level of technical equipment, military skill and indomitable morale," it was noted



at the 26th CPSU Congress, "constitute the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 66). All military services and combat arms have been transformed into a formidable, invincible force.

Our Strategic Rocket Forces are a powerful shield which holds in check the aggressive aspirations and schemes of imperialism. They are capable of ensuring exceptional reliability in hitting various enemy targets at practically any distance.

The firepower and striking power, mobility and maneuverability of the Ground Forces have increased substantially. Their main striking force consists of tank combined units and units, which possess a high degree of mobility and capability to resist the effects of mass destruction weapons. Operational-tactical missiles comprise the foundation of Ground Forces firepower. Important missions are also performed by artillery and mortar subunits, which are armed with modern, highly-effective guns, howitzers, mortars and missile launchers.

The role of airborne troops is steadily growing under conditions of modern warfare. The high level of technical equipment of these troops and the combat expertise of paratroopers are persuasively attested by their successful actions at the recent "Zapad-81" [West-81] exercise for Soviet Armed Forces personnel.

The Air Defense Forces constitute a reliable shield guarding the nation, the army and navy against hostile air attacks. They are equipped with potent antiaircraft missile systems, all-weather missile-armed fighter-interceptors, and modern radar gear. All this enables air defense forces to hit hostile air targets with accuracy and sureness at maximum range, at high and low altitudes and at supersonic speeds.

The combat capabilities and striking power of the Air Force have increased. It possesses the most modern supersonic jet aircraft, carrying nuclear, missile, rocket and cannon armament, including swing-wing multirole aircraft.

Our Navy represents a potent force. Within a short period of time it has become a blue-water navy armed with nuclear missile weapons. Its combat power is based on nuclear submarines armed with submerged-launch missiles and homing torpedoes, as well as missile-armed naval aviation. The Navy also possesses sophisticated guided missile, mine countermeasures, amphibious landing and other surface ships, naval infantry, and shore units.

The USSR Armed Forces Rear Services have experienced further development. Today characteristic features include a high degree of motorization, mechanization and mobility, and formidable capabilities in the area of logistic and technical support of troops and naval forces.

Thanks to tireless concern by the party, our border and internal security troops as well as this nation's Civil Defense are constantly improving. Their role is increasing substantially in present-day conditions.

Concerned with providing the Armed Forces with everything they need for reliable defense of the interests of the Soviet State, the CPSU attaches great importance to all-out improvement in the professional and military skills of personnel. The level of expertise depends first and foremost on the quality of missile, field, air and

sea proficiency of troops and naval forces and their ability maximally to utilize the capabilities of weapons and equipment and effective modes of combat against an adversary. The most intensive development of personnel takes place precisely in the field, during artillery and missile shoots, during flight activities and on long sea (ocean) cruises; they work actively to acquire action skills in conditions maximally approximating actual combat.

We should note that Soviet Armed Forces personnel work persistently to master modern weapons and equipment, study that which is needed in war, work hard to meet performance standards and master combat techniques, and work to improve their endurance, combat aggressiveness, boldness, decisiveness, and will to win. The growing military expertise of military personnel is an important component part of the combat potential of our army and navy, which was once again confirmed at the large-scale "Zapad-81" [West-81] Soviet Armed Forces exercise which recently took place in the Belorussian and Baltic military districts as well as in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea. "Excellent proficiency, precision cooperation and teamwork among the combat arms, and skillful mastery of today's potent hardware," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "were all demonstrated in the course of the exercise." The exercise demonstrated that Soviet servicemen are ready and able at all times successfully to carry out the most complex missions pertaining to crushing any aggressor who dares encroach upon our socialist homeland.

Personnel should also be reminded that steady improvement in the morale of army and navy personnel is a matter of Communist Party special concern. Morale is the cementing factor of the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. V. I. Lenin pointed time and again to its exceptional importance. He emphasized that in the final analysis victory in war "is determined by the spirit of those masses which shed their blood on the field of battle" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch," Vol 41, page 121).

The strength of our servicemen lies in their firm ideological conviction, Communist consciousness, total dedication to the homeland, to the party and people, and in constant readiness and willingness at all times to come to the defense of their socialist homeland and to defend it, with no thought of their own life, until total victory over the aggressor is won. The high degree of ideological conditioning and Marxist-Leninist conviction of Soviet servicemen form the basis of all their successes in combat training and service activities and constitute the main factor which determines the capability of the enlisted man, noncommissioned officer and petty officer to display courage at the proper moment and to perform heroic deeds for the sake of communism. Our officers and men displayed an indomitable strength of spirit during the years of the Great Patriotic War. In battle against the German-fascist invaders, more than 300 Soviet servicemen emulated the deed of Aleksandr Matrosov. Our pilots rammed the enemy in aerial combat on more than 400 occasions. On more than 300 occasions they aimed their burning or damaged aircraft at concentrations of enemy personnel and equipment.

Exceptionally high morale and constant readiness and willingness to perform feats for the sake of the homeland and for the triumph of our great Communist cause comprise a distinctive feature of Soviet servicemen as well. As was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, today the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War stand in the ranks of defenders of the homeland. They have not experienced the harsh trials which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers.

But they are true to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. Discussing this at the congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "And whenever the interests of national security and defense of peace demand it, when it is necessary to help victims of aggression, the Soviet serviceman appears before the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, prepared to surmount any and all difficulties" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 66). Every member of the USSR Armed Forces should be proud of such high praise, should be proud and redouble his efforts in training, service activities, in strengthening discipline, and in further increasing the combat readiness of troops and naval forces.

The propagandist emphasizes that the combat potential of the USSR Armed Forces is greatly increased by the fact that they are serving shoulder to shoulder with the armies of the Warsaw Pact member nations. The CPSU and the brother parties of the nations of the socialist community are constantly concerned with steady improvement of the Warsaw Pact. It was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress that the "military-political defensive alliance of the nations of socialism is faithfully serving the cause of peace. It possesses everything necessary in order reliably to defend the socialist achievements of peoples" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," page 6).

During this class it is desirable to cite examples of heroism and courage by personnel in peacetime. The instructor should tell about the leading servicemen of his unit or ship, noting that their successes in combat and political training are grounded on a high degree of ideological conviction, Soviet patriotism, and socialist internationalism.

It is advisable to complete presentation of the material of the second topic item with the conclusion that Soviet servicemen are responding to CPSU concern for further strengthening national defense and increasing the combat readiness of our country's Armed Forces with a high degree of intensity in combat training, all-out improvement in skills, and a conscientious attitude toward performing the missions assigned to them by the 26th CPSU Congress.

### 3. Tasks of Personnel in the New Training Year

Proceeding with presentation of the material of the third topic item, it is important to note that in the new training year army and navy personnel are faced with large and complex tasks. The peaceful, productive labor of Soviet citizens is threatened by the imperialist aggressors and their stooges, who are nurturing plans of military attack on our country and the other nations of the socialist community. Therefore the main demand on the Armed Forces and their main task is reliable defense of the socialist homeland. In conditions where the threat that the imperialists will unleash a thermonuclear war remains a harsh reality of our time, the following statement by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev assumes special significance: "The Soviet Armed Forces as a whole, each combined unit and each military unit must constantly maintain a state of readiness which eliminates the slightest possibility that the aggressor can take us by surprise...."

The highest demands in ensuring constant combat readiness on the part of troops and naval forces are imposed on all servicemen, the level of missile, field, air and sea proficiency of whom determines the war-fighting capability and combat coordination of subunits, units, and warships. It is very important that each and every



enlisted man and noncommissioned officer rapidly master his job duties and gain a consummate mastery of his equipment and weapons, the techniques and methods of combat actions. To achieve this a serviceman of any military occupational specialty must work hard in class and at training drills, must utilize training time efficiently, and display activeness and persistence in the course of socialist competition. A serviceman should strive from the very first day in the military to become an excellent performer, an expert at his job, to be able to hit targets on the first round, burst, missile or pass. The main thing is to learn to defeat a powerful, clever, crafty and well-equipped adversary, to utilize all weapons to full advantage, and to operate effectively day or night, in all weather and climatic conditions. Military skill comes only to those who perform with diligence, without unnecessary relaxation of demands or simplifications, at training classes and exercises, during flight training and on cruises, in tank training areas and on firing ranges.

The Soviet people have furnished their defenders with powerful military hardware. The high degree of effectiveness of this equipment depends not only on how well a serviceman has mastered it but also on the quality of servicing and handling and observance of operating and maintenance rules and procedures. Hence an important task of each enlisted man and noncommissioned officer is to ensure strict observance of the demands of rules and regulations specifying equipment operation and care procedures.

Today combat operations are group actions. They demand considerable joint efforts on the part of servicemen of various military occupational specialties. An error or mistake in the performance of even one specialist can lead to failure to accomplish the combat mission. Today it is not enough for a military specialist to know well only his own job duties. It is important that he also fully master the job duties of his comrades, so that if necessary he can take the place of a disabled fellow serviceman who has been put out of commission. This requires complete mutual interchangeability in every squad, equipment and vehicle crew, and at every duty station.

In order to repel an aggressor sneak attack, a certain number of Soviet servicemen stand alert duty daily, duty which essentially constitutes performance of a combat mission in peacetime. It is not surprising that military personnel standing alert duty are called the forward echelon, which is called upon immediately to engage the enemy and to thwart his plans.

It is important that each serviceman standing alert duty be deeply aware of his national significance, his responsibility for the security of the homeland, and be constantly prepared for an effective struggle against an actual adversary. To achieve this the specialist must learn to utilize in full measure the performance characteristics of his weapon, display vigilance, and competently perform his job duties.

In the process of standing alert duty many servicemen display examples of a high degree of responsibility for the assigned task, moral-psychological and physical conditioning, and act with initiative, resoluteness, courageously and boldly. It would be appropriate at this point for the propagandist to cite concrete examples of vigilant and precise performance of alert duty by the men of his subunit and at the same time to name those who do not yet address full effort to this important task.



It is further necessary to state that constant personnel combat readiness involves a high degree of personnel political vigilance. Each and every enlisted man and noncommissioned officer must not forget for a single moment about the intrigues of our enemies and must be able to recognize and correctly assess the aggressive plans of the imperialists and their accomplices and to offer a prompt rebuff to the acts of ideological sabotage by our class enemies. It is necessary to remember that enemy intelligence is interested in all Soviet military and state secrets. This obliges the enlisted man and noncommissioned officer to keep secret information pertaining to troop dispositions, numerical strength and armament, strictly to observe rules and procedures of radio and telephone communications, and to avoid talking about military matters off the post and with strangers, as well as in correspondence with friends and relatives.

Political training of military personnel is an important means of increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of troops and naval forces. Topics to be studied in the new training year within the political education system will help personnel gain an even deeper mastery of Leninist ideas on defense of the socialist homeland, the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, current problems of building communism in this country, and tasks pertaining to further improvement of the Armed Forces. Every man must be conscientious about increasing his political knowledge, broadening his outlook, and be clearly aware that the complex world military-political situation obliges him to carry out with an even greater sense of responsibility his constitutional duty to guarantee the impregnability of the sacred borders of the homeland.

One of the basic conditions for successful accomplishment of tasks pertaining to steady increase in combat readiness is strong military discipline. In the Soviet Armed Forces it is grounded not on coercion and fear of punishment but on a high degree of political consciousness on the part of personnel and their total dedication to the homeland, the party, and the people. Each and every enlisted man and noncommissioned officer must absolutely observe the demands of military regulations and Soviet laws, and carry out the orders of his superiors in an exemplary manner.

An important task of servicemen is the campaign to ensure that the daily routine is strictly and absolutely carried out in the subunit, that there is strict observance of regulations and organization, that the military collective is unified and harmonious, and that any, even the slightest deviation from standards of conduct is condemned by one's fellows. The political attitude of each serviceman should be displayed particularly clearly in the campaign for firm military discipline.

Socialist competition is a powerful means of increasing the activeness of servicemen in training, service performance and in strengthening discipline. Its initiators have been specified in all Armed Forces branches and arms. Competition and serviceman initiative have assumed a large scale from the very first days of the new training year. Many examples of patriotic initiative by personnel are noted in the course of competition. The movement for excellent performance on each day of combat training, for exemplary performance of alert duty, and for maximum utilization of the capabilities of equipment and weapons is broadening. The campaign for the title of excellent crew, subunit, regiment, warship, and for the

title of leading combined unit is filled with genuine content. The initiative under the slogan "Not one lagging performer alongside!" is assuming increasing concreteness. A campaign for economy and thrift is being vigorously prosecuted.

It is a matter of honor for each and every serviceman to take his worthy place in the ranks of competition. It is essential that each and every hour of training promote accomplishment of pledges and increase in combat skill. It is important that in the course of competition the men extensively display mutual assistance and comradely mutual help, a feeling of healthy rivalry, a respectful and attentive attitude toward one's fellow servicemen, and impatience toward cases of complacency, lack of discipline, and departures from standards of socialist morality.

Communists and Komsomol members can play an active role in the campaign to create in military collectives a situation of competitiveness and a healthy moral atmosphere. They are called upon to lead the competition participants, to inspire the men by word and personal example to storm new heights in improving combat performance, to help their comrades, especially lagging individuals, in mastering military skills, to participate actively in civic affairs, and to be concerned with organizing leisure-time and daily off-duty activities of military personnel.

At the conclusion of the lecture it is appropriate to show with concrete examples what concrete successes have been achieved by the personnel of the subunit, unit and naval ship in the past training year. The instructor should give the names of outstanding performers in training, relate their service achievements and call upon the men to emulate the leaders in socialist competition and more fully to utilize reserve potential for further increasing vigilance, combat readiness, strengthening of discipline and observance of regulations.

By the entire course of presentation of the material, the instructor must lead students to the conclusion that the party and people have assigned them a lofty and responsible obligation -- to ensure the security of their socialist homeland and of our friends and allies. At the 26th CPSU Congress Comrade L. I. Brezhnev expressed on behalf of the Central Committee firm confidence that the glorious defenders of the homeland will continue in the future reliably guarding the peaceful, constructive labor of the Soviet people (see "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS," page 66). And our servicemen are doing everything they can to justify this confidence. As was noted by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, in a speech at a field inspection of the troops which were taking part in the "Zapad-81" exercise, they are prepared at all times to carry out their patriotic and internationalist duty.

The following can be recommended for personnel independent study: V. I. Lenin's "War and Revolution" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 32, pp 77-79), "Letter to the American Workers" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 37, pp 48-64), and "Appeal to the Red Army" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 38, pp 234-235); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's "CPSU Central Committee Report to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Current Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS," page 66); Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, articles 31, 32, 62, 63; chapters 4 and 6 of the textbook for political instruction classes "Na strazhe Rodiny" [Guarding the Homeland] (Voyenizdat, 1978).

Personnel can be asked the following questions for discussion of the topic at the seminar or during the discussion: 1. What did V. I. Lenin say about imperialism as the main culprit and source of wars? 2. What conclusions were reached by the 26th CPSU Congress on the stepped-up aggressiveness of imperialism in present-day conditions? 3. What measures is the CPSU taking to strengthen national defense and increase the combat power of the USSR Armed Forces? 4. Why are higher demands being imposed on the combat readiness of troops and naval forces in present-day conditions? 5. What was said at the 26th CPSU Congress on strengthening the combat potential of the USSR Armed Forces? What tasks face subunit, unit, and warship personnel in the new training year?

#### Literature for Propagandists

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V. I. Lenin, "Socialism and War," "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 26, pp 311-317.

V. I. Lenin, "Letter to the American Workers," "Poln. Sobr. Soch.," Vol 37, pp 48-64.

Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Articles 31, 32, 62, 63.

L. I. Brezhnev, "CPSU Central Committee Report to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Current Party Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], page 66.

"Proceedings of the Fifth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation," PRAVDA, 24 June 1980.

D. F. Ustinov, "Against an Arms Race and the Threat of War," PRAVDA, 25 July 1981.

D. F. Ustinov, "Speech at a Field Inspection of Troops Participating in the 'Zapad-81' Exercise," PRAVDA, 13 September 1981.

D. F. Ustinov, "Speech at an Official Meeting in Yel'nya Dedicated to the 40th Anniversary of the Soviet Guard and Award of the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st Class, to This City," PRAVDA, 19 Sep 1981.

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## ARMED FORCES

### SOVIET TELEVISION PROGRAM ON ARMED FORCES REVIEWED

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[Article by Col A. Sabel'nikov: "Army and Navy Life on the Screen"]

[Text] For 8 years now a program called "I Serve the Soviet Union!" has appeared on our TV screens every Sunday morning. This series enables viewers to see army and navy work days and holidays, the intense combat and political training of those who in the language of the military are called USSR Armed Forces personnel.

The subject and main content of these programs have become clearly defined in past years. And this is not as simple as might appear at first glance. Initially the idea was that the series should encompass everything which might be of interest to servicemen. But of course the range of interests of today's "man with a gun," who possesses a solid general education and is highly cultured, is quite broad. And to respond to all his desires within the framework of a single weekly one-hour program is obviously an impossible task. Therefore in our opinion the only correct decision was the one reached by the producers of this series -- to make the main content of the TV program "I Serve the Soviet Union!" a depiction of the life and activities of today's Armed Forces and disclosure of their combat potential as a solid fusion of a high level of technical equipment, military skill, and indomitable morale.

Embodiment of the concept proved to be within the capabilities of the patriotic indoctrination division of the Main Propaganda Office of Central Television. This organization offered a highly skilled, experienced, energetic and aggressive team united by awareness of the importance of the job to which they are devoting their energies and abilities, and of responsibility for that contribution which they are making to the cause of ideological-political, military, moral and aesthetic conditioning of servicemen and to the military-patriotic indoctrination of our country's working people and Soviet youth.

This is discussed in the great many letters received by Central Television, including the patriotic indoctrination division. On the basis of this mail one can judge the makeup of the regular viewing audience and the quality and effectiveness of the telecasts. These letters persuasively demonstrate that people look forward to and watch this program. They watch it with attentiveness which gives rise to the desire to respond, to state their opinion, to ask a question, or to make a



suggestion. The majority of viewer responses are favorable, warm and, we are particularly gratified to note, constructive. Their analysis helps the program producers determine the direction of subsequent artistic quest and to modify project plans.

Just what is offered by the program "I Serve the Soviet Union!" and what does it tell the military audience and all those many friends of the army and navy who gather in front of their TV screen every Sunday morning?

First of all the program depicts life in the Soviet Armed Forces, shows what tasks are being performed and how military skills and combat readiness are being improved. The cameras enable the viewer to visit, as it were, military units and naval ships, airfields and tank training areas, training classrooms and command posts, and to see servicemen in the midst of combat and political training. We get together with leading army and navy personnel, officers and enlisted men, socialist competition winners, excellent-rated personnel, experts at military affairs. More and more frequently we not only see servicemen in the dynamics of diversified military labor but also interview them directly, entering the world of their thoughts and feelings. And sometimes words spoken by an enlisted man or officer, perhaps just a few words, but words from their lips and heart, gives more insight for an understanding of the spiritual, intellectual and moral essence of this individual than a voice-over commentary.

The TV screen also presents the "geography" of the Armed Forces in a fairly diversified manner. Just in recent telecasts viewers have learned of the successes of the men of the Belorussian and Turkestan military districts, have "visited" the Northern Fleet, the "Zapad-81" [West-81] exercise, and the military personnel who are taking part in building the Baykal-Amur Mainline, and they have become acquainted with the training process at many service schools.

Preparing these and other topics, the producers placed particular emphasis on socialist competition in the military initiated on the eve of and following the 26th CPSU Congress, revealed the vanguard role of Communists and Komsomol members, and told about servicemen elected as delegates to this highest party forum.

A worthy place in this series is occupied by materials dealing with the military activities of V. I. Lenin and implementation of his precepts on defense of the socialist homeland.

At first each program in the series "I Serve the Soviet Union!" was devoted to some one topic item. Experience indicated, however, that it was advisable to expand the structure of this series. Thus were born program topic areas which became regulars: "Your Military Profession"; "From Your Letters"; "Training Ground"; "The Region in Which You Serve"; "Pages From History"; "On the Globe"; and others. This has made it possible to make the program more interesting and to increase its content.

For example, the program telecast on 22 February 1981, on the eve of the 26th CPSU Congress, assembled in the TV studio three generations of Soviet servicemen and many popular people in the arts, known by their long friendship with the military. They included gray-haired veterans -- the first Red Kremlin cadets, heroes of the Great Patriotic War, and members of today's Armed Forces. Those who spoke, including participants in the assault on Berlin -- Lt Gen (Ret) F. Lisitsyn, poet A. Zharov,

who joined Komsomol in 1918 and has been a party member since 1920, USSR People's Artist B. Andreyev, and composer Ya. Frenkel'; delegates to the 26th CPSU Congress Maj A. Gerasimov, WO D. Zaguzov, and former naval infantryman Engr-Col P. Kolosov -- spoke in a persuasive and moving manner about the heroic deeds of servicemen in the Great Patriotic War, the vanguard role of army Communists, and disclosed with concrete examples from life the succession of generations and the faithfulness of the present defenders of the homeland to the fine traditions of our army and people. And although the form of the program is not new, its high ideological and artistic level has evoked many fine responses and letters of thanks.

The program devoted to military personnel building the Baykal-Amur Mainline was also quite interesting in our opinion. TV newsmen succeeded in showing in a comprehensive and diversified manner the daily life and work of the soldiers who are building this rail line. We saw leading workers and learned about their labor achievements, and we were there with them as they laid the railbed, engaged in combat training activities; we attended a performance of the "Mainline" amateur talent ensemble, and we visited a soldiers' buffet. We still remember the interview with railway troops veteran M. Zernov and his son, Capt V. Zernov, who is continuing the family tradition. Composer Oleg Ivanov and singer Ol'ga Voronets, who took part in this program, performed several songs dedicated to the railway troops.

A fine addition to the TV program "I Serve the Soviet Union!" in our opinion is the regular feature entitled "Our Movie Theater," which has won viewer approval. Indeed, this country's film studios, including the film studio of the USSR Ministry of Defense, put out many films dealing with military and heroic-patriotic themes. Who other than the program "I Serve the Soviet Union!" can rapidly bring information on them to the mass army and navy viewer.

In our opinion there should be not only more frequent showing of new documentary films on military-patriotic themes on television, but discussions of such films should also be organized, get-togethers with filmmaking groups, etc. It would also be a good thing for the best works of army and navy amateur filmmakers to be given TV viewings.

While giving high marks to the TV program "I Serve the Soviet Union!" and noting its continuous improvement, we must also mention unresolved problems and shortcomings. The resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress require of us such a critical, demanding analysis. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in the Central Committee Report to the Congress: "...Every TV or radio program must be viewed as a serious conversation with the people, who expect not only a truthful and up-to-date presentation of facts but also a profound analysis and serious conclusions."

Unfortunately not every program of this series meets these high demands, for it sometimes happens that we see people and combat equipment on the TV screen but are not satisfied with what we have seen. I recall that at the beginning of this year there was a program dealing with airmen. They showed fliers by their aircraft at the airfield, around a campfire in the woods, playing pool at the club, and at a children's concert, but we did not really get a good look at their activities. The questions which the airmen were asked were of a primitive nature, and naturally their answers to the questions were monosyllabic and shallow. And yet the viewer wanted very much to hear from these intrepid aerial warriors about how they came

into aviation, about how they are mastering their complex modern aircraft, how they are honing their combat skills, and how they are helping one another in the course of socialist competition. I believe it would be a good thing if a representative of the TV viewing audience took part in the telecast and engaged in a detailed, lively conversation on all these problems with the heroes of this TV presentation. But on this occasion this did not happen, and the statement that the fliers had done an excellent job on accomplishing their task proved to be an uncorroborated declaration, and yet the personnel of the aviation unit in question are initiators of socialist competition.

In our opinion such failures could be avoided if military journalists -- persons who as a rule combine a high level of professional training with thorough knowledge of military service, army and navy affairs were enlisted to prepare materials which require knowledge of the specifics of a given branch of the Armed Forces. There are examples of fruitful cooperation with some military journalists, but in general television is not showing particular initiative in this regard.

We believe that it would also be appropriate at this point to state that portrayal on the TV screen of the daily life and activities of army and navy, internal procedures in military units and on naval ships, the external appearance of servicemen, military rituals and mass cultural activities are perceived by viewers as a model which should be followed. It is therefore so important that the TV screen be irreproachable in all respect. Unfortunately errors both in a regulation and military respect still crop up in these telecasts. This occurs to a greater degree because during filming commanders and political workers sometimes fail adequately to monitor observance of regulations by personnel, to ensure that training activities are conducted on a high methodological level, etc. Thus various "punctures" occur. Correction of errors at the final stage of telecast production is sometimes very difficult if not impossible. There still occur, although not frequently, annoying instances where one gross error nullifies all the work done by TV people during a distant location shoot.

Many "I Serve the Soviet Union!" telecasts deal with achievements and successes in meeting socialist pledges, which is quite logical. But frequently this is reported as a final result, while the most important thing -- the way these results were achieved -- unfortunately is ignored. I believe that one should not sidestep the issue of those difficulties and problems which occur in the military and which are of concern to people. Take, for example, the problem of development of the young officer or noncommissioned officer, the process of formation and unification of the military collective, creation of a highly moral atmosphere in the collective, and incorporation of the principles of Soviet military comradeship. Many important, vital questions await investigation and representation by TV commentary!

Of course display of combat equipment and its capabilities will remain on the agenda, but man should always be at the focal point -- a conscientious soldier possessing high political standards, a patriot and internationalist. How important it is that this person, appearing on our TV screens, be remembered and evoke on the part of young people admiration and the desire to emulate him.

Comprehensive display of the best people of the army and navy -- socialist competition winners, excellent-rated individuals in combat and political training,



genuine experts in military affairs, skilled commanders and indoctrinators -- will unquestionably foster, as is required by recent party documents, general strengthening of the prestige of honest, productive military labor.

The problem of further development of the heroic-patriotic theme on the TV screen is also important. "Military-patriotic indoctrination of Soviet citizens and our young people," wrote USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "remains today one of our vital tasks." The program "I Serve the Soviet Union!" devotes requisite attention to it.

It is a rare program during which we do not hear about the heroic deeds of fighting men in battles for the freedom and independence of our homeland and do not see veterans of the revolution, war and labor. At the same time TV newsmen seek to trace the close link between the heroic traditions of the past and the military labor of today. This is also promoted by special telecasts entitled "Victor" and by the TV almanac "Exploit." In addition, heroic-patriotic materials are periodically produced in all the main programming offices at Central Television.

The scattered nature of this work on the scale of Central Television, however, cannot help but evoke disappointment. Essentially each main programming office develops heroic-patriotic theme material with its own manpower, which sometimes leads to parallelism, unnecessary duplication, as well as simply to various errors and inaccuracies caused by the insufficient competence of TV newsmen in the specific military field. The assistance of military consultants, however, does not always produce the necessary effect, in view of the sporadic nature of their participation in preparing telecasts. While not venturing to suggest ready recipes in this complex matter, we nevertheless feel that there is a lot of food for thought here.

When discussing the effectiveness of TV programs, one of course should not forget that improving their ideological and artistic level is merely one aspect of things. It is no less important that telecasts reach those for whom they are intended. And while commanders and political workers make efforts to ensure that servicemen have the regular opportunity to view the program "I Serve the Soviet Union!" (viewings are included as a rule in the off-duty day activity schedules), unfortunately planned organizational work on these programs is not being conducted as vigorously as would be desired. And yet it is very important to encourage people to discuss various problems, to respond in a qualified manner to questions which arise, and to help correlate the fine examples seen on the TV screen with the state of affairs in one's military collective. In this area one sees a considerable field of activity for political workers, club activists, and Lenin room councils.

Information and propaganda media and their tasks in the present-day situation are given considerable attention in the proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress. The necessity of making fuller utilization of the vast opportunities and capabilities of our television was stated at the All-Union Seminar-Conference of Ideological Workers held in April 1981 by the CPSU Central Committee.

There is no doubt that television will become an increasingly more effective factor in ideological-political, military-moral and aesthetic indoctrination of Soviet Armed Forces personnel.

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## GROUND FORCES

### POLITICAL WORK: IMPORTANCE OF CRITICISM AND SELF-CRITICISM

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 81 (signed to press 5 Oct 81) pp 39-46

[Article by Col Gen M. Popkov, military council member, chief of the Ground Forces Political Directorate: "Criticism and Self-Criticism -- Tested and Proven Method of Improving Things"]

[Text] One of the most important standards of party affairs -- comradely criticism and self-criticism -- elaborated and comprehensively substantiated by V. I. Lenin, has become the property, a moral and legal standard of the Soviet people, an effective method of combating shortcomings, developing creative initiative and indoctrinating people. Deeply aware of its responsibility to the people, the party does everything it can, utilizing criticism and self-criticism, to raise to an even higher level the title of party member, to involve Communists in even more active participation in the campaign to accomplish the tasks of building communism.

V. I. Lenin strongly warned Communists against smugness, conceit and overestimation of what has been achieved. He taught that the party's attitude toward its own mistakes is one of the most important criteria of its seriousness and its ability to carry out in a practical way its obligations to the worker class and to all working people. Pride in successes should not lead to complacency; enthusiasm for one's work should be combined with a healthy feeling of dissatisfaction. "Self-criticism," stressed V. I. Lenin, "is absolutely essential for any living and vital party. There is nothing more trivial than self-satisfied optimism" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 10, page 355). Following Lenin's behests, the party seeks to ensure that criticism and self-criticism become an effective means of combating stagnation and a reliable guarantee of forward movement. In the Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev called for establishing in all party organizations a spirit of self-criticalness and implacableness toward shortcomings. The CPSU Rules state that every Communist shall develop criticism and self-criticism.

Today criticism and self-criticism is a weapon which is employed not only by Communists but by all Soviet citizens. The U.S.R. Constitution guarantees the right of every citizen to criticize shortcomings in the performance of various agencies and organizations. The law prescribes that officials shall consider citizen suggestions and requests and take necessary steps within a specified period of time. The law also prohibits persecution for criticism, specifying criminal liability for this offense.

Party standards, which define the essence and character of criticism and self-criticism, also apply in full measure to party organizations in the military. Instructions to CPSU organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy state: party organizations shall, on the basis of criticism and self-criticism, boldly expose shortcomings in training and indoctrination of personnel, party-political work, in the activities of party committees and party bureaus, political agencies, supply and services for military personnel, civilian workers and employees. Of course criticism of orders and instructions by commanders and other superiors is not permitted in the military, which is due to the specific features of military service and is aimed at strengthening one-man command on a party foundation.

Criticism, constituting a regular pattern of development of the party and all Soviet society, should be deeply party-minded, high-principled, and should proceed from the interests of the party, the state, of all working people. Criticism and self-criticism are essentially effective. The party develops criticism not for the sake of criticism but for the purpose of correcting deficiencies in organization. The CPSU has always viewed criticism as a most important initial point for subsequent action. And today one of the most important points advanced by the 26th CPSU Congress stresses giving criticism maximum effectiveness. This effectiveness is ensured by organizational work directed toward correcting revealed mistakes and deficiencies.

Military councils, commanders, political agencies and party organizations in the Ground Forces, carrying out the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress on development of high-principled criticism and self-criticism, direct them toward successful accomplishment of the tasks of increasing combat readiness and improving all ideological, political-indoctrination work and practical activities of military cadres.

The work of political agencies and party committees (bureaus), for example, directed toward implementing critical comments and suggestions by Communists made during the most recent sports and elections to party agencies, was analyzed at a recent meeting of chiefs of political agencies. It was recommended that during the report-election meetings which had begun party members be informed on what had been accomplished to carry out their instructions and to create in party collectives an atmosphere of demandingness, criticism and self-criticism, and a high sense of responsibility for that which was planned and decided to accomplish.

Political agencies now seek to analyze in a more self-critical manner their organizational and political work among military personnel and to evaluate it not according to quantity of measures but by the influence which it exerts on results in the campaign for effectiveness and quality of the training process and firm military discipline.

Further development of criticism and its increased effectiveness were promoted by party meetings held in many party organizations on the recommendation of the political directorate, with the agenda "On instilling in every Communist party principledness and a critical approach to appraising the results of one's labor."

Experience teaches us that in those party collectives where an atmosphere of strong responsibility and mutual demandingness has been created, where all conditions are present for direct and open criticism of deficiencies, wherever they

appear, stronger party influence is exerted on the service performance of servicemen and combat training of the subunit and unit, and the greater is the sociopolitical activeness of party members and probationary members. There is no stagnation, complacency or excessive self-congratulations for what has been achieved, combat and political training results are better and military discipline is stronger.

Take, for example, the party organization of a certain motorized rifle regiment. This unit was the initiator of socialist competition in the Ground Forces in the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, under the slogan "For a high degree of combat readiness and firm observance of regulations!" The regiment is meeting its pledges honorably. A great deal of credit for this goes to party members, who self-critically approach evaluation of their labor, appraise any negative fact in performance of duty and combat training in a strict and demanding manner, and are persistent in working to achieve stated goals. Working harmoniously and with good cooperation and teamwork, the commander, political worker, and party committee smoothly and efficiently organize execution of suggestions by party members and work persistently to correct deficiencies.

Just before a recently held regimental tactical exercise, for example, they held a party meeting with the agenda "On the personal responsibility of party members for high-quality preparation for and conduct of tactical exercises." Many critical comments were made at this meeting. In particular, matters of discussion included the poor follow-through on the part of certain party full members and probationary members, their poor skills in command control of the subunits, and shortcomings in equipment operation, servicing and maintenance. Ways to correct all that which impedes preparing for exercises as for actual combat were specified at the meeting, as well as ways to improve the contribution of each and every party member and probationary member toward the successful conduct of an exercise. The exercise was held in an organized and instructive manner. The commander highly praised the personal example and actions of the party members.

An attentive attitude on the part of the regimental command and party committee toward criticism, comments and suggestions from the lower echelon has become standard here. It teaches party members and probationary members demandingness and mobilizes them for correcting deficiencies which diminish success even to the slightest degree in the campaign for firm observance of regulations and further increasing combat readiness. Tangible results are already in evidence. They have succeeded in significantly reducing the time required to put the subunits and the entire regiment into a state of full combat readiness. The majority of party members have become excellent-rated in training, and more than 70 percent of them are advanced proficiency-rated specialists.

The demand advanced at the 26th CPSU Congress that each leader show greater responsibility for the assigned task played an important part in the fact that recently there has been an appreciable improvement in the level and effectiveness of criticism and self-criticism in party organizations of headquarters and control agencies. Meeting agenda in the past frequently covered only shortcomings and errors of omission in the activities of subordinate commanders and political workers. But no opinions were stated on the degree of culpability of headquarters and control agency Communists in the mistakes and errors of omission of these individuals. At the present time the critical gaze of members of party organizations of headquarters and control agencies is focused primarily on their own



activities. Criticism is leveled not only at existing deficiencies but also on the specific culpable parties, including leader-Communists, and practical measures are being specified for correcting the deficiencies. Utilizing the weapon of criticism and self-criticism, headquarters political agencies and party organizations are actively campaigning to carry out the demands of the party, orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense, and are beneficially influencing improvement in work style, monitoring and verification of execution, and the indoctrination of military leader personnel in the spirit of strict observance of party and state discipline. All this is promoting smooth and more effective performance by control agencies.

A very important period of activity following the 26th CPSU Congress has begun for Communists in the military -- the report-election campaign. They consider it to be a very important task to analyze profoundly and self-critically the state of affairs in party organizations, to scrutinize in a demanding manner to determine whether everything possible has been done to increase party influence on the daily life and training of personnel, to help the commander strengthen combat readiness and military discipline, and to promote extensive socialist competition. CPSU members use the strictest measuring stick to evaluate the status of intraparty work and, in particular, how a spirit of criticism and self-criticism is becoming established locally, and how people are being indoctrinated in a spirit of implacability toward various deficiencies and departures from the demands of the CPSU Rules. A criterion for evaluating all this work is fulfillment of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress by the party collective and by each party member.

The party teaches us that criticism and self-criticism do not develop automatically, spontaneously. They are ensured by purposeful ideological and organizational work on the part of political agencies, party committees, bureaus and all party members. And a correct job is being done in this regard by those party organizations which explain to Communists the points of the Party Program and CPSU Rules, the role and significance of criticism, and which organize a thorough study of its principles and methods within the party education network, at theoretical conferences of party and Komsomol activists, and which periodically devote party meetings, party bureau and party committee meetings to this tried and true means of combating deficiencies. Many political agencies sternly reprimand those Communists who are disinclined sensibly to analyze the state of affairs in the subunit or unit, who have reconciled themselves with errors of omission, and who attempt to rationalize them with references to various "objective" causes. An essential demand in work by political agencies with all Communists, especially officers, is to instill in them the ability objectively and self-critically to assess the results of their efforts directed toward accomplishing combat training tasks.

Considerable experience in indoctrinating Communists in a spirit of high principledness and self-criticism in light of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress has been amassed in the political section of the Kantemirovskaya Guards Tank Division. They have had good results with the established practice of conducting interviews with commanders, political workers, and secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations on how to instill in Communists implacableness toward shortcomings and to develop willingness critically to appraise one's job performance. The political section recently analyzed how party meetings are conducted in primary party organizations and discussed with activists measures which must be taken in order to increase to



an even higher degree the responsibility of activists for implementing decisions and suggestions by party members.

Attention to each and every word of criticism and a businesslike response to well-substantiated observations is the standard followed by the party organizations of this combined unit and a characteristic feature of the entire atmosphere of the units and subunits. The political section teaches leader-Communists to see first and foremost the heart of the matter in every critical presentation. Against what laws and errors of omission is it directed? What are their causes? Who specifically is culpable? What steps must be taken to improve things? We must say that this helps improve the quality of the training process, the effectiveness of political indoctrination work, helps resolutely eliminate cases of overstating combat and political training performance results, and thus helps concentrate attention on a persistent campaign to achieve excellent results by personnel in socialist competition.

But not everywhere is this done. Some people acknowledge the importance of criticism, but in actual fact they underrate and sometimes even ignore it. To what does this lead? Some individuals do not always take a principled position toward eliminating deficiencies and errors of omission occurring in the unit and subunit. Cases occur where the activeness of Communists is of an ostentatious nature, calculated for external effect. Such individuals talk more than others of the necessity of correcting some deficiency and blame and criticize everybody for something. But as soon as the time comes to get to work in a practical manner, they contrive to stay clear.

A wide forum is also necessary for criticism and free exchange of opinions. Party meetings constitute such a fine forum. Our party has always attached and continues to attach great importance to development of criticism and self-criticism at meetings of Communists. It was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress that the party meeting is a place where all matters of vital concern should be discussed deeply and in a serious manner. We should comment that many party meetings in subunits and units are presently being conducted on a higher ideological and organizational level. They are characterized by a businesslike nature, bold statement of problems, and a critical analysis of experience and shortcomings. The reports and elections which are being held at the present time also attest to this. They are distinguished not only by increased demandingness by Communists on their elected officials but also by greater demandingness on themselves and their comrades.

At the same time we must acknowledge that in some party organizations practically no preparations are made for meetings, and they are held in a sluggish manner, without active discussion or profound analysis of the points of agenda. Some comrades always remain silent at meetings and do not express their opinions. It also sometimes happens that a person mentions facts of a negative nature but fails to name the culpable persons and to analyze the reasons for their wrong behavior. This usually happens where a genuinely involved attitude toward the performance results and affairs of one's subunit and unit are not instilled in party members, and where they are afraid to speak the truth to one another's face.

This is what happened, for example, in the regiment in which Maj I. Takhtamyshev serves as party committee secretary. The members of the party committee and other

Communists, aware of instances of dishonesty and lack of modesty on the part of CPSU member Maj A. Savin, for a long period of time were reconciled with this situation and failed to condemn his behavior. Nor did the political agency take any measures against him. Feeling that he could act with impunity, Savin began abusing his position and ceased critically appraising his performance results. The lack of adequate demandingness, criticism and self-criticism in the party collective also had a negative influence on the performance of a number of other party members and probationary members and on the state of affairs in their work sectors. As a result performances in combat and political training declined in some subunits.

Experience convinces one that it is important not to ignore facts of an indifferent attitude by anyone toward shortcomings, errors of omission, and violations of standards of Communist morality, strongly to condemn the philistine attitude of "It's none of my business," and to bring enlightenment to those who close their eyes to negative phenomena. It is necessary to bear in mind that when there is desire, it is always possible to make the party member and probationary member adopt a more active attitude toward life. There are plenty of opportunities for this in every party collective. Here is just one example. The conduct of CPSU member Capt A. Kirillov was once being discussed at a party meeting in a certain subunit. The officer had shown a lack of conscientiousness toward his duties, kept aloof from indoctrination of subordinates, conducted training classes poorly, and was frequently late to work. The party organization raised the question of the conduct of this CPSU member for discussion at the meeting. But imagine the surprise when some individuals, such as CPSU member V. Barkin, for example, who were well acquainted with Kirillov's poor job performance and breaches of discipline, simply remained silent. And when the vote was being taken to approve party punishment, Barkin stated: "Decide what you think is right. I personally am abstaining from any conclusions."

Signs of a passive attitude on the part of this party member had been observed previously. For example, once when the party organization secretary gave him a lecture assignment, he replied: "Why me? Let lectures be given by those whose job it is." The party bureau brought Barkin strictly to account: "What is your party position as a member of the CPSU?" He was compelled to respond. Involving a person in party work and giving him concrete assignments all had the most effective influence on Barkin, helped him better understand his role in the party collective, helped him become more actively involved in civic affairs and take a high-principled position toward everything which is at variance with party standards, with the demands of the CPSU Rules and our military regulations. In short, he radically changed his attitude toward criticism.

The summer period of training attests to the fact that success in accomplishing the increasingly more complex tasks of ensuring a high degree of combat readiness depends in large measure on a demanding appraisal by each and every serviceman, particularly a party member, of his own labor, and on a healthy feeling of dissatisfaction with what one has achieved. All these valuable qualities experience suitable development only where people are genuinely high-principled and implacable toward shortcomings. And on the other hand, if a party organization has a condescending attitude even toward the slightest manifestations of complacency, sooner or later a more serious illness will develop: self-satisfied smugness as well as an endeavor to embellish the state of combat and political training.

Something of this sort occurred in the division in which Lt Col Ye. Babich serves as senior instructor for organizational-party work. Certain commanders and political workers, lulled by past successes, introduced practically no new elements in the current training year into methods of training and indoctrinating personnel, and did little to improve the training and indoctrination process, being content with the fact that the subunits were producing decent results in the unnecessarily simplified conditions and on familiar pieces of ground. The few critical comments made by individuals about this situation were not heard in the overall atmosphere of smugness and complacency. Criticism and self-criticism were for the most part of a general character. Such a work style produced bitter fruit: at a recent inspection those subunits which in the opinion of the combined unit command had been doing well failed to match their previous results.

Everybody knows that in order to advance further it is necessary constantly to build on success, to instill in each and every party member a feeling of healthy dissatisfaction with what has been achieved. Such an approach to appraisal of one's labor is in consonance with today's party demands -- not to rest on one's laurels, to seek new reserve potential for increasing efficiency of labor, and to implement this reserve.

Experience indicates that the level of criticism and self-criticism is in direct relationship to how party collectives and higher party agencies monitor and verify response to critical comments and suggestions presented at party meetings, at party committee and bureau meetings, and in the press, and whether leader-Communists have a correct attitude toward the opinion of their party comrades. In the decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Monitoring and Verification of Execution in Light of the Resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress," the CPSU Central Committee attaches particular importance to improving verification of execution in primary party organizations. There should be created here an atmosphere of high demandingness and efficiency, criticism and self-criticism, and implacability toward shortcomings. It has been suggested at party meetings, party committee and party bureau meetings that regular party member reports be submitted on what they are doing to carry out adopted decrees, to support the initiative and creative innovations of people and their practical suggestions. Such monitoring and verification is an effective means of increasing demandingness on cadres, strengthening discipline at all levels, and guaranteeing a unity of word and deed.

A party attitude toward criticism is an indicator of a Communist's political maturity and his understanding of his responsibility to the party and state for the assigned task. V. I. Lenin stated that nobody is fully guaranteed against mistakes and errors in his work. The entire question lies in that person's attitude toward mistakes discovered in his activities and how he responds to critical comments directed toward him. If a person is capable of looking at things in a sober and sensible way, of acknowledging his mistakes and taking measures to correct them, this means that any important job can be entrusted to him. But if a person responds to criticism from the position of defending the "honor of the uniform," if he is unable to overcome within himself irritation with and resentment over criticism, there arises the danger that he will ignore it and refuse to acknowledge it to an even greater degree.

Here is confirmation of that. Lt Col G. Makarov was brought to strict party account for actions incompatible with the lofty title of CPSU member. He



acknowledged his culpability. After it was all over, however, he proceeded threatening and harassing military personnel who had blown the whistle on his abuses. In addition, Makarov forced certain warrant officers and enlisted personnel to write statements to the party commission and to recant their previous statements. It would seem appropriate to punish Makarov severely for suppressing criticism and harassing those persons who helped him see the error of his ways. But the party commission attached to the political directorate of the Baltic Military District failed to respond appropriately sharply to the situation.

One still encounters, even if rarely, among officer-Communists in a leadership position comrades who respond with great hostility toward every critical comment or letter which openly and boldly reveals deficiencies and errors of omission. In addition, taking advantage of their position, they endeavor to exert pressure and literally persecute those persons who have dared to "air dirty linen," as they say. CPSU member N. Maslova, for example, a civilian employee of one of the military commissariats in the city of Saratov, sent in numerous reports to the political section of the oblast military commissariat and to district headquarters about abuses of position and incorrect actions by Col B. Nikiforov. They only gave lip service, however, to verification of N. Maslova's statements, while the rayon military commissariat, in violation of labor laws, fired the whistle blower. We note that at the political directorate of the Volga Military District they were subjective in their treatment of Maslova's letter and failed to reach a prompt and high-principled assessment of the conduct of party member Nikiforov. Higher authorities were forced to intervene. Severe party punishment was meted out against Nikiforov. Party member N. Maslova was reinstated in her job.

The above fact also indicates a certain trend which sometimes is observed, so-called selective perception of criticism. If it comes from above, it must be accepted in order to avoid trouble, but if it comes from below or from the newspaper it can be ignored. Such an attitude toward criticism is intolerable. There should only be one response to criticism, from whatever quarter -- a party-minded, high-principled, immediate response.

The party demands a resolute response to eliminate cases of suppression of criticism, to correct, and if necessary, to punish the guilty party. "Any attempts at harassment or persecution for criticism," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "must be most vigorously rebuffed.... There shall be no connivance in regard to those who suppress criticism -- this is a demand both of the laws of the party and of the state!"

Nor does the party tolerate smoothing off sharp corners, maintaining silence about shortcomings, sham efficiency, or embellishment of the state of affairs. "Wherever criticism and self-criticism are not observed," states the CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," "wherever there is a lack of publicity in public affairs, direct detriment is done to activeness by the masses, and an important source of the strength of the socialist system lies precisely in activeness by the masses."

Of course criticism is not honey, and it is not always pleasant to receive it. A party official, however, is called upon to show an example of a correct, party attitude toward criticism. This is one of the signs of an official's deep understanding of his duty to the party and people.



Party punishment constitutes harsh criticism of a Communist's job performance, actions, and conduct. It is important that such punishment be of a strong indoctrinational character both for the guilty comrade and for those around him. To increase the effectiveness of disciplinary punishment, political agencies are called upon to verify and analyze what concrete work is being done with Communists receiving party disciplinary punishment, what they are doing to enhance their ideological conditioning, to improve quality of training, precise and absolute fulfillment of the demands of the CPSU Rules and military regulations, whether they have correctly accepted criticism directed at them, and whether they are drawing the necessary lessons from it. At the same time a political agency has a right to require of the party committee and party bureau a demanding and at the same time comradely attitude toward a party member or probationary member who has committed an offense and assistance in correcting shortcomings.

Prompt and timely analysis of letters and requests submitted by servicemen and taking necessary measures in response constitutes an effective means of development and support of meaningful, constructive criticism. We know that many letters and petitions contain expression of implacability toward wastefulness, various kinds of bureaucratic distortions, and lawless actions. The recently issued CPSU Central Committee Decree entitled "Measures for Further Improvement of Response to Worker Letters and Suggestions in Light of the Resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress" once again notes the necessity of an attentive attitude toward people's letters, petitions and suggestions, as well as the necessity of resolutely putting a stop to attempts to suppress criticism, to harass and persecute the authors of letters.

The Ground Forces Political Directorate, political agencies and party organizations see their duty as using all means of ideological and organizational work and strict observance of the principles of intraparty democracy to establish in all party collectives a spirit of criticism and self-criticism, implacability toward deficiencies, and to ensure active participation by Communists in the activities of party organizations and in discussing and settling all matters advanced in the course of affairs. This is one of the most important conditions for forming a vigorous life position in CPSU members and probationary members and increasing the militance of party organizations and their role in ensuring accomplishment of the tasks proceeding from the resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress for Communists in the military.

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## GROUND FORCES

### GROUND FORCES TRAINING

#### Motorized Rifle Units: Battalion Defense Training

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Nov 81 p 1

[Article by Lt Col M. Lishniy, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Red Banner Far East Military District: "Right-Flankers of 1981 Competition: A Test in the Mountains"]

[Text] The steep-faced hills were wreathed in fog. Surrounded by a semicircle of a mountain ridge on one side and on the other dropping off with inaccessible cliffs to the sea, they stretched along shore in a narrow ridge, forming the only passage to the cape suitable for landing a force. The "enemy" straddled this passage firmly and, in assigning the mission to the battalion commanders for capturing the defile, the regimental commander did not conceal the fact that a difficult fight lay ahead.

Once again Maj A. Novikov lifted the binoculars to his eyes, trying to find weak places in the depth of "enemy" defenses, but in vain. The fog stirred and slipped somewhere from above, from the mountains, enveloping the distant hills in a dense shroud.

"Request permission to proceed," he said to the regimental commander, who was bending over the map.

"Act. We are placing hopes on you."

And this "placing hopes on you" emphasized even more the responsibility and difficulty of the mission which the regimental commander was assigning to him, Maj Novikov, and to the battalion. The mission was as follows: to board a self-propelled ferry at night, make a sea crossing, land on the cliffs and, after negotiating them, attack the "enemy" in the flank and rear at the designated time, when the regimental main body would strike up the fight against him.

It was not by chance that the regimental commander entrusted performance of this difficult mission to Maj Novikov. The officer has the combat qualification of master, high command and volitional qualities, and much experience of operating in the mountains. He has the energy and persistence to achieve a set goal.

Two years ago Capt Novikov, commander of one of the foremost battalions, had occasion to work as part of a commission in a backward subunit in which the position of commander was vacant. After completing the inspection, the officer reported its

results and the serious shortcomings in combat training and expressed suggestions aimed at remedying them. Then he requested of the combined unit commander: "I request you appoint me commander of this battalion..."

They accommodated him. After taking over the battalion, Novikov took it among the foremost in a year. Every third person became outstanding in the subunit. Capt Novikov's subordinates learned to operate expertly under conditions of the wooded mountainous terrain, to cross cliffs and mountain rivers and to fire accurately, and they acquired endurance and firm psychological and physical conditioning. Another year passed and the proficiency of Capt Novikov's subordinates shone with new facets. They learned to operate as part of an amphibious force and land where the surf boils even in still weather and where ocean waves break against the cliffs.

And it was with these people that battalion commander Novikov, now already a major, went into combat.

After reaching the planned point at dawn, the self-propelled ferry landed the motorized riflemen on a rocky desert shore. Screened by fog, the motorized riflemen covered a steep ascent and went up to the pass. Reconnaissance sent ahead prudently reported that the pass was guarded by a small group. "That means the 'enemy' is not expecting danger from here and is relying on the inaccessibility of the cliffs," concluded the battalion commander. "That's better. The attack will be more telling for him."

"It is important to assure surprise and keep the pass security from succeeding in contacting the 'enemy' main body," Maj Novikov said, cautioning company commander Sr Lt S. Anufriyev, assigned as commander of the "snatch" group.

Anufriyev's subordinates acted swiftly and precisely. Moving to the pass noiselessly, the motorized riflemen beat the "enemy" off with a lightning-like dash, seized the radio, which didn't quite manage to go on the air, and moved toward the hills.

The fog almost had dispersed when the battalion deployed into combat formation, and Maj Novikov saw that a swamp stretched along the left "enemy" flank. On the map this place was denoted as a marshy meadow, but after the rains a quagmire had formed here. In some places it was up to 1½ m deep and it was clear that the defenders did not expect an attack from here. What was to be done? To go around the swamp meant to lose time and surprise.

"Forward!" commanded Maj Novikov, and the motorized riflemen rushed into the attack. The battalion commander hoped that Sr Lt Anufriyev's subordinates would not let him down this time as well, and his hopes were borne out. The soldiers crossed the difficult sector, sinking waist-deep in the swamp water, ascended the hill and struck the defenders together with the other companies. By attacking from two directions, the battalion crushed the "enemy" reserve, which had not managed to deploy, and passed through the rear areas to come down on his main body, which was fighting other subunits of the regiment.

Summarizing exercise results, the director noted in particular the capable, decisive actions, initiative and resourcefulness of battalion commander Maj Novikov and his subordinates' high proficiency and firm psychological and physical conditioning, and he emphasized that they were the ones who had played the deciding role in the fight to seize the defile.

An ability to identify the chief element and mobilize personnel, and officers above all, to achieve the set goal--these are the factors by which Maj Novikov seeks to achieve high indicators in training and indoctrinating personnel. On taking over command of the backward battalion two years ago he tried above all to raise the officers' command and professional training. Demonstration and instructional methods classes, group exercises, short tactical training problems, and practices in firing and combat vehicle driving began to be held regularly in the subunit. The commander conducted many of them personally. And it was he who introduced an interesting innovation--a "homework assignment" for each officer. For each week he determined in notebooks especially designated for these purposes what to study and on what issue to give a report at the next command training class.

The innovation at first was disliked by some, but a month went by, then another, and everyone began to sense how much their knowledge had been refreshed, strengthened and systematized and how effective the independent training and work on oneself is if it is done on a continuous, planned basis. In just a half-year many officers raised class ratings and just a few months later the battalion successfully passed an inspection and fulfilled socialist pledges.

Competition among platoons and companies livened up noticeably with the arrival of the new battalion commander. Maj Novikov displayed imagination and inquisitiveness in this matter as well. At his suggestion the personnel of competing companies began to challenge each other in classes, in firing and in a summarization of results and to share experience. The battalion now holds regular contests of competing squads and platoons directly on the tank training area course, at the firing range and while accomplishing operational training tasks and norms.

Now the battalion commanded by Maj Novikov continues to be the leader in competition among the regiment's subunits. Final problems which concluded successfully showed that even more outstanding persons, rated specialists and ranking athletes had appeared here. The once backward battalion now is the pride of the regiment.

The commander also took new heights in improving combat proficiency together with all battalion personnel. In the year of the 26th CPSU Congress he won the right to be called the best unit specialist and was promoted in rank. And one other important event recently occurred in the life of the foremost officer: He became a student of the correspondence-course department of the Frunze Military Academy.

[Photograph caption]: Motorized rifle battalion commander Maj A. Novikov [photo not reproduced].

#### Tank Units: Regiment's Training Results

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Nov 81 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Parfenov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Southern Group of Forces: "Lost Opportunities: Why the Personnel of Tank Regiment 'X' Did Not Fulfill Their Socialist Pledges"]

[Text] In spring of the last training year Tank Regiment "X" held one of the last places in the combined unit for technical training and equipment upkeep and had not fulfilled pledges in competition. It seemed the commander, staff and party organization had to draw serious conclusions from this bitter lesson, but the impression



is created that they soon forgot about the failure, assuming that there still was an entire training period before summarization of the year's results. For the sake of justice it should be noted that an increase in the quality of the personnel's technical schooling and keeping the equipment in exemplary condition was discussed at service conferences and party meetings but, unfortunately, matters did not go beyond the discussion stage.

Then came the final inspection and again a failure.

"The equipment let us down both in spring and now," they say in the regiment. They say it without those sad intonations which automatically burst from the heart when a person becomes aware of and takes a failure deeply. In a discussion with me the chief of the combined unit political department even cautioned: The regiment does not look bad from results of the inspection, so that one must be careful in writing about it in a negative aspect.

I admit that the political officer's words surprised me. But later everything became clear during work in the regiment.

The tankmen--the political department chief was right in this--performed weapons training exercises well and showed firm skills in tactics and other disciplines. For example, the company commanded by Sr Lt S. Yefimov was the only one in the combined unit to receive the highest grade in physical training, and this instilled optimism and satisfaction in the tankmen. Against the background of this success the fact that not one of the five companies in the regiment which had pledged to become outstanding failed to do so seemed insignificant. No alarm was generated also by the fact that regimental personnel did not receive the grade for equipment condition which had been planned in their pledges. Some appointed persons tried to explain the low grade in technical training by "objective" reasons. To show how groundless these arguments were, I will quote them completely.

Lt Col V. Stasyuk, deputy regimental commander for weapons:

"First of all, we were first to be inspected in the group of forces and so did not know the commission's requirements. It delved into every minor detail. Secondly, the inspectors mixed up the cards for us. We did not ready the 3d Battalion for the inspection, but they began the inspection with it, and even after the battalion had made a march of many kilometers. And so they discovered a heap of troubles--stretched tracks, disruption of adjustments, a lack of deficiency checklists, and so on. Thirdly, the repairmen were not in place and there was no one to fix the deficiencies discovered right away, which the commission did not like. Fourthly, a technical servicing point had not been organized and spare parts could not be found immediately."

Capt V. Kravchuk, deputy commander for technical affairs of 3d Battalion:

"There was no time and no one to service the vehicles. The personnel often went on details and worked on combat training a great deal, firing and driving."

These explanations attest to one thing--a formal attitude in the regiment toward increasing the quality of the personnel's technical training and toward upkeep and maintenance of equipment. This, for example, is what the former regimental political officer, Maj V. Kozyrev said about this (during the inspection he had received an appointment to another station):

"We ourselves are guilty in everything. It is, to put it lightly, frivolous to refer to the commission's severity, absence of repairmen, lack of time, spare parts and so on. It is a matter of shortcomings in the organization of the training and indoctrination process in the regiment."

After talking with the people and delving into the organization of the training process, I became convinced that Maj Kozyrev was correct. Approximately a month before the inspection the tankers fired the authorized round and received mediocre results. One of the chief reasons was that it was not the firers themselves, but the senior commanders who prepared the weapons for firing. For example, the company commanded by Sr Lt K. Pipsin, which received a low grade, had its weapons prepared... by the regimental commander and his deputy.

Why, one might ask, was there such a substitution? For it is well known that every tank commander must prepare his own weapons with the crew. But it turns out the regiment does not trust the tank commanders, and not only them, but the platoon and company commanders as well. And it does not trust them because it does not teach them registration during classes and practices. In that same firing Sr Lt Yefimov showed the worthlessness of such coddling with what would appear to be all obviousness. His subordinates received "unsats" with the first runs. Then Yefimov stopped the firing and requested he be given time to prepare the weapons himself together with subordinates.

He checked and prepared them and the firing went normally. Company tankmen received a good grade.

"Unfortunately, not everyone can do it as Sr Lt Yefimov did," Lt Col Stasyuk told me with disappointment. "He is a competent officer and his platoon commanders are intelligent. But the others have a poor knowledge of equipment and weapons. They can't prepare them for firing as they should."

A strange position: Since they aren't able, we'll substitute for them. But who will teach them? This position is maintained in the desire to obtain a high grade by any means and appear better. Such an approach to matters was one of the reasons that the tankmen showed results below their possibilities in the check firing, for their guardians again prepared weapons for them.

The regiment's equipment also proved to be in far from exemplary condition. For example, inasmuch as the tankmen demonstrated inauspicious results in firing the authorized round (this was prior to the inspection), the regimental command element directed all efforts at improving the personnel's weapons training. People and tanks were in the field days and nights. Real crash work was declared. No one thought about the equipment and it essentially was operated until it wore out.

"A week before the inspection we were about to begin placing the equipment in order, but there was not enough time," complained Lt Col Stasyuk. "Moreover, we did not organize the work quite correctly. An officer should be assigned as senior person to each tank, but we had an officer for 2-3 vehicles."

"But why an officer for each tank?" I asked.

"Some of the mechanics as well as crew commanders are inexperienced, especially in 3d Battalion."

And here, as we see, was the desire for coddling and substituting for those who have to be able to prepare weapons for firing independently.

Much already has been said and written about the worthlessness of such a work method, but the unit cannot give it up in any way. Why is it so tenacious? What soil nourishes it? It would appear that Capt S. Bazhenov answered these questions well.

"For a long while our company's vehicles were in the weapons compound. People from different subunits worked with them there. Here's how they regarded it: They would train and leave without servicing the equipment. And later, when the vehicles had been run into the ground, as they say, it was necessary to resort to crash work."

"How did such an attitude toward the equipment get started?" I asked.

"The commanders have poor exactingness," said the officer, "and we do a poor job of developing a love for the equipment in the personnel."

It is impossible not to agree with this. Although many lectures and discussions are held in the regiment about equipment upkeep, indoctrination is not only the pronunciation of correct words, slogans and appeals. There must be more indoctrination by action, including exemplary organization of equipment servicing and repair. I will give an example, which provides an idea about how some officers regard subordinates' needs and requirements when the subject turns to equipment. I was told this by Sr Lt Yefimov:

"Last year driver-mechanic Pvt Viktor Kuzyk went to an officer from the technical service: 'The fuel pump went out on my training vehicle long ago. Everyone knows about this, but no one is taking steps.' The fuel pump finally was replaced."

This was at the beginning of the training year. And here is a fresh fact. The stabilizer is out on a training vehicle in one of the companies. The platoon and company commanders report this almost daily through channels but senior chiefs are not taking steps.

I asked the regimental party committee secretary:

"What influence did the party committee have on improving officers' technical culture?"

"Unfortunately the question of the personnel's progress in fulfilling pledges in technical training was not once examined directly in the party committee. The experience of the best specialists was not generalized or propagandized. Factors of moral incentives for right-flankers of competition and people who expertly master equipment also were not fully used."

No explanation is needed, as they say.

It would appear to be clear from everything said where the reasons lie for poor quality of technical training. Let's add to this the fact that officers' individual pledges were not oriented on improving technical training. Instructional methods, demonstration and other scheduled classes in technical training often were conducted in the regiment with oversimplifications.

Division staff officers could have done much back in the spring to remedy the omissions identified in the regiment, but their work often reduced merely to recording the deficiencies. Meanwhile, what was needed was concrete assistance and strict personal demand for the organization of classes and effectiveness of competition. This lesson must be considered in preparing for the new training year, so that the regiment can take a worthy place in unit competition in technical training as well, where the level largely is determined by the degree of the personnel's combat schooling.

#### Motorized Rifle Units: Training Shortcomings Described

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Nov 81 p 1

[Article by Col L. Derevyanko, senior officer of Ground Forces Combat Training Directorate: "Shortcomings were Repeated"]

[Text] At the beginning of the past training year the personnel of this motorized rifle regiment made high socialist pledges. One point in particular stated: "Learn to hit targets with the first rounds or first bursts at maximum ranges."

Judging from combat training registers and visual agitation in the reading rooms, the motorized riflemen came right up to the planned goal. Outstanding or good grades were opposite the majority of the soldiers' names on the eve of final problems, but during the final problems many were not able to confirm the high grades. Sr Lt G. Lapin, Lt V. Vergilis and others were among them in particular.

Just why did this happen?

Progress in fulfilling firing exercises and analyzing the status of the personnel's weapons schooling showed that one of the chief reasons comprises shortcomings in officers' methods training and the oversimplifications and indulgences permitted in classes and practices. Some officers clearly lacked skills in organizing competition by tasks and norms and in taking a critical approach to assessing the results achieved. Some of them violated training sequence and made poor use of the training facility. In evaluating subordinates' schooling they often were concerned not about quality in carrying out operational training tasks and norms, but about the time shown. If a private kept within the norm he got an outstanding grade. But no consideration was given to the fact that he had not acted in the best manner and had committed deviations from requirements of the Firing Course, manuals and instructions.

Officers of the higher staff directed the regimental officers' attention to these shortcomings at the end of the winter training period. It would seem that the regimental commander and staff would pay serious attention to improving the officers' professional expertise in the summer training period. One would have thought that division staff officers would give the regiment serious assistance in this matter. But summer passed and it was learned that matters had not improved. The motorized rifle battalion commanded by Maj V. Kopylov and some other subunits had not fulfilled their socialist pledges in weapons training.

As already stated, one of the reasons for this was the poor methods training of some officers. Here are the facts. During one class the senior commander had to relieve Capt S. Gorbunov, motorized rifle battalion chief of staff and firing



instructor, from his duties. He was not able to give a single correct command to the crews who were to carry out a practice firing exercise. Some other officers also did not demonstrate the best training.

Who does not know that it is possible to achieve high results in weapons training only if demands of the Firing Course are strictly fulfilled during classes and practices? But it was as if they had forgotten about this here. Even during final problems when, in particular, the company commanded by Sr Lt Yu. Ryumin began performing night firing, some targets were denoted incorrectly. And what is especially alarming is that the battalion commander and deputy regimental commander Maj N. Kurapov tried to dispute the requirement to make everything conform with the Firing Course. We'll fire as we are used to firing, i.e., with obvious oversimplifications.

The battalion was tested in conformity with established requirements, and here it was discovered that some servicemen did not have the necessary skills. They were not able to observe the battlefield, perform reconnaissance, or operate at the sight dextrously. All this was a result of the fact that the regiment did not pay proper attention to eliminating the deficiencies pointed out in the spring. During summer training some class instructors organized practices only at one training station--at the open-fire line. As a result, a knowledge of the laws of ballistics and an ability to introduce necessary corrections while performing fire missions under various meteorological conditions was a bottleneck in the companies and platoons.

In inspecting classes and practices in the regiment's subunits, division staff officers uncovered gaps in organization of the training process. Nevertheless, the check inspections often lacked the chief element--a thorough analysis of the training process and revelation of the reasons for existing deficiencies.

A formal approach also was taken to organizing competition. At the beginning of the training year regimental staff officers, specialists of services and party committee members helped the personnel draw up high socialist pledges, but with this they considered their work ended. The competition in tasks and norms and contests for the title of best regimental specialist were forgotten. Officers of higher headquarters also knew that many classes in weapons training in the company commanded by Capt S. Sazonov were being disrupted and postponed from month to month. But they also did not take decisive steps to put an end to such occurrences.

The rule that senior personnel teach the junior personnel was implemented with insufficient persistence in the regiment. Officers of the regimental staff did not hold a single class in one of the battalions during the summer training period. A command training register also was not kept.

The unit does of course have subunits which demonstrated high weapons proficiency both previously and in the final problems. Their experience could be of good service to the personnel in other subunits, but leaders' experience is poorly disseminated in the regiment. Insufficient attention still is being given here to competition among platoons, companies and battalions. But lively competition is known to be an effective means of drawing up all subunits to the leaders' level.

Firing results in the final fall inspection must be the basis for a detailed and self-critical analysis. Its purpose is to increase the effectiveness and quality of the personnel's weapons schooling, which is a most important component of combat readiness. There must be no repetition of the deficiencies in the new training year.

#### Motorized Rifle Units: Unit Competition Results Compared

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Nov 81 p 2

[Interview with Col V. Tereshchenko and Lt Col A. Savchuk by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, and commentary by division chief of staff Lt Col Yu. Yernakov: "For Foremost Combined Unit: Regimental Heights"]

[Text] In the past training year the Samara-Ul'yanovsk, Berdichev, Iron Motorized Rifle Division came out as the initiator of a movement for foremost combined unit in the Ground Forces. The Samara-Ul'yanovsk personnel fulfilled their pledges fully and achieved a further increase in combat readiness and a strengthening of military order.

Socialist competition was an effective means in the struggle for complete fulfillment of combat and political training plans and programs. Much attention was given to competition between regiments. For example, it helped identify reserves for a further improvement in tactical-weapons and methods expertise and the technical culture of officers. The commanders of competing units tell how these reserves were sought and used.

Col V. Tereshchenko:

The regiment completely fulfilled socialist pledges in the most important kinds of combat training. It is gratifying that previously lagging companies and battalions drew themselves up noticeably in training to the level of leaders in the course of competition. For example, the gap between them and the best subunits, which are commanded by captains S. Anisimov and V. Andryushchenko, Sr Lt V. Bevzyuk and our other leading commanders was determined by fractions of points in the final inspection.

It is of course no simple task to teach people to accomplish assigned missions in a tactically competent manner and to master equipment and weapons expertly. Accomplishment of this task assumes an organization of field problems where trainees experience the breath of combat and apply as a complex the knowledge and skills acquired in studying separate disciplines. But far from all of our officers had the ability to create such a situation. The majority of commanders in the regiment which was our rival in competition demonstrated higher results in certain phases of the training year, such as in tactical-weapons training.

It stands to reason that we tried to understand in detail how these results were achieved. It turned out that the neighboring regiment made capable use of an integration of all classes with tactics, which of course is the heart of field schooling. The neighbors invited us to attend a demonstration class in one of the best subunits, commanded by Capt V. Govorushchenko. The class was conducted under the topic "Motorized Rifle Company in the Attack."

The trip to the neighboring regiment was of great benefit to us and helped us identify unused reserves more efficiently. Its results were discussed in the unit methods council and in the party committee, and recommendations were drawn up on the commanders' mastery of foremost methodology.

The intensity of competition rose even further when battalions of neighboring units went into the field. Their commanders, Maj V. Starodubtsev and Capt V. Sozinov, agreed ahead of time which tasks and norms were to be worked and which platoons and companies would compete among themselves. Performance of identical exercises on adjacent moving target gunnery ranges and on parallel routes of tank training areas permitted a concrete comparison of results, an active exchange of experience, and adoption of all the best points. And it was not only a matter of high indicators achieved by personnel of both battalions in tactical and weapons training. The people came to know the joy of real combat rivalry and saw in action what great opportunities competition opens up for a mutual enrichment with foremost experience.

Lt Col A. Saychuk:

The regiment commanded by Col Tereshchenko is our old rival in competition. I will say right off that it is a worthy rival from which there is something to be learned in organizing the training process and in the methodology of training personnel.

For example, at one time our regiment's tankmen were having trouble with firing at long ranges, basically because too much time went for adjustment on targets. But the neighbors were conducting the adjustment enormously faster. What was the matter? The neighbors invited us to a weapons training class and to tank gunnery practices.

What struck us above all? Practice of such lessons, for example, as reconnoitering targets and determining distances to them was conducted in the battalion in the form of an intense, entertaining contest. Platoon commanders would inform subordinates of the results immediately, compare them and critique mistakes.

In conducting the classes in an atmosphere of competitiveness, Capt Andryushchenko and the other commanders would create conditions for the tankmen to display all their abilities and would prompt subordinates to go all out. After studying the rivals' experience in organizing competition by tasks and norms in weapons training classes and tank gunnery practices, our regiment's tankmen adopted it. This soon had a beneficial effect on results of the personnel's training. For example, the previously lagging tank company commanded by Capt S. Chernykh rose in weapons schooling to the level of our best subunits.

Or take the following example. It was noted in a critique of one of the tactical exercises that the coordination of motorized riflemen and tankmen of the regiment commanded by Col V. Tereshchenko was more precise than ours. This conclusion by the exercise director stung to the quick our regiment's officers and forced them to delve more deeply into the neighbors' experience. Its essence was that motorized riflemen and tankmen accomplish one and the same tactical mission during small arms and tank gunnery practices and carry out various narrative problems together, honing coordination in conduct of fire. It became clear that we were devoting too little time for such joint problems.

It would seem that the examples given graphically reveal the capabilities of competition between regiments for increasing the personnel's military proficiency. It helped us fulfill our pledges competely.

At the request of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, division chief of staff Lt Col Yu. Yermakov comments on the statements by the regimental commanders:

The motorized rifle regiment commanded by Col Tereshchenko again was the winner in competition of division units. In striving to emulate it, the other regiments took new heights in combat proficiency. In our view, this is one of the important indicators of effectiveness in the work of the division staff and political department in organizing competition among units and actively involving the Samara-Ul'yanovsk personnel in the movement for foremost combined unit.

Stated briefly, the competition of regiments in the year of the 26th CPSU Congress acquired a more concrete, businesslike nature. There was a deeper and more substantial mutual desire to penetrate into the creative laboratory of commanders at all levels, the best methods specialists and masters of combat specialties, and to see and adopt all the best in organization of the training process and in ideological indoctrination work. It must be noted that a wide range of party members--chiefs of combat arms and services and political department officers--was included in this work. Thanks to their help the division commander and his deputies had a clear idea of the state of affairs in competing units and could efficiently influence the increase in quality of their combat improvement.

At the same time, we realize well that capabilities of the movement for foremost combined unit still are far from exhausted. In particular, we are now thinking about how to improve the coordination of efforts of regimental staffs in accomplishing the basic missions of the new training year, to provide them better information about each other's affairs, and be more efficient in passing on the experience of assuring publicity of competition, comparability of results, adoption of foremost methodology into practice, and the exercise of daily supervision over progress in fulfilling pledges.

Serious thought also must be given to more effective use of the training facility. Certain work has been done in this regard. For example, we compiled the schedule for use of the facilities so that subunits of different units could go to the training center simultaneously and compete in specific tasks and norms. But this schedule was not always followed.

Now, during preparations for the new training year, we are trying to take account of lessons of the past. One of the important reserves for regiments to achieve new heights in combat expertise lies in an improvement in the style of competition management.



## Tank Units: Regiment's Socialist Obligations for 1982

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Nov 81 p 1

[Article: "Stand Reliably on Guard over the Motherland: Address of Personnel of Double-Order Guards Tank Regiment to Ground Forces Personnel"]

[Text] The double-order guards tank regiment ~~commanded~~ by Gds Lt Col S. Kiselev has grand combat traditions. It covered thousands of fiery kilometers over roads of the Great Patriotic War.

In recognizing their responsibility to the Communist Party and Soviet people for defending the beloved Motherland, regimental personnel are full of desire to develop and augment the grand combat traditions, persistently improve military proficiency and strengthen combat readiness, efficiency and discipline.

The resolution of the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum, the plenum speech by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and documents of the 6th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation generated a new surge of energy in the guards tankmen. This was manifested vividly at a meeting of regimental personnel which discussed pledges for the new training year.

The speakers, Gds Maj D. Vershinin, Gds Sr Lt Yu. Sorokin, Gds Sr Sgt V. Sukhov and others called on their colleagues to mark the upcoming training year, the year of the 60th anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with new achievements in military labor and with a further increase in combat readiness.

Personnel of the regiment, one of those foremost in the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District, appealed to all personnel of the Ground Forces with a call to begin socialist competition in 1982 under the motto "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!"

Address of Personnel of the Double-Order Guards Tank Regiment to Ground Forces Personnel

Dear comrades and combat friends!

Under the Communist Party's leadership, the Soviet people are working vigorously and fruitfully to fulfill the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Successes achieved in all spheres of building communism convincingly confirm their vitality and powerful mobilizing force. The growth in our country's economic and defense might and the increase in the people's welfare, for which the party and state's constant concern was vividly reflected in resolutions of the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum and documents of the 6th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation, generate a feeling of pride in us for our socialist Motherland, a new surge of creative initiative and energy, and the desire to achieve higher results in military labor.

At the same time, it is impossible not to see that the struggle for implementing the plans outlined by our party is occurring under conditions of a sharp aggravation in the international situation caused by the aggressive actions of imperialists and by an intensification of adventurism in the policy of ruling circles of the United States and other NATO countries as well as of the Beijing hegemonists. Enemies of peace and socialism are attempting to change the relative strengths in the world arena in their favor, are whipping up the arms race and are hoping to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries. They are not giving up attempts to intervene in the affairs of socialist states. They encourage and support reactionary forces in all parts of the world. Elimination of the danger of war and assurance of reliable peace remain the fundamental problem of modern times. Under these conditions, as was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress, our party requires Soviet military personnel to stand reliably on guard over the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people.

Realizing deeply the entire complexity of the present-day military-political situation and our own responsibility for high vigilance and constant combat readiness, we personnel of the tank regiment which has grand combat traditions, are persistently improving our proficiency and, in the past training year, responded to resolutions of the 26th party congress with new successes in combat and political training. Field schooling rose to a higher level. The regiment accomplished all missions assigned it with outstanding or good grades. The ranks of persons outstanding in training and of rated specialists swelled. Party and Komsomol members are setting the example in training and service. Thanks to the constant concern of the party and government for the Soviet Armed Forces, our regiment has the most sophisticated combat equipment and weapons and has a good training facility.

Without settling for what has been achieved, we view results of the 1981 training year as the basis for a further advance and mastery of higher goals in combat improvement. Fervently approving and supporting the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy and synchronizing our work and plans with guidelines of the 26th party congress and the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum, we turn to all Ground Forces personnel with the call to begin socialist competition in the 1982 training year under the motto "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!"

After clarifying the missions assigned by the USSR Minister of Defense for the new training year and weighing our capabilities and reserves, we assume the following socialist pledges:

--To win the title of outstanding regiment by the end of 1982 and maintain its high combat readiness constantly. To reduce the times for making subunits and the regiment as a whole combat ready by 13-15 percent through the deep mastery of duties by every soldier and use of the most effective methods of their accomplishment;

--To study persistently Marxist-Leninist theory, the works of V. I. Lenin, the heroic history of our country, the Leninist Party and the Soviet Armed Forces, documents of the 26th CPSU Congress, and works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other party and government leaders. To develop in ourselves communist conviction and high moral-political and combat qualities; to display high vigilance; and be in constant readiness to defend the great achievements of socialism;

--To accomplish training plans with high quality and have outstanding indicators in all basic kinds of combat and political training. To give special attention to an improvement in tactical-weapons schooling, night training and mastery of varied methods of action in modern combat. To conduct all tactical exercises--regimental, battalion and company--for an outstanding or good grade, and tactical field fire exercises only for a grade of outstanding. To see to it that at least half of the combat subunits become outstanding;

--All officers, warrant officers and NCO's are to master foremost methods for training and indoctrinating subordinates, prepare carefully for every combat and political training class, conduct it with high effectiveness, make fuller use of the experience of Exercise "Zapad-81," constantly display initiative and imagination in work, and perfect their own professional training;

--To master combat equipment and weapons persistently, to improve technical knowledge and to raise class ratings. Make it a wider practice to conduct contests for best specialist and improve military-technical propaganda to this end. Everyone authorized it is to have a class rating, with 70 percent to have an advanced rating. Servicemen in the first year of service are to master one related specialty, and those in the second year are to master two related specialties. The regiment will attain complete interchangeability in crews and teams. Seventy percent of tank commanders will master the specialty of driver-mechanic at the 3d Class level by year's end. Unit personnel will be persistent in mastering the art of hitting targets with the first round or first burst and at maximum range day and night;

--To operate equipment and weapons capably and keep them in exemplary order. To extend the periods of tank operation between repairs by 17 percent, and that of wheeled vehicles by 8 percent. To struggle vigorously for prize places in the competitive review for best motor pool and repair subunit. To continue to improve the training facility. To assure the personnel's active participation in rationalization and invention work;

--To struggle for strict fulfillment by every private, NCO, warrant officer and officer of the moral-ethical norms of behavior, to carry on high the honor and dignity of the guardsman, and to strengthen friendship and troop comradeship. To have an exemplary external appearance and military posture. To act with the entire force of public influence of the military collective against the slightest infractions of regulation order, discipline and communist morality;

--To increase the personnel's physical conditioning. Ninety-five percent of the personnel are to become ranking athletes and 90 percent VSK [Military Sports Complex] badge wearers;

--To keep the barracks, motor pools, offices, training facilities and all the regiment's military gear in exemplary condition. To save 5-7 percent of electrical power and 5 percent of GSM [fuels and lubricants], engine operating time and rubber. To struggle for high culture of the military post and an increase in the number of "thrifty subunits."

Heading for the 6th All-Army Conference of Party Organization Secretaries and the 19th Komsomol Congress, party and Komsomol members of the regiment will set the example in the struggle for high-quality accomplishment of all operational training and indoctrination tasks and in fulfilling pledges.

Guided by Leninist principles of socialist competition, we will develop competitiveness among servicemen and subunits persistently, make fuller use of the force of publicity and comparability of results, achieve prompt dissemination of foremost experience and, on this basis, draw up the laggards to the level of the leaders. We plan to summarize results of the first phase of competition by the 19th Komsomol Congress, and of the second phase by the 65th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

We challenge the motorized rifle regiment commanded by Gds Lt Col N. Sapishov to socialist competition.

Personnel of the Ground Forces!

We call on all of you to join actively in socialist competition and mark the 1982 training year, the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation, with new successes in carrying out resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, with a further improvement in combat readiness, with an increase in the quality of combat and political training, and with a strengthening of military discipline. It is our duty to provide reliable protection over the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people and over the achievements of the Great October.

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## GROUND FORCES

### COMBAT ARMS TRAINING

#### Follow-Up Report on Nonuse of Simulators

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Nov 81 p 2

[Article: "'Why are the Simulators Idle?'" ]

[Text] That was the title of a report by Lt Col M. Lishniy published on 15 October. It noted shortcomings in use of technical training means in units commanded by officers M. Kabak and Yu. Ivanov.

Maj Gen V. Volkov, chief of the combat training and military educational institutions directorate of the Ural Military District, informed the editors that the article had been discussed at a party meeting of the combat training and military educational institutions directorate of the district, as well as at officer meetings and headquarters meetings of the units in question. The criticism was deemed just. The officers who allowed the negligent attitude toward upkeep and use of simulators were given disciplinary punishment.

By order of the district commander, specialists were assigned from among staff officers to be responsible for the technical status of the training facility. The district combat training and military educational institutions directorate assumed supervision of the simulators' use.

#### Motorized Rifle Units: Use of Simulators

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Nov 81 p 1

[Article by Gds Lt Col P. Yegorchenko and Maj A. Petrov: "The Chief Reference Point"]

[Text] The new training year is awaited in order-bearing Guards Motorized Rifle Division "X" with special enthusiasm generated by resolutions of the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum and the USSR Supreme Soviet session. At the same time, the beginning of the winter training period coincides with the 40th anniversary of the combined unit's formation. The elevated, businesslike atmosphere which now reigns in the units and subunits therefore is understandable.

The guards motorized riflemen have something of which to be proud. Next to the combined unit's colors now will be the Challenge Red Banner of the district military council awarded to the motorized riflemen for goals achieved in military work in

the past training year. The success in combat and political training depended largely on the condition of the training facility and adoption of simulators and foremost pedagogic techniques and methods into training practice. Much has been done in this direction.

The course toward further improvement of the training facility continues even now. All personnel, and party members above all, have joined in this work. Materials of the November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum, which once again thoroughly revealed the importance of work effectiveness and quality, became a program of action for them.

The basis of the division's entire training facility is the already existing installations, which now have been renovated and outfitted with new equipment. Let's take the motorized riflemen's weapons compound. Not long ago some of the infantry fighting vehicles were kept here under the open sky, but now all equipment is in spacious bays. Nearby are two other rooms intended for studying BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] equipment and weapons. They also have several electronic trainers for teaching gunner-operators to fire the ATGM launchers, and there is other training equipment.

Many innovations have been installed in the training complex for preparing air defense subunits. For example, previously existing classrooms with mock-ups of antiaircraft machinegun mounts now adjoin a special room where simulators have been installed for gunners of portable shoulder-fired systems, which in the future will permit a noticeable intensification of the air defense personnel's training.

During a discussion with us the division commander said with satisfaction that new training facilities also will be placed in operation by the new training year. They include above all a classroom for skindiver training of tank crews. All the necessary gear is here for underwater tank driving. Moreover, now it will be possible to train tankmen in a shorter period of time than before and with greater benefit for them. To this end the tankmen will begin practical classes in a special pool for performing the simplest tasks using skindiving equipment. Later, observing safety precautions, they will begin classes in the hydrosimulator, the mock-up of a tank under water. During such practices the personnel not only will acquire the practical skills, but endurance as well, and they will become physically conditioned. By the way, this skindiving complex, as well as other training facilities, was built with the division's own resources. Officers Gds Lt Col A. Dergunov, Gds Maj V. Khodyrev and others directed this work. For example, an electronic tactical training simulator classroom has been installed. Class instructors have at their service tape recorders for recording and playing back their decisions, instructions, and the operation orders issued. There is a large photo library of lectures in tactics and weapons training, a video tape recorder, and narrow-film projector for viewing training films. The combined unit's film library, for example, now numbers over 500 copies with soundtracks on various topics in basic training disciplines.

Varied simulators are used widely and new ways are sought for their use in the training process in the combined unit, as in the majority of district units and subunits. There already are several well equipped special simulator complexes here. They are installed in two-story buildings with several classrooms having electronic and mechanical gear which allows problems in weapons training, combat vehicle driving and firing theory to be worked. The number of training stations also was increased here by the new training year. Simulators of a new type also appeared. All this will permit even greater intensification of the training process and an

increase in the quality of combat training. It will provide an opportunity to save a large amount of fuel and preserve a considerable amount of engine operating time.

It is understandable that the training facility, particularly the simulators, can be used to the full extent only if the equipment functions faultlessly, if subunit practice schedules are drawn up and if class instructors master the progressive work methods on them. The division showed prior concern for this. A practical science conference held recently in the division during which the question of simulator use was discussed in particular was of great benefit to the officers in this regard. Many demonstration classes and training methods courses were held in the units and subunits prior to the training year. The division staff together with the political department performed several integrated inspections on readiness of the training facility. Their results became the basis of an order which took note of shortcomings along with achievements and emphasized the importance of experience of the best unit methods specialists guards captains V. Avazov and A. Orlov, Gds Sr Lt A. Bodelukov and others.

...We visited many subunits in the division--barracks, motor pools, reading rooms and athletic compounds--and everywhere one sensed a readiness for classes and the motorized riflemen's desire to join actively in competition under the motto "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!" and the desire to greet the 60th anniversary of the USSR's foundation with new successes in combat and political training.

#### Artillery Units: Training Simulator Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Nov 81 p 1

[Article by correspondent from Order of Lenin Transbaikal Military District: "Rationalizers' Contribution"]

[Text] A weapons compound was placed in operation in Unit "X" on the eve of the new training year. Artillerymen installed new classrooms here and readied functioning mock-ups and electrified displays for operation. The weapons compound is the pride of the unit. It is a modern complex of training auditoriums, bays, maintenance pads, battery firing positions, target observation radar posts and a direct fire gunnery range.

Unit rationalizers did much here with their own hands for comprehensive, high-quality preparation of highly skilled specialists, the junior commanders, and for improving officers' artillery fire training. In particular, another innovation was installed--a computerized simulator. Its adoption will permit the artillerymen to save a significant amount of money in every training period.

#### Tank Units: Training Year Preparations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Nov 81 p 1

[Article by Col B. Nekhimchuk, deputy chief of combat training directorate of Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Reserves into Action"]

[Text] Extensive organizational work has been performed in group units to prepare for the new training year. For example, demonstration and instructional methods

classes with battalion, company, platoon and squad commanders were conducted with greater effectiveness than before. Young soldiers who recently joined formation were presented with weapons and combat equipment in a ceremony. Meetings were arranged and conducted with leaders in training who are augmenting the grand tradition of frontlinemen with their selfless labor.

Much has been done to improve the training facility. The capacity of many tactical fields has been increased. This is one of the most important factors in raising the intensification of the training process.

Take Training Center "X" for example. The tank weapons compound wouldn't be recognized here. Two companies work here now simultaneously. Targets have been set up on the terrain in such a way that class instructors create variants of fire missions for each gunner, i.e., the trainees accomplish a new mission each time and consequently become accustomed to estimating the situation at hand and making decisions on their own. The training classrooms also attract attention here. In particular, ten gunners and as many tank commanders work simultaneously in the simulator-programmed training classroom. It has displays installed with the firing rules, film projector and epidiascope, which allows showing training films and solving fire missions using the movie screen.

I would like to mention one other innovation. Classes with officers in control of fire and subunits now are held here with great effect. The tactical classroom, equipped with a movable terrain model, radio-equipped booths and a class instructor's console, permits working at full intensity while solving short tactical training problems. Officer V. Grudovik made a great contribution to the improvement in this training center.

The search by rationalizers and inventors is productive. In this year alone the officers, warrant officers, NCO's and privates developed and adopted hundreds of various technical innovations permitting a saving in engine operating time, rational expenditure of time, and conduct of classes and practices with greatest benefit. Meriting attention in particular are developments proposed by majors I. Volosovich and A. Chikin and by warrant officers B. Kaplich and V. Soshin.

Good preconditions thus have been created for accomplishing operational training missions with high quality from the first day of winter combat training and achieving success in competition under the motto "Reliable protection of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!" Group personnel joined in it actively, supporting the initiative of competition pioneers in the Ground Forces--personnel of the double-order guards tank regiment commanded by Gds Lt Col S. Kiselev.

#### Tank Units: Start of Training Year Described

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Dec 81 p 1

[Article by Gds Lt Col V. Balabushkin, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "With the First Step: From the Experience of Exercise 'Zapad-81'"]

[Text] Strenuous work is in full swing in the weapons compound. Tankmen are practicing combat norms by the numbers and training in reconnoitering targets and accomplishing fire missions. Some of them are wearing rather new coveralls. These are young privates. Now is an interesting time for them, for every class and practice



is the first test of strength for the novice, a sort of adjustment on the path to heights which are to be conquered.

As in other subunits of 2d Tank Battalion, the company commanded by Gds Capt V. Saplin has an inspection at the end of the class to see what the novices learned. And the result was that in fulfilling time norms they acted as the equal of their more experienced comrades.

As a division political department officer I had occasion to visit classes in other of the battalion's subunits in the first days. I noted with satisfaction that young replacements were entering formation quickly everywhere and mastering equipment and weapons. It stands to reason that successes in combat training do not come of themselves.

The battalion commanded by Gds Capt A. Chapovskiy is the best in our division. All its companies are outstanding. Having responded to the appeal of personnel of the double-order guards tank regiment commanded by Gds Lt Col S. Kisalev to all Ground Forces personnel to begin socialist competition in the 1982 training year under the motto "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!" the tankmen pledged to confirm the title of outstanding battalion, won in the last training year, and gladden the Motherland with new successes in military labor. As results of the first days of training show, the proper reference point has been chosen: The tankmen are confidently assaulting the heights of combat improvement outlined in the pledges.

Adoption of experience of those who distinguished themselves in Exercise "Zapad-81" into personnel training and indoctrination practice probably is one of the chief "secrets" for specialists' rapid development both in 2d Battalion as well as in other of the division's subunits. Officers who went through the exercise school do much to ensure that each novice feels confidence in his abilities in the first classes, where the soldiers' individual proficiency is honed, and becomes convinced in practice that, with proper zeal, a goal planned in competition invariably will be achieved.

The fact that the experience of persons who distinguished themselves in the exercise is becoming common property and being used actively in personnel training and indoctrination of course is of credit both to the division staff and political department. We are accomplishing this important task through coordinated efforts.

In preparing for the training year the staff and political department try to ensure that exercise experience was studied by officers of various categories during training methods courses, instructional methods classes, demonstration classes and methods conferences. Questions involving adoption of experience were discussed at party meetings in the subunits. It was determined what had to be done by what time, specific performers were assigned, and supervision was set up over implementation of the outlined plans.

What are the tankmen learning from those who distinguished themselves in Exercise "Zapad-81"? Above all, a responsible attitude toward the job and toward their military duty. Here too we have someone from whom to learn and take an example. Take the commander of that same 2d Battalion for example. He wears the Order of Red Star on his chest. It stands to reason that Gds Capt Chapovskiy was not thinking about the award when he signed out of the hospital where he was being treated and made his

way to the exercise area by hitching a ride on vehicles in order to be with the battalion. On learning that the battalion commander would lead them into the attack, the tankmen sprouted wings, as it were. Advancing at the point of the main attack, they acted boldly, resolutely and in a frontline manner.

Today the whole division knows about this and those novices who serve under Gds Capt Chapovskiy are proud of this and consider themselves very lucky.

That is how an officer's authority works. It is hardly necessary to mention how important it is to use such examples for indoctrinating the youth in a spirit of allegiance to military duty and responsibility for their place in combat formation. Party and Komsomol organizations take account of this indoctrination work with people. Presentations by exercise participants to young soldiers and evenings for an exchange of experience represent a far from complete list of the activities which have been conducted in the subunits just in recent days.

But the basic work of adopting foremost experience goes on directly in classes in the crews, squads and teams. This is especially important now, when questions of their combat teamwork are being worked; the more so as weak points in the tankmen's schooling also were identified during the exercise.

Take weapons training for example. Crews usually hit large targets with the first rounds and at maximum range, but when it got down to small targets, some found it difficult here. At times the crews did not manage to detect the target and the vehicles would rush forward, risking coming under "enemy" fire.

We carefully delved into each such instance and concluded that we have to improve the methodology of training crews in reconnoitering targets. We took as the basis the experience of Order of Red Star wearer Gds Capt P. Gribov. The company he commands demonstrated high weapons schooling in Exercise "Zapad-81."

The commander achieved this by making the training process approximate actual combat conditions to the maximum. In classes and practices he pays special attention to denoting "enemy" actions and tries not to allow any oversimplification. In particular, antitank weapons of the opposing side are deployed to be as invulnerable as possible. Ravines, bushes, the reverse slopes of hills and other natural cover are used for this.

Gds Capt Gribov teaches his gunners to determine with the first glance the location of "enemy" weapons based on local terrain features and to identify the most dangerous targets and destroy them first of all. He demands that every crew conduct reconnaissance continuously. Each specialist performs observation in a strictly defined sector of observation.

This methodology also contributes to the tankmen's rapid acquisition of skills needed in combat, and it raises the crew members' sense of responsibility for the assigned job, for success depends on each one's actions.

The experience of Gds Capt Gribov now is used in all the division's subunits. This determined to no small extent the fact that the tankmen master skills of orientation in a difficult target situation in short periods of time and the process of developing the crews' combat teamwork is accelerated.

Other examples also can be given attesting to the fact that the experience of Exercise "Zapad-81" is having an active effect on combat readiness. But this does not at all mean that there no longer are any problems here. We also have subunits where new, foremost elements still have difficulty making their way. There is a broad field of endeavor here for commanders and the party and Komsomol organizations. As emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress, it is our primary task to eliminate everything making the process of adopting new things difficult, slow and painful.

...Dusk falls on the compound. A song can be heard somewhere around the nearby forest. Subunits are returning from classes. Judging from the soldiers' mood, this day of the new training year also went successfully.

#### Artillery Units: Poor Command Training Battalion Cited

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Dec 81 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col L. Golovnev: "Discrepancies at the Start"]

[Text] The battalion commanded by Capt V. Karsakov did not fulfill pledges in competition in the past training year. It was noted during the result summarization that poor preparation of junior commanders was one of the deficiencies in the subunit. At that time Karsakov did not agree with this opinion and declared that all NCO's were good specialists and had a 1st or 2d class in weapons training. Unfortunately, the battalion chief of staff also tried to defend his viewpoint. In addition, he tried to prove that the subunit had received the satisfactory grade in the exercise by chance. But then officer-party members criticized this approach to matters at a report-election meeting and sharply raised the question of paying particular attention to an increase in the junior commanders' methods training, teamwork of crews and an improvement in planning in the new training year.

The first days of classes in the new training year are behind. The artillerymen studied combat equipment and regulations and practiced drill movements and gymnastic exercises in the athletic compound. Artillery fire practices had been held in the batteries. And what struck the eye was that deficiencies of the past training year had moved over into the new year in some subunits.

For example, all classes with personnel in the battery commanded by Sr Lt A. Simokhin were conducted by platoon commanders or senior chiefs. Not one NCO took an active part in organizing or conducting the classes. This was at a time when, in the words of the battery commander himself, the officers were loaded down to the limit.

Had this battery's NCO's been used for classes more often, the load on the officers would have dropped considerably, but it is not only a matter of this. In an actual combat situation the NCO will have to command the team and often act as platoon commander. Will he cope with such missions if he does not learn this now and if his duties are shifted to the officers' shoulders?

The battery also often takes an ill-conceived, formal approach to drawing up class schedules. The schedules resemble each other like two drops of water. For example, the word "regulation" is in the column "Class Logistical Support" and the word "field" in the column "Class Location." Take this to mean what you will, but

everything in the schedule must be envisaged and thought out to the small points. It must be presented with extreme clarity and precision.

Matters are different in the battery commanded by Sr Lt V. Nikol'skiy. Over 20 percent of classes here were conducted by the NCO's. Officers would work the most important topics with subordinates. With more time for class preparation, they conducted them at a higher level.

It is said in the battalion that Sr Lt Nikol'skiy has "strong NCO's." But all of them came into the regiment from the training subunit simultaneously. The NCO's became strong because the battery commander constantly improves their professional training and methods proficiency. The officer planned an instructional methods class with them for the current week as well.

"We give constant attention to the NCO's," says the battery commander, "because not only the quality of classes, but cohesiveness of the subunit and success of combat and political training as a whole depend largely on their preparation."

By relying on the NCO's the young officer quickly achieves firm cohesiveness in teams and strong discipline and efficiency. The battery rightly holds first place in the unit. An exchange of work experience among the NCO's was conducted in an interesting, instructive manner in the subunit. Instructional methods classes of high quality are conducted with them. The adjacent battery, however, has not taken a look at this experience.

The battalion staff headed by Capt N. Dymin also did not speak out for disseminating foremost experience in working with NCO's. The regimental staff stands aloof from this work.

The new training year is gathering tempo with each passing day. Lessons must be learned from the first classes and from those discrepancies at the start which are still occurring in a number of subunits. All steps must be taken for more precise planning of company and battery schedules and combat training must be continued in an organized manner by displaying constant concern for the methods proficiency of class instructors, including the NCO's.

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CSO: 1801/079



## GROUND FORCES

### TOLUBKO ARTICLE FOR ROCKET AND ARTILLERY TROOPS DAY

Moscow AGITATOR ARMY I FLOTA in Russian No 19, Oct 81 (signed to press 28 Sep 81)  
pp 1-6

[Article by Arm Gen V. F. Tolubko, deputy minister of defense of USSR, CIC of Strategic Missile Forces, Hero of Socialist Labor, delegate to 26th CPSU Congress: "Reliable Guardian of the Land of Soviets"]

[Text] Each year on 19 November the Soviet people and Army and Navy personnel widely celebrate a traditional holiday, Rocket and Artillery Troops Day. According to established tradition, on this day our country extols the frontlinesmen's exploits for the sake of the Motherland, honors its famed missilemen and artillerymen who are worthy successors of the combat glory and heroic traditions of Soviet artillery, and do justice to our remarkable scientists, designers, engineers, technicians and workers of the defense industry--creators of the powerful missile and artillery weapons.

It was on this November day in 1942 that the powerful salvos of 15,000 guns, mortars and rocket launchers heralded the beginning of the Soviet Army counteroffensive, grandiose in its scope and importance, at the walls of heroic Stalingrad, after which there was a fundamental turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War and World War II as a whole.

This year the traditional holiday of missilemen and artillerymen is being celebrated in an atmosphere of unprecedented political and labor enthusiasm of all our people caused by the inspiring effect of the ideas and resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

The personnel of our famed Armed Forces, like all Soviet citizens, fervently and unanimously support and approve the Leninist course of our native party. They see their patriotic and international duty in vigilantly protecting the great achievements of socialism and always being ready to offer a crushing rebuff to any aggressor.

The Communist Party and Soviet government struggle persistently and consistently for peace, for a relaxation of tensions, and for prevention of a new world war and armed conflicts. Army and Navy personnel took in with great attention Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 5th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation, and the USSR Supreme Soviet address "To Parliaments and Peoples of the World." These documents take on ever-increasing importance today, when the world situation is becoming seriously complicated.

Militant militaristic circles headed by American imperialism began an arms race unprecedented in scope. They are avoiding in every way talks about checking it, about eliminating centers of military tension and about the peaceful solution of controversial international problems. Their feverish militaristic activities are aimed at disrupting the military balance which has formed in the world and changing by any means the relative strengths in their own favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to the detriment of international detente and the security of nations. The U.S. administration recently undertook one more extremely dangerous step toward a further fanning of the threat of outbreak of a nuclear war. President Reagan issued instructions for the full-scale production of neutron weapons, the most inhuman variety of mass destruction weapons. It is indicative that this decision, which threatens general peace, was made on 6 August, on that very day when the first American atomic bomb was detonated over Hiroshima 36 years ago. It is obvious that the very same cannibalistic instincts now predominate in the White House by which then President Truman was guided in 1945 in issuing the order for employing atomic weapons. The alarm generated everywhere by the U.S. president's dangerous decision is intensified even more in connection with statements by U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, who is issuing interviews and statements right and left extolling the neutron bomb. Reagan's decision cannot be viewed as other than a challenge to world public opinion.

Under these conditions the Communist Party considers it to be its sacred duty to continue conducting a steadfast policy of curbing the forces of war and aggression and strengthening general peace. It has done and will do everything necessary for a further strengthening of the defenses of the Soviet state and the entire socialist community. No one should have any doubt that our party will do everything to ensure that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union continue to possess all necessary means for performing their responsible constitutional mission of being a reliable guardian over the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of general peace.

Personnel of the Rocket and Artillery Troops make a worthy contribution to accomplishment of this historic mission. Misslemen and artillerymen, as well as all Army and Navy personnel, are obligated by their grand traditions above all to the Communist Party and its tireless work of creating, developing and strengthening the USSR Armed Forces.

Soviet artillery began its combat career in the October days of 1917. In the Civil War years the Communist Party and its leader, V. I. Lenin, devoted constant attention to the establishment and development of this combat arm in resolving problems of military organizational development.

Our artillery honorably withstood a severe test of combat maturity in repulsing the first invasion of international imperialism against the young Soviet republic in fierce battles of the Civil War at Tsaritsyn, Ufa, Petrograd, Volochayevka and Kakhovka, in the assault on Perekop, and in many other battles.

Having defended the Great October's achievements against the interventionists and White Guards, our people began creative work under the direction of the Leninist Party to reorganize society on a socialist basis. At the same time, the Communist Party and Soviet government were taking steps to strengthen national defenses, improve the Armed Forces and prepare them to repulse any aggression.

The prewar five-year plans were an important stage in accomplishing this task. The ever-growing rates of economic growth and development of defense industry made it possible to carry out the re-equipping of all combat arms. Soviet artillery also saw further development. The average annual production of all types of guns rose from 2,540 in 1930-1933 to 6,130 guns in 1934-1938. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Army had in the inventory 91,493 guns and mortars of various calibers. Field rocket artillery--our renowned "Katyusha's"--was formed.

Soviet scientists and designers A. A. Blagonravov, V. G. Grabin, I. I. Ivanov, F. F. Petrov and others made a great contribution to outfitting the Red Army with artillery weapons and combat equipment.

The Great Patriotic War--the fiercest of all wars ever experienced by our Motherland--was a stern test and comprehensive check of the firmness of the Soviet multinational state and its Armed Forces.

In the very first battles Hitler's Army fully tested the strength, courage and steadfastness of Soviet soldiers, including artillerymen.

For example, in July 1941 the fascists lost some 300 tanks, chiefly to the fire of our artillery, near the city of Shyaulay. In the very first month of fighting at Lutsk and Novograd-Volynskiy the 1st Antitank Brigade, then commanded by Maj Gen K. S. Moskalenko, and the 5th Brigade commanded by Col A. A. Gusev destroyed over 400 enemy tanks.

In one sector of the Southern Front antitank gunner Ya. Kol'chak knocked out four tanks. The courageous soldier was the first of the artillerymen in the war years to be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In July 1941 the enemy felt the strength and might of Soviet rocket artillery. Missilemen of the battery commanded by Capt I. A. Flerov were the first to open the chronicle of combat exploits in firing a salvo against the fascists at the railroad junction of Orsha.

A special place in the annals of heroic deeds of artillerymen is held by the Battle of Moscow, where the fascists were dealt a crushing defeat and the myth about the invincibility of Hitler's Army was dispelled. Thirteen artillery units were awarded the guards title for steadfastness and stubbornness shown in the defense of Moscow and during the subsequent offensive.

The artillerymen made themselves famous forever in defense of the city-heroes of Moscow and Leningrad, Odessa and Sevastopol', Minsk and Kiev, Stalingrad and Tula, Smolensk and Kerch'. The artillery was the steel shield of the Land of Soviets against which the furious attacks by enemy tank and infantry units were broken up.

The Soviet government gave high praise to the artillerymen's exploits and to their military valor and heroism in the Motherland's defense in the Great Patriotic War. Over 1,800 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 1.6 million were awarded orders and medals, and over 500 artillery units and combined units were awarded a guards designation.

The Great Patriotic War ended with a victory over Hitler Germany. The Soviet people began peaceful construction. Our Armed Forces were not back in the rear.

But aggressive circles of the imperialist states took advantage of the temporary U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons to begin preparations for a new world war, and they began to foster plans for attacking the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Under these conditions the Communist Party and Soviet government were forced to take a number of steps to strengthen national defenses.

Some U.S. figures believed that the Soviet Union would need 15-20 years to create atomic weapons. But as early as 1947 our government declared that the atomic bomb was no secret for the Soviet Union, and in August 1949 our country conducted an experimental detonation of an atomic device. The U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons had been eliminated. Soon Soviet scientists, engineers, technicians and workers of the atomic industry won a new major victory: In August 1953 we successfully conducted tests of one of the types of a hydrogen bomb earlier than in the United States.

The successful test of the first multistage intercontinental ballistic missile in the world in 1957 was an outstanding event in the development of Soviet missile construction. This marked the end of military invulnerability of the United States, the chief bulwark of imperialism.

Such a far-sighted CPSU policy permitted the Soviet people to create nuclear missile weapons in a short period of time in the difficult postwar period in response to the increasing intrigues of imperialism, thus immeasurably augmenting the defensive might of our state and countries of the socialist community.

Prominent Soviet scientists and designers K. E. Tsiolkovskiy, N. I. Tikhomirov, F. A. Tsander, S. P. Korolev, M. K. Yangel', V. P. Glushko, G. N. Babakin and many others made a great contribution to the creation of Soviet missile technology.

Equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces with nuclear missile weapons caused a genuine revolution in military affairs. The organizational structure and the entire tenor of life and work of the troops were subjected to fundamental changes.

The decision of the CPSU CC and Soviet government on creating a new branch of the Soviet Armed Forces--the Strategic Missile Forces--which was made in December 1959 was the most striking expression of these changes. The Strategic Missile Forces now represent the chief component of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Today they have in their inventory the most sophisticated missile systems with high tactical and technical specifications and performance characteristics. These missiles are capable of delivering nuclear warheads of colossal power to the target quickly and reliably and inflicting irresistible strikes against the aggressor no matter where he may be.

The Missile Forces are in constant combat readiness thanks to the daily concern of the Communist Party and Soviet people. Even in peacetime they are performing a combat mission of state importance and continuously are in operational readiness.

Combat capabilities of other branches of the Soviet Armed Forces also have grown in recent years. The Ground Forces, outfitted with operational-tactical and tactical missiles, have enormous fire and shock power and high maneuver capabilities. Combat capabilities of missile and artillery systems of the Air Defense Forces, Air Forces and Navy have grown immeasurably.



But no matter how powerful contemporary military equipment is, the ideologically persuaded individual who expertly masters his entrusted weapons and is morally prepared for any tests for the sake of achieving victory has been and remains master of the equipment and the deciding force in war.

In the CPSU CC Report to the 26th party congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "A firm alloy of high technical outfitting, military proficiency and indestructible morale--that is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces. . . . And each time the interests of national security and defense of peace require it, when it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a selfless, courageous patriot and internationalist, ready to overcome any difficulties."

Better trained people are coming into the missile and artillery units each year. Our forces now have over 70 percent of privates and NCO's with a higher or secondary education. Over 75 percent of officers in the Missile Forces have engineer training and over 90 percent of them are rated specialists and genuine masters of missile affairs. The presence of such an officer corps, which is at the level of modern demands of military theory and practice, serves as a guarantee for new successes in improving the combat proficiency of all personnel. As always, the party and Komsomol members are in the lead. They are that combat nucleus which consolidates the military collectives and mobilizes the personnel for achieving high indicators in combat and political training and strengthening military discipline.

Missilemen and artillerymen, like all Soviet Armed Forces personnel, constantly sense the unremitting attention and concern of our party's Central Committee, the Politburo and of CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally. He has visited missile and artillery units repeatedly. In 1978 Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev was present at an exercise of a missile unit in the vicinity of Novosibirsk during his trip through parts of Siberia and the Far East, and he gave his praise to the missilemen's actions.

In response to the party's paternal concern, missilemen and artillerymen are steadfastly improving military proficiency, persistently mastering the sophisticated combat equipment and weapons, strengthening discipline and efficiency, and increasing vigilance and combat readiness. They are celebrating their traditional holiday with the successful conclusion of the training year and with new achievements in combat and political training and in fulfillment of socialist pledges.

Personnel of the missile unit commanded by Lt Col I. Shelestov are in the vanguard of socialist competition. At the beginning of the current training year the unit was first in the Strategic Missile Forces to come out with a call to begin socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress. This initiative found fervent support among missilemen, and a struggle broke out among the troops for marking the year at the 26th party congress with the highest combat readiness and with full military order. Training results attest to the fact that the missilemen are keeping their word firmly and are confidently heading toward their planned goals. The unit has 60 percent of subunits and 55 percent of combat teams which have become outstanding.

Missilemen and artillerymen of the units and subunits where officers Yu. Zhuravlev, G. Kuznetsov, A. Belyakov, V. Orlov, N. Bogachev, Yu. Isvetkov, M. Ilyashenko and other officers serve have arrived at their traditional holiday with high results.

In celebrating Rocket and Artillery Troops Day, missilemen and artillerymen are imbued even deeper with a feeling of high personal responsibility for reliable defense of the creative labor of the Soviet people and of our socialist achievements. We are taught this by the great Lenin, the Communist Party and lessons of history. This stems from features of the present-day very complex and acute situation in the world.

Our Army is an offspring of the most advanced social system, socialism. It is a military organization of a new, higher, socialist type, formed for defense of the revolutionary achievements of the working class and all working people, and the very fact of such an army's existence acts as a warning to those who love military adventures.

Together with all Soviet people, Army and Navy personnel fervently and unanimously approve and completely support the consistent and purposeful work of the CPSU CC, Politburo and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally aimed at relaxing international tension and at the full and guaranteed exclusion of the use of thermonuclear weapons and other latest means of mass destruction.

Every missileman and artilleryman is inspired by the awareness that, in vigilantly guarding the peaceful labor of the people, the Soviet Armed Forces thus are making and will continue to make their tangible contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and international security, and will contribute to implementation of the magnificent plans outlined by the historic 26th CPSU Congress.

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## NAVAL FORCES

### GUIDED MISSILE BOATS IN THE 'ZAPAD-81' EXERCISE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 20, Oct 81 (signed to press 5 Oct 81) pp 26-32

[Article by Capt 2d Rank P. Kuznetsov and Sr Lt M. Lukanin: "True to the Traditions of Heroes"]

[Text] Having visited an excellent-rated division of guided missile patrol boats, one has a sharper perception of everything connected with the heroic deeds of the men of the Baltic Fleet during the Great Patriotic War. When you enter a combat glory room, where relics and exhibits are gathered, attesting to the high degree of military skill, unbending courage and unparalleled valor of the combat veterans; when you enter a tree-lined lane, where a torpedo boat stands mounted on a pedestal, the boat commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union Capt-Lt B. Ushchev, who was famed for bold, victorious attacks; when you visit shore crew quarters and patrol boats, which contain display corners honoring the heroes of the Baltic Fleet, and where there are action stations which have received the honor of bearing their names -- everywhere one becomes convinced that today's defenders of our country's sea borders sacredly honor the memory of our heroes and are endeavoring to continue the tradition of military valor in a worthy manner. And one involuntarily recalls the warm words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev spoken from the rostrum at the 26th CPSU Congress: "The sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War today stand in the ranks of the defenders of the homeland. They have not experienced the harsh trials which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are true to the heroic traditions of our army and our people."

Today's guided missile patrol boat crews operate much more sophisticated combat equipment than that with which our combat veterans smashed the hated foe. But they are drawn together with the heroes of the past war by the highest dedication to the ideals of communism, the cause of our Leninist party and socialist homeland. All this is an inexhaustible life-giving source of their indomitable morale which, as was noted at the party congress, is a component part of the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The filial dedication to the Communist Party and the unswerving loyalty to heroic traditions on the part of Baltic Fleet guided missile patrol boat crews is clearly manifested in their deeds -- in irresistible missile attacks, in high-quality performance of combat training missions, and in decisive, bold actions at exercises. For 10 years now the division has borne the title of excellent. It has been

awarded a Lenin Certificate of Merit and a USSR Minister of Defense Pennant for courage and military valor. Six times this outstanding collective has won competitions in tactical and weapon training at the navy championships. This year as well, the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, the men are successfully accomplishing all assigned tasks. Guided missile boat crews also did an excellent job at the "Zapad-81" [West-81] exercise. Division personnel once again demonstrated a high level of naval combat proficiency and the ability to employ intelligently and effectively their potent weapons in the most complex situation.

The men prepared for this important exercise with particular thoroughness and enthusiasm, viewing it as a tough examination of combat maturity, as their report to the Communist Party and Soviet people on accomplishment of the tasks assigned by the 26th CPSU Congress on further strengthening the combat might of the Armed Forces. The entire content of party-political work conducted on naval ships was directed toward affirming in the consciousness of the men the ideas and demands of the party and a deep understanding of the fact that quality and effectiveness of military labor, firm discipline and organization, unremitting vigilance and constant combat readiness are dictated by the interests of national security. Achievement of such an understanding was promoted by party and Komsomol meetings, Lenin readings and lessons, political information sessions, special evening activities, get-togethers with war veterans, as well as other measures and vigorous work with individuals. The division's Communists, setting for themselves the goal of mobilizing the men, by personal example and persuasion, to achieve excellent accomplishment of missions at the exercise, generated a high level of aggressive enthusiasm in the collective.

Leader-Communists officers D. Ukrainets, N. Bayrak, V. Gridnev and others set the tone in lively, purposeful work with personnel. They effectively briefed personnel on missions assigned the division, organized socialist competition for their exemplary accomplishment, and guided the activities of party and Komsomol activists on a daily basis. At the initiative of the party bureau, division officers held a theoretical discussion, returning again and again to the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and USSR minister of defense regarding Armed Forces combat readiness and exchanged experience and know-how in the area of their practical implementation.

The activities of agitation-propaganda group members were distinguished during these days by aggressiveness and an innovative approach. Many of them presented interesting lectures to the men, discussing the successes of the Soviet people in accomplishing the targets of the first year of the 11th Five-Year Plan and the reasons for aggravation of the present international situation and the increased threat of war for our homeland and the nations of the socialist community, proceeding from U.S. imperialism and its NATO aggressive bloc allies, and the Beijing hegemonists. Extremely popular among the patrol boat crews were issues of the oral magazine "The Plans of the Party Are the Plans of the People," the film lecture series "Communists, Sons of the Century," and discussions in front of a map of the world.

Communists assigned a suitable place in all party-political work to dissemination of glorious fighting traditions and study of the invaluable war experience. At a meeting of personnel the men gave enthusiastic support to the initiative of the crew of the large amphibious landing ship "Krasnaya Presnya," who appealed to the



men of the Baltic Fleet to emulate the heroes of past battles in all things and to engage in a patriotic movement under the slogan "Emulate a Hero." Enlisted men, petty officers, warrant officers and officers adopted upgraded socialist pledges: to perform at the exercise just as in combat, to hit targets with the first missile or first round, and to display staunchness and resoluteness.

The patriotic enthusiasm and aggressive mood of the men was also fostered by discussion of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's book "Malaya Zemlya." Experience in party-political work, profound conclusions and syntheses from this outstanding work were adopted by officers, party and Komsomol activists. Capt 1st Rank (Ret) A. Bogdanov, former commanding officer of a division of torpedo boats, spoke at a military-scientific conference devoted to study of the experience of conduct of combat operations by torpedo boat crews in the Great Patriotic War. He cited many instructive examples from the war. Referring to the book "Malaya Zemlya," this war veteran reminded today's patrol boat commanders of a conclusion which was tested and proven in the flame of combat: "Everything does not proceed according to plan in war. Often battles turn out a little differently, and sometimes quite differently than was depicted on staff maps. In such situations valor, dedication and initiative on the part of each and every commander and political worker, each and every enlisted man become truly priceless."

The conferees cited many examples from their practical experience which confirm the current significance of this conclusion for the forthcoming exercise as well. In particular, they recalled the following incident. A complex tactical situation was created during a recent missile firing drill. The "aggressor" was maneuvering skillfully and employing jamming. Nevertheless the radar operators on the guided missile boat "Kaliningradskiy Komsomolets" were able to lock onto the target at maximum range. Its coordinates were immediately transmitted to other vessels participating in the attack, which were ready to initiate their attack run. Suddenly the unforeseen happened: the blip on the radar screen became two blips. Which one was the target? Which one should they fire at? We shall not go into a detailed analysis of the actions of Capt 3d Rank V. Gridnev; we shall merely note that they were genuinely decisive actions of initiative. And it was precisely the initiative of this commander-party member which ensured a successful shoot.

Summarizing the discussion, division commander Capt 3d Rank D. Ukrainets emphasized that both combat experience and his own experience convinced him that attacks at sea rarely proceed in precise conformity with the model of mock combat constructed back at base. And although it would seem that all possible variations of performance of missions at the forthcoming exercise had been worked out with the officers at brief tactical drills, nevertheless it was necessary to be prepared for an unexpected turn of events, an unforeseen situation change, when a decision must be made literally within seconds. Therefore each individual should be prepared to display initiative and to take a calculated risk.

And we must state that during the period of preparation for the exercise, party members did a great deal to form in the men initiative, responsibility, courage, staunchness and other moral-fighting qualities. That is not quite a true statement, however. It would be more accurate to word it as follows: not only on the eve of exercises but at all times, command authorities and the division party organization devote unabating attention to forming these valuable qualities in personnel and to instilling unyielding dedication to combat traditions.

loyalty to traditions and the endeavor to follow the example of heroes both on and off duty, just as any other moral standard of behavior, are not born spontaneously. They put down deep roots into heart and consciousness only when a person understands and feels the objective necessity, the spiritual sources and moral beauty of such behavior, when dedication to the homeland, courage and valor, willingness and ability to carry out orders at all costs are transformed from demands of regulations and moral ideals into convictions and character traits. Fiction and documentary literature, the press, radio and television, all types of art and the living word spoken by war veterans elevate and give attractive force to the deeds of heroes for today's defenders of the homeland. Division party and Komsomol activists extensively utilize all these means of heroic-patriotic indoctrination, but they give preference to personal contacts between servicemen and veterans of the Great Patriotic War. Recently missile boat crews have met Adm (Ret) Ya. Pochuyaylo, Capt 1st Rank (Ret) A. Bogdanov, WO (Ret) I. Ptitsyn and V. Konstantinov, plus other veterans.

It is one thing to read and quite another thing to hear from the lips of the direct participants, for example, the following war story.

...A fierce battle was in progress. The ground shook and the sea threw up columns of spray from shell and bomb bursts. A fascist cruiser and five destroyers were heavily shelling Soviet shore units, with intentions of putting a landing force ashore. Soon enemy aircraft appeared and released their bomb loads. Death awaited our bold warriors at every step. Blood turned cold in one's veins. At this time four torpedo boats surged boldly toward the enemy. They were led by Hero of the Soviet Union V. Gumanenko. Four patrol craft against six large warships! They swept forward. But they were not dashing forward blindly. They maneuvered adroitly, cheating death. The patrol boat commanders were able to give the only maneuver command which would avoid being hit by bombs. In that infernal hell the helmsmen and enginemen flawlessly controlled their equipment, instantly responding to orders. Under a hail of bullets and shell fragments, chief boatswain's mates Konstantinov, Kuznetsov, Yefimov, and Fomenko poured machinegun fire into the vultures. Afanas'yev's boat skillfully laid down a smoke screen. Gumanenko, who was on Lashchev's boat, attacked the cruiser together with Kremenskiy's boat. At the last minute the enemy executed a maneuver, turning its stern to the attack. Gumanenko instantly changed his tactics: he ordered Lashchev to attack from starboard and Kremenskiy from port. The cruiser once again attempted to take evasive action, but in vain -- one torpedo hit it. Another hit a nearby destroyer. While this was going on, Afanas'yev's and Naletov's boats were attacking the other destroyers. The fascists panicked and proceeded to run.

Four small torpedo boats gained victory over a cruiser and five destroyers which were being provided air cover by enemy aircraft. The story of this feat made an enormous impression on today's missile boat crews. They were also interested in what caused our navymen's victory. Veterans A. Bogdanov and V. Konstantinov replied in detail to this question as well: ideological conviction, belief in the righteousness of their cause, great love of the homeland, and military skill. This is what refueled the energy of the combat veterans, gave them boldness, courage and valor, and led them to face mortal danger squarely. The men also committed to memory the conclusion by the veterans that not much can be accomplished in battle without skill and obedience.

The activists had it figured correctly. The truthful word of the eyewitness, the participant in a combat feat convinces one that it is necessary to perform precisely in that manner in mock combat. Therefore both get-togethers with war veterans at the base and a message recorded on tape by Hero of the Soviet Union B. Usachev and sent at the request of the political worker, a message telling the men to hold high the honor and dignity of the torpedo boat crewmen, to act at the exercise as they would in combat, a message played over the boat's intercom system when they were at sea, plus competition for the right to be designated the followers of the finest specialists of the war years impelled the men to work with full output of resources and energy and to display staunchness and courage.

Sr Sn I, Kharin told us: "When I was in my training subunit I learned about the feat of PO 1st Class Mikhail Kormich, who saved his boat and crew at the cost of his own life. I endeavored mentally to put myself in his place. I asked myself: 'Could I have done the same thing?' And I endeavor to emulate this heroic petty officer. Serving on the guided missile boat on the rolls of which this Baltic Fleet hero is permanently entered carries a big obligation. Recently I told my family the happy news that I had won in the competition for the right to be called follower of PO 1st Class Mikhail Kormich."

There is a sequel to Senior Seaman Kharin's story. During a preparatory sea drill the commander of the engineering department performed what was akin to a heroic deed. Here is what happened. Gale-force winds were blowing. The boat was proceeding at full speed on a missile attack run. Suddenly the seaman noted that the vibration had caused the line feeding oil to the turbocompressor to rupture. There was no time to think. Kharin, informing his comrades of the problem, grabbed the hose with his hand to stop the stream of hot oil....

This ordinary lad of little more than 20 years of age responded as required by his military duty and his memory of the young men who had fought in the war.

This same duty and memory impelled PO 1st Class A. Sipavichus to master two occupational specialties in addition to his main one. And he really mastered them -- he has a first class rating in all three! Suffice it to say that a fine tradition -- to achieve a higher proficiency rating in one's principal and related occupational specialties -- was initiated in the fleet by missile boat crewmen. CPO A. Chekhlay was once first to report accomplishment of his target in competition. His bust is now on display in the fleet combat glory museum, alongside the busts and portraits of Baltic Fleet heroes. The traditions of skill and courage have truly found worthy followers in today's personnel. Many of the division's officers have been awarded government decorations -- the same as were awarded to war heroes for courage and valor.

As we see, commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol activists are doing everything to ensure that the convictions of personnel are transformed into deeds, resulting in a fusion of political awareness, discipline and combat skill. They work hard to ensure that party-political work is conducted continuously and is effective. This was the case both before and during the exercise. It was conducted in a comprehensive manner, encompassing all aspects of personnel combat training activities. The main emphasis was placed on moral-psychological conditioning, personnel special and tactical-weapon training. Communists taught their fellow

servicemen by personal example how maximally to make drills and exercises approximate a real combat situation, which demands of naval personnel swiftness of reaction, keenness of wit, ingenuity, and the ability to maintain composure in the most difficult conditions. Capt 3d Rank V. Gridnev, a party bureau member and acknowledged expert at delivering missile strikes, held for the boat commanders numerous demonstration attacks in the classroom and subsequently at sea as well.

We know that naval warfare tactics do not tolerate lack of originality, blind copying of the same techniques over and over. But we are also aware of another factor: initiative should be intelligent and conform to the general scheme, for otherwise it is a short step to inefficiency. Where is the boundary? Young officers received an answer to this question at a seminar held at the initiative of the party bureau. The discussion was a timely one, since some lieutenants had not been taking the trouble to work hard in their training. This was observed, for example, with Lt A. Filinshakov. At a time when preparations for missile firing were in full swing, he permitted himself to ignore the common concerns. The party bureau recommended that the Komsomol organization receive a report by this officer-Komsomol member and look into the reasons for his negligence.

Not only in such extreme cases do the division party and Komsomol organizations follow the practice of receiving reports from their members. Party activists have given a good deal of useful advice on preparation for missile firing activities, Capt-Lt V. Get'manskiy, for example, and they corrected party member WD V. Demidchik, who was not always exemplary in his discipline. On the instructions of the party bureau master proficiency rated Communists warrant officers Ye. Vinogradov, V. Torgashev and others shared with their colleagues their experience and know-how in reliably readying missiles for firing.

Patient work with each individual is the main feature of the work style of party members and Komsomol activists. So I. Muzafarov came to the fleet from sunny Tajikistan. This was the first time he had ever seen the sea, and he had a poor knowledge of Russian. The young serviceman was beset with doubts: would he be able to become accustomed to the sea, and would he be able to master the difficult military occupational specialty of missile crewman?

"Don't worry, Tadzhikhan," party member V. Torgashev tried to cheer up the desolate conscript. "Many of us, just as you, began with zero, but we now have a total mastery of the missile system. The main thing is try, and we shall help."

And they did help, supporting him daily and hourly. Muzafarov later calculated that if one added up the time spent by WD V. Torgashev, So B. Mostovoy and other activists on his development, it would total at least half a year. The result is skill and sober calculation in the actions of Komsomol member Seaman Muzafarov in what psychologists call a stress situation. Prior to the exercise, at a preparatory missile firing, when only seconds remained before the missile was to be fired, the commander was informed that things were not going smoothly with the missile crewman. But the commander did not have time to determine at that moment what the problem was; he immediately received a report that they were ready to fire. He later learned that those few seconds were quite enough for Seaman Muzafarov to find the cause of the problem and correct it.





the guided missile boats traversed the mine channels and performed combat training missions in the same places where the crews of Heroes of the Soviet Union M. Vashchey, V. Gerasimov, S. Ushakov, and A. Alamedov had smashed the Hitlerites during the war. . . . Party and Komsomol activists regularly informed the men about those past victorious battles and the feats accomplished by the men of the Baltic Fleet. They regularly briefed the men on the overall course of the "West 81" exercise and the actions of the motorized riflemen, tankers, artillerymen, and airmen in the attack. All this impelled the guided missile boat crews to work with redoubled energy.

The situation at the exercise was a complex one, with a great many unexpected developments of events and sudden scenario changes. En route to the objective area, in the concentration area, and subsequently at the height of the naval "engagement," division personnel were compelled to repulse attacks by "aggressor" aircraft and patrol craft, to combat the "mine threat," and to cross radioactive "contamination" zones.

But "combat" with a detachment of warships proved to be the most difficult mission for the missile boat crews. "Aggressor" force superiority and abilities demanded of the division commander and commanders of the missile boats as well as all crew members a high degree of tactical skills, bold initiative, and resolute actions. And they proved that they have an abundance of these qualities. The missiles fired by the crew of Capt. 1st Rank V. Gribnev's boat hit the target with great accuracy.

Successfully accomplishing all assigned missions at the exercise, the guided missile boat crewmen once again confirmed their loyalty to the traditions of the war heroes and their preparedness reliably to defend the security of the homeland.

CONTINUED. "Doklady Voenno-Morskoy Flota", 1981

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MILITARY SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES

#### INSTRUCTION OF ALLIED SOLDIERS: OVERSIGHT EFFORTS DISCUSSED

ISSUES PERTAINING TO WORKING OUT THE BILL In Russian No. 20, Oct. 64 (signed for press 7 Oct. 1964) No. 57

article by candidate of Pedagogic Sciences Capt 1st Rank P. Ostodov, senior instructor, Social Sciences Department, Propaganda and Agitation Directorate, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Rapportage of the Military Education: Ways to Improve It"

[Text] Noting the successes of the Soviet system of higher and secondary special school education, the 26th CPSU Congress at the same time emphasized that a great deal within this system must be and can be improved. This applied first and foremost to improving the quality of teaching and strengthening the link between the curricular process and practical activities. Toward this end, it was noted in the report, it is necessary more fully to utilize the scientific potential of higher educational institutions, from which proceed quite specific tasks pertaining to further increasing the professionalism of the faculty of military educational institutions.

In recent years such work has become considerably expanded and improved in both regular and correspondence graduate study, in advanced training curricula, and directly at service academies and schools. Matters pertaining to improving teaching skill are regularly discussed at higher educational institution councils and at departmental meetings. Work with various categories of faculty personnel is being conducted in a more differentiated manner: with novice teaching faculty and with young faculty members lacking laboratory training. The efforts of political agencies and party organizations are directed toward boosting their level of qualifications, which has a positive influence on the level of instruction and indoctrination of enrolled personnel.

At the same time practical realities are imposing new and higher demands on this realm. The CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree entitled "On Further Development of Higher Educational Institutions and Improving the Quality of Specialist Training" points to the necessity of ensuring that each and every instructor works daily to expand his political and cultural horizons and serves as an example of a high level of communist moral fiber, party-mindedness, an innovative attitude toward labor, moral purity and nobility. This is dictated by a number of factors. In conditions of developed socialism, higher educational institutions are called upon not only to provide specialists with a high level of







development of students' self-esteem. On the other hand, while promoting self-esteem will be beneficial to students' academic and social growth, it is not an end in itself. It is important to ensure that students' self-esteem is not inflated and that they are not over-reliant on external validation.

It has long been recognized that one of the most important factors in a student's academic success is their self-esteem. Self-esteem is a person's overall sense of self-worth and value. It is a feeling of confidence and belief in one's abilities. Self-esteem is not a fixed trait; it can be developed and strengthened through various means. One of the most effective ways to build self-esteem is through positive feedback and encouragement. Teachers and parents should provide specific praise for students' efforts and achievements, rather than general statements like "good job" or "well done". This helps students understand what they did well on and encourages them to repeat those behaviors. Another important factor in building self-esteem is setting realistic goals and expectations. Students should be encouraged to set goals that are challenging but achievable. When they achieve these goals, they should be praised and encouraged to set even higher goals. This process helps students develop a sense of accomplishment and confidence in their abilities. It is also important to teach students how to deal with failure. Failure is a natural part of learning, and it should be viewed as an opportunity to learn and grow, rather than a reflection of one's worth. Teachers and parents should help students understand that failure is not a permanent state and that they can always improve themselves. By providing positive feedback, setting realistic goals, and teaching students how to deal with failure, teachers and parents can help their students develop a strong sense of self-esteem, which will be beneficial to their academic and social growth.

The primary purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between self-esteem and academic achievement. The study will focus on the following research questions: (1) What is the relationship between self-esteem and academic achievement? (2) How does self-esteem affect academic achievement? (3) What factors influence self-esteem? (4) How can self-esteem be improved? The study will use a quantitative research design to collect data from a sample of students. The data will be analyzed using statistical methods to determine the relationship between self-esteem and academic achievement.

The study will also explore the role of self-esteem in the learning process. It will investigate how self-esteem affects students' motivation, effort, and persistence. It will also explore how self-esteem affects students' social interactions and relationships. The study will use a qualitative research design to collect data from a sample of students. The data will be analyzed using thematic analysis to identify themes related to self-esteem and its impact on learning. The study will also explore the role of self-esteem in the learning process. It will investigate how self-esteem affects students' motivation, effort, and persistence. It will also explore how self-esteem affects students' social interactions and relationships. The study will use a qualitative research design to collect data from a sample of students. The data will be analyzed using thematic analysis to identify themes related to self-esteem and its impact on learning. The study will also explore the role of self-esteem in the learning process. It will investigate how self-esteem affects students' motivation, effort, and persistence. It will also explore how self-esteem affects students' social interactions and relationships. The study will use a qualitative research design to collect data from a sample of students. The data will be analyzed using thematic analysis to identify themes related to self-esteem and its impact on learning.

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scientific research work opens up exceptional opportunities for increasing the educational science knowledgeability of military educators. A teacher who is working actively in this area is well acquainted with literature on the subject of specialization and related subject areas, actively incorporates research results into the teaching and indoctrination process, and teaches theory and practice of military scientific work to his students. In short, he constantly enriches his knowledge and develops in himself the natural need to keep up with all new developments, critically to evaluate completed work, and to improve his skills. The majority of teaching personnel at service academies and schools are of this type. At the same time, as inspections indicate, some teachers view scientific work only as preparation of dissertations. If one considers the fact that the realm of research includes writing scientific papers, performance of particular research in one's own higher educational institution in the interests of improving the teaching process, as well as efficiency, innovation, invention, and guidance of student military scientific activity, it will become obvious that practically every educator can make his contribution to the common cause.

Departmental party organizations are called upon to make a large contribution toward improving the pedagogic skills of teaching personnel. Party members at military educational institutions, and particularly departments of social sciences, have already done a great deal to raise the level and increase the effectiveness of teaching, to arm students and cadets with Marxist-Leninist methodology, to form deep ideological convictions in them, and to prepare them for active work in their units. Departments of military-technical and social subjects have begun devoting greater attention to problems of ideology and to the ideological theoretical thrust of classes. In many party organizations at military educational institutions matters pertaining to improving teaching skills are not only discussed in a general way, but party member reports on ideological-theoretical growth and improvement of professional skills and personal exemplariness are received on a regular basis. Party members are doing a great deal for dissemination of advanced know-how and giving daily assistance to young teachers in their development.

Improvement in one's professional skills is the constant concern of every educator. V. I. Lenin stated: "Theoretical knowledge, political experience, and organizational ability will all come with time. One merely needs the desire to learn and to develop the requisite qualities" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [complete works], Vol. 3, page 360). Practical experience also indicates that the effectiveness of all measures directed toward resolving this problem depends on the degree to which each educator is aware of the necessity of self-improvement and strives toward it.

The majority of teachers work conscientiously and effectively on boosting their ideological-theoretical and professional level. Unfortunately at many military educational institutions an increasing number of departmental staffs the duty load of military educators fails to meet the demands of its scientific organization. As a rule deficiencies in this area are a consequence of certain shortcomings on the part of those who direct the teaching process and, consequently, can certainly be corrected by purposeful organizational efforts. It is essential to utilize to full measure the advanced know-how of educational institutions which have achieved comprehensive improvement in the professional skills of their teaching faculty. ↗

Every teacher performs a great many teaching and indoctrination tasks every day. Concentrated at the focal point of the teacher's activities are political and

general cultural level, knowledge of one's subject and teaching skills, the personality of the student, and concrete conditions and circumstances which are unique in each case. And he always needs an innovative approach to things, intelligent selection and optimal application of forms, methods, techniques and devices with teaching and indoctrination effect on students. Precisely such comprehensive professionalism predetermines the honored role of the military educator in training highly skilled officer cadres and, consequently, the necessary level of organized efforts to carry out the demands of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree entitled "On Further Development of Higher Educational Institutions and Improving the Quality of Training Specialists."

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On the other hand, planning reflected the reality of the fact that the U.S. could not afford to support the war in Vietnam and to maintain its position in the world. The United States was forced to withdraw its troops from Vietnam in 1973. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Cuba in 1962. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Laos in 1973. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1973. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Laos in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam in 1975.

As we know, in 1971 the United States was forced to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Laos in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Laos in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam in 1975.

However, the United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Laos in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Laos in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Laos in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from Cambodia in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from North Vietnam in 1975. The United States was also forced to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam in 1975.

On 5 August 1970 the New York Times reported that there were signs of a new movement in the United States. The movement was said to be a new movement in the United States. The movement was said to be a new movement in the United States. The movement was said to be a new movement in the United States. The movement was said to be a new movement in the United States. The movement was said to be a new movement in the United States. The movement was said to be a new movement in the United States. The movement was said to be a new movement in the United States. The movement was said to be a new movement in the United States. The movement was said to be a new movement in the United States.

This concept, called the "New U.S. nuclear strategy," is a new concept in the United States. The concept is called the "New U.S. nuclear strategy." The concept is called the "New U.S. nuclear strategy." The concept is called the "New U.S. nuclear strategy." The concept is called the "New U.S. nuclear strategy." The concept is called the "New U.S. nuclear strategy." The concept is called the "New U.S. nuclear strategy." The concept is called the "New U.S. nuclear strategy." The concept is called the "New U.S. nuclear strategy."

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Not only that, but the United States has always been a great power. The United States has always been a great power. The United States has always been a great power. The United States has always been a great power. The United States has always been a great power. The United States has always been a great power. The United States has always been a great power. The United States has always been a great power. The United States has always been a great power. The United States has always been a great power.



addition, support of the author for conducting fieldwork for the purpose of collecting data illustrating both positive and negative phenomena. An example is: I conducted a study recently, on adult men for indications of the appearance of such symptoms as the presence of the latent variable and the other DSM criteria. It also suggests, the latent variable factor will have an effect observed in multiple conditions (e.g., some of them).

2018 will be another year marked as a significant challenge for the people of the world. The solution for the long movement to ensure individual protection of justice remains.

The authors have treated the novel subject thoroughly. The chapters consider the employment of the randomized Fourier transform, an exact test, power, the median test, a new distribution approximation which helps people use the  $\chi^2$  test of goodness of fit more widely, the  $\chi^2$  distribution given by some early workers, the "graphical approach" which has been published elsewhere and which is useful in many cases, and the  $\chi^2$  test of fit to a continuous distribution. But this concise presentation of modern topics is highly instructive and useful.

the U.S. military-industrial complex doctrine in spending some place "which guarantees national prestige for the maintenance of advanced weapons." For example, the U.S. budget rose 140,000 dollars in 1948, the government paid 10 billion dollars a year by 1951 for the U.S., while it will pay 200 billion dollars by 1960 (U.S. budget). According to the will of the government, the budget administration is producing a "comprehensive bookkeeping system for the economy." In the total, the "new system" will continue will take one and a half trillion dollars from the taxpayer's pocket. The entire propaganda campaign about the "social military threat" is growing under the an increase in military expenditures, and this is not surprising. After 1948, one of the authors of the policy of "cold war" of the 1940's, recommended to the U.S. propaganda machine that in order to fulfill the mission to keep the system of international financial control under "it is necessary to create the impression of a common front against." And now the Pentagon has decided to revive the strategy for post-1945 "social military threat," recently announcing publication of a special book - "The military, allegedly contributing towards the independence" but in fact will do the job of the defense.

The ship was converted to the Metric System, implemented in 1970. In addition, not only the metric system, but also the date computations, including leap-year calculations, is included in the fixed schedule of computations. The position, called by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, the Oxford Science Operations, implemented 1,100 arbitrary units and is called, named by Oxford Day, history and mathematics in the University of water chemistry = 1991 January 10, 1992 and 1993 January 10, 1994. There are no units, except at Oxford at Oxford, which include the Oxford Unit.

and more complex way extended not only speaking the Dutch. Recently the situation has been further complicated by various documents from European governments, dated 1970, which explicitly state that "the Indonesian government has strategic interests in Australia." Great Britain, United States, Russia, China, Japan, and other super-powers follow a similar line and suggest that 1961 provides for autonomous and free decisions in economic matters in Western Europe. Under "imperialism" a "free market"



Contained in this high praise is a warning to all fanciers of military adventures. We threaten nobody. But we have plenty to defend, the men to defend it, and plenty with which to defend it!

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